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Foreword
This is the final report on the project titled “Farm Service Agency Direct Farm Loan Program Effectiveness
Study” funded through Cooperative State Research, Extension, and Education Service (CSREES) award number 2004-39528-14476 between the Farm Service Agency (FSA) and the Department of Agricultural
Economics and Agribusiness at the University of Arkansas, Division of Agriculture, Fayetteville.
The first part of the report focuses on Objective 1 of the study, which is to identify groups being served by
FSA Direct Farm Loan Programs. This objective is concerned with how consistently FSA is serving its various targeted groups relative to its mission. The second part of this report discusses the results of Objective 2,
which examines the length of time borrowers remain in the FSA Direct Farm Loan Programs and how frequently direct borrowers “graduate” to conventional sources of credit. Part three of the report considers
Objective 3, which measures and examines ways of reducing loan subsidy rates. The scope of Objective 3 is
limited to identifying ways to lower loan reorganization and default costs.
In accordance with the contract stipulations for the funding of this project, a preliminary report was submitted to FSA on July 29, 2004. Partial findings on Objective 1 were given in the preliminary report. The present report revises some of the findings in the preliminary report and provides additional findings. Charles
Dodson and Steven Koenig of FSA provided comments on the preliminary report and a draft of the final
report. Many of their comments have been incorporated into this report.
Data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and the Economic Research Service (ERS)
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) provide vital information for this study. Farm population counts from NASS and detailed financial characteristics of FSA loan recipients by relevant groupings
from the ARMS were vital to this study. We acknowledge the assistance of James Burt of NASS and Charles
Dodson of FSA in obtaining Census of Agriculture data. We acknowledge and extend our appreciation to
Robert Dubman of ERS who has been extraordinarily helpful in processing the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the ERS and the University of Arkansas, in constructing data sets used by the research
team at the Arkansas Agricultural Statistics Office in Little Rock, Arkansas, and also in providing statistical
computations that eased the team’s computational burdens. We thank Charles Dodson and Steven Koenig of
FSA for their guidance and assistance at various stages of the project. The team also wishes to thank Ben
Klugh and Doug Rundle of the Arkansas Agricultural Statistics Office who provided expertise, access, and a
work environment conducive to analysis of the ARMS data set in their Little Rock offices. Edward Gbur and
Kevin Thompson of the University of Arkansas Division of Agriculture provided much-appreciated statistical expertise. Many FSA personnel provided help in this study. In particular, we thank Connie Holman,
Charles Dodson, Steve Koenig, Kathleen Miller, Lonnie Ewing, Rebecca Carpenter, Veldon Hall, Ed Zera, Jim
Bolego, and Ellen Sachs and her DLPESA group who coordinated and implemented the FSA borrower survey.
We also thank Nan Ma, our graduate research assistant, for preparing the GIS maps and other technical assistance. The technical editing provided by Camilla Romund is appreciated. Responsibility for errors in analysis and interpretation of findings lies solely with the research team.
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Executive Summary
This final report presents the results of an independent,
performance-focused review of the effectiveness of Farm
Service Agency (FSA) Direct Farm Loan Programs (FLPs)
as requested by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) in the 2005 Passback for FSA. The study focuses
on FSA’s direct Farm Ownership (FO), Farm Operating
(OL), and Emergency (EM) loan programs.

The analysis within the report draws primarily on four distinct data sources for two time periods. Data on individual loans from FSA loan making and servicing databases
were obtained for fiscal years (FY) 1994–1996 and FY
2000–2003. The other three sources are USDA’s
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) for
2000–2003, the 2002 Census of Agriculture, and a survey
designed by the research team and administered by FSA
staff of a sample of direct loans originated in FY
1994–1996.

The study has three major objectives: (1) identify groups
being served by FSA Direct Farm Loan Programs, (2)
examine the length of time borrowers remain in the direct
FLPs and the proportion of borrowers who exit or “graduate” from the programs, and (3) measure and identify ways
of reducing loan subsidy rates. The first objective required
examining characteristics and creditworthiness of recent
borrowers to determine if they are consistent with the
creditworthiness of groups targeted by the direct FLP mission. The second objective measured duration of loans
and how many borrowers exited FLPs and graduated to
commercial sources of credit. The third objective emphasized reducing FSA’s loan restructuring and default costs.

Objective 1: Identify Groups Being Served
by FSA Farm Loan Programs

• Direct FLPs are primarily serving family-sized farms. An
estimated 78–92 percent of FLP Direct Loan recipients in
FY 2000–2003 were farms with annual gross sales less than
$250,000, a common definition for a small farm. The caps
on the total amount of indebtedness a borrower can incur
in the programs plus loan eligibility criteria appear to
ensure that the clienteles of these programs are consistent
with FSA’s mission. Most borrowers had weak financial
characteristics and would likely have had difficulty obtaining loans elsewhere.

This independent study was undertaken by a team of
researchers in the Department of Agricultural Economics
and Agribusiness at the University of Arkansas, Division of
Agriculture, Fayetteville. The award for the project contract (CSREES Award number 2004-39528-14476) was
finalized on June 14, 2004, with the goal of having a final
report by June 2005. A preliminary report on the first
objective was delivered to FSA’s FLP staff on July 29, 2004.
Where feasible, FSA worked conscientiously with the
research team by providing data and explanations as
requested. FSA also provided reviews of the preliminary
report and an early draft of this final report. While the
team appreciated and incorporated many of the reviewers’
suggestions, this report is independent and is the sole
responsibility of the research team. Responsibility for
errors in analysis or interpretation of findings lies solely
with the research team.

• There is substantial geographical dispersion in the intensity of FLP loan use by loan type (FO, OL and EM). Loan
size (principal) also differs among regions. The regional
dispersion of FO and OL loans appears driven, in part, by
the distribution of farmers eligible for FSA Direct Loans.
In this report, EM loans are not evenly distributed geographically because demand for these loans was driven primarily by the location and intensity of natural disasters
during the study period.

• Approximately 37 percent of all U.S. farms are estimated
as the target market for FSA Direct Loans when farm size,
credit needs, years of farming experience, and farming as
an occupation rather than a hobby are taken into account.
This is due largely to the large number of “hobby farms”
that are not the target of FLPs.

v
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ers are clustered. In these regions a higher percentage of
loans go to SDA borrowers than in the northern regions.
Average national market penetration of SDA loans is 4.6
percent compared with a penetration ratio of 3.7 percent
in the family farm market. Hence, penetration is greater
for SDA operators than the overall family market.

• Market penetration, measured as the proportion of the
target market for FSA Direct Loans that actually received
FSA Direct Loans for FY 2000–2003, varies considerably
across states, with the national average rate for all direct
loans being 3.7 percent. Rates for any of the major FSA
cohorts are below six percent. The majority of the states
have rates less than 8.0 percent, ranging from 0.4 percent
to 21.5 percent. These penetration levels may seem low
but penetration as defined in this study refers only to borrowers originating new loans during FY 2000–2003. Based
on estimates from ARMS data, market penetration
increases by approximately a factor of five if all existing
FSA FLP borrowers are included. Increased market penetration would require more obligation allocation or smaller
loan amounts.

• In general, race-based SDA borrowers appear to be financially comparable to non-SDA farmers, except for SDA
race borrowers being more solvent. FSA targeting has,
most probably, enabled more SDA borrowers to obtain
FSA credit than they otherwise would. Targeting beginning
farmers likely restricts allocations available to non-beginning farmer borrowers.

• SDA gender (female) farms exhibit statistically significant differences in financial characteristics from both the
non-SDA and SDA race farms. SDA gender farms are significantly smaller and exhibit significantly less income but
higher solvency than non-SDA farms. Differences in liquidity, repayment capacity, and financial efficiency
between the two groups are not statistically significant.
FSA Direct Loan market penetration for female farms is
2.6 percent.

• FSA borrowers are in a weaker financial position (less
creditworthy) than their non-FSA (farms with no FSA
debt) counterparts as indicated by lower farm solvency,
liquidity, repayment capacity, and financial efficiency.
However, no significant differences in gross cash farm
incomes, net cash farm incomes, and net farm incomes
between FSA borrowers and non-FSA operators were
found. The data suggest that direct loans on average are
supporting farmers who would likely fail to meet conventional lending standards and hence would have trouble
securing credit from private-sector sources at reasonable
rates and terms.

• Beginning farmers operate significantly smaller farms (in
terms of acres operated and gross cash farm income). As
expected from their small sizes, they have significantly
lower total incomes, assets, liabilities, and net worth levels.
With their limited financial resources, size, and experience,
beginning farmer borrowers are unlikely candidates for
conventional credit.

• Direct FLPs provide less than 4 percent of the total farm
debt in the U.S. But since FLPs are targeted to family
farms, an estimated 18 percent of indebted non-hobby
farmers and beginning farmers were found to rely on
direct FLP loans for at least a portion of their credit needs.
Given that these recipients were found to typically have
weakness in their financial profiles and likely would have
difficulty qualifying for commercial credit, the direct FLPs
are largely servicing the intended clientele based on the
agency’s mission.

• FSA is required to target 35 percent of OL allocations and
70 percent of FO allocations to beginning farmers. Thirtyeight percent of the OL loan dollar volume went to beginning farmer borrowers and 69 percent of FO loan dollar
volume went to beginning farmer recipients over FY
2000–2003.
Objective 2: Length of Time Borrowers Remain in
Program and Type of Exit

• Socially Disadvantaged (SDA) farmers tend to be geo-

• An estimated 78 percent of direct FLP loans that origi-

graphically concentrated in southwestern and southeastern states. FSA market penetration rates into the SDA
market are generally highest in states where SDA borrow-

nated from FY 1994–1996 were terminated (paid back or
otherwise settled) by November 30, 2004. More than half
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of the borrowers who originated loans during FY
1994–1996 no longer had any active OL, FO, or EM loans
by November 30, 2004. The analysis did not identify if
there is a cohort of long-term FLP participants.

• For the most part, it appears FSA borrowers are using
direct loans as a temporary credit source. A majority of the
loans were paid back without a loss. A majority of borrowers did not become permanent clients of FSA.

• Loan termination was much more frequent for OL and

Objective 3: Measuring and Reducing Subsidy Rates

EM loans than for FO loans. Duration times to termination were close to the term lengths for OL loans paid in
full, and were between five and six years for EM loans
although a larger proportion of these loans remain to be
terminated.

• The amounts and percentages of direct FLP loan losses
have generally trended downward over the FY 1994–2004
period. FO loans had a lower average annual loss percentage (2.0 percent) than OL (5.3 percent) and EM (13.2 percent) loans. FO loans are secured with real estate while OL
and EM loans may be secured with either real estate or
non-real estate assets, but primarily non-real estate assets.
In general, during the study period, farmland values rose
steadily, thereby greatly decreasing the likelihood of FSA
sustaining material losses on farm ownership loans.

•

An estimated 53.4 percent of the terminated FY
1994–1996 loans had borrowers who exited FLPs and continued farming. Twenty-four percent of the terminated
loans had borrowers who exited the FLPs and left farming
voluntarily other than for retirement, and 6.9 percent of
the loans had borrowers who retired. The remaining loans
were terminated due to leaving farming involuntarily (11
percent) or due to death (5 percent). Among the 53.4 percent who continued farming, only 17 percent of these
loans had farmers who graduated to FSA guaranteed credit and the remainder graduated by continuing farming and
using conventional credit (65 percent) or no credit at all
(18 percent).

• An estimated statistical model shows the likelihood of a
loan loss is positively related to borrowers with previous
debt settlement experience with FLPs, indicating that loan
restructuring activities are generally more likely to result in
a loan loss. Farms found to be at greater risk of having
their loans end in a loss—and hence increasing program
costs—include those with higher relative indebtedness, less
repayment capacity, less liquidity, crop farms, and larger
farms. The likelihood of a loan loss is negatively related to
borrowers already having or receiving an FO loan. The
likelihood of a loan loss is not found to be significantly
related to borrowers receiving limited resource rates (subsidized interest) or to those classified as socially disadvantaged.

• Consistent with other findings about FO loans, FO borrowers were least likely to exit. Also, borrowers who had
larger numbers of other active FSA Direct Loans and higher debt-to-asset ratios at time of loan origination were less
likely to exit FLPs. Borrowers with more direct loans may
have a greater need for FLPs.

• An estimated regression model indicates that, when a

• The evidence on change in financial well-being is mixed

loan loss occurs, the amount of loan loss as a percent of the
original loan amount is positively related to beginning
farmer loans and negatively related to borrowers receiving
FO and OL loans and having greater repayment capacity.
The beginning farmer loan relationship indicates loan
losses relative to loan amounts are greater for beginning
farmer loans than non-beginning farmer loans.

but generally positive. Annual changes in net worth were
positive and significant. Rising farmland values over this
period undoubtedly contributed to this. Debt-to-asset
ratios increased over time, which could indicate that the
relatively young borrowers are in an expansion phase and
acquiring new debt to support their operations. Current
ratios did not change significantly over time for the sampled borrowers. These findings on financial characteristics
coupled with the majority of borrowers leaving FLPs to
continue farming or leave voluntarily indicate financial
progress.

• The loan loss analysis suggests the following options to
reduce loan loss occurrence: reject applicants who have
had previous debt settlement experience (i.e., adhere
strictly to the existing one-time debt forgiveness policy);
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grant loans to borrowers who already have FO loans;
require increased collateral and stronger financial standards, and continue to concentrate on lending to small
farms. However, in addition to reducing loan losses, these
options would greatly reduce the number of farmers
receiving FSA loans.

• A consistent policy requiring farmers to purchase insurance in order to receive farm program payments and qualify for emergency assistance should limit the demand for
emergency loans and thus the rate of loan losses. Crop
insurance and additional collateral beyond the crop itself
would likely mitigate loan loss rates.

• There are several options to decrease loan loss rates such
as: increase the proportion of FO and OL loans relative to
EM loans; decrease the number of beginning farmer loans
(i.e. the group of farmers most likely to be denied credit
from conventional creditors due to limited experience, lack
of track record, and inadequate equity); and restrict loans
to farms with less than a specified repayment capacity
(many existing FSA recipients with low repayment capacity would instead be denied credit). In general, such activities would run counter to the role of FLPs—i.e. making
credit available to farm operators on the financial margin.
Limitations
A primary study goal was to measure the market for FSA
Direct Loans. While the majority of U.S. farms were designated ineligible, we believe far too many farms were left
in the eligible pool. Yet, to be consistent with precedent in
the literature, the eligibility criteria were minimal. Hence,
estimated penetration ratios seem low.
The study did not focus on identifying and estimating a
subset of long-term (“life-time”) FLP borrowers. Such
research would require much different data than those collected in this study. To the extent that there are such borrowers, a detailed analysis would need to be conducted to
determine the attributes of such borrowers and how the
life-time cycle could be ended.
FSA would further like to lessen losses and the need to do
loan restructurings. The data collected do not explain the

occurrence of such events as well as better data probably
could. Personal events such as medical emergency, change
in marital status, and loss of off-farm employment are
probably important factors explaining the occurrence of
these losses. Collection of such data would go far beyond
what FSA does in its loan application and Farm and Home
Plans. Perhaps a longitudinal panel of sample borrowers
would help FSA to better understand the dynamics of its
borrowers.
The estimates of loan terminations and loan losses are
biased downwards. More loans were terminated than
reported here, but our assumptions bias this estimate
downward. An ability to track loans through their various
restructurings and consolidations would have made the
termination estimates more exact. Loan losses for the FY
1994–1996 loans will increase as some currently active
loans encounter financial difficulties in the future.
The Farm and Home Plan data used have some quirks. In
particular we strongly believe that zeroes were entered
where an observation was potentially missing. We
assumed the zeroes in such instances were, in fact, missing
data. Also, although we treated the Farm and Home Plan
data as completely representative of the FY 2000–2003
borrowers, only 43 percent of the loan originators were
paired with a Farm and Home Plan.
The data in the survey of FY 1994–1996 loans had to be
“cleaned.” Observations that appeared as data entry errors
or implausible guesses were changed to missing observations. Questions in the survey answered as “unknown”
were also set to missing. Such practices are common in the
use of primary data. The inferences from the data are conditional upon these actions.
Estimates based on ARMS data identifying FSA borrowers
are likely biased downwards. In ARMS farm operators
only report five of their loans. If they have six or more
loans, these extra loans are not reported. A farm operator
with six or more loans could have omitted all FSA loans
and therefore be counted as a non-FSA Direct Loan participant even though they had an FSA Direct Loan.
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help characterize the role of FSA Farm Loan
Programs in the agricultural credit market.

Final Report
Introduction

Effectiveness is evaluated in the context of three
objectives. In Objective 1, we examine the history of
the FSA, the current trends in agricultural lending,
the demographics and location of FSA loan recipients, the targeting of socially disadvantaged and
beginning farmers of FSA loans, the financial characteristics of FSA borrowers, and the implications of
alternative creditworthiness standards.2 In Objective
2, we investigate loan and borrower duration in the
FSA Direct Loan Programs and the financial progress
of FSA loan recipients over time. In Objective 3, we
measure subsidy rates and discuss ways of reducing
subsidy rates.

As is customary with government programs, there is
a need for periodic assessment to determine whether
stated goals are met and if changes would be useful to
improve program effectiveness. The Office of
Management and Budget’s (OMB)1 2005 Passback
for Farm Service Agency (FSA) requested an independent performance-focused review of the FSA
Farm Loan Programs (FLPs) to guide management
initiatives for the Direct Farm Loan Program and
Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 budget requests. The goal of this
study is to provide data and analysis to assist policymakers in determining how effectively FSA’s Direct Farm
Loan Programs are meeting their stated objectives.

1. Groups Being Served by
FSA Direct Farm Loan Programs

The specific objectives of this study are: (1) to examine how effectively the Direct Farm Loan Program is
serving family farms in general as well as specifically
targeted groups; (2) to evaluate the length of time
borrowers remain in the program, to identify the outcomes for borrowers receiving loans in the past, and
to identify changes in financial characteristics; and
(3) to describe the extent of subsidy use by various
cohorts and to determine what steps can be taken to
lower these subsidy costs. The results of this study
will aid policymakers in determining ways to improve
overall program performance, provide FSA officials
with information needed to sharpen self-review, and

1.1. FSA Mission and History, and
Data Sources for Study
The Direct Farm Loan Programs administered by the
Farm Service Agency (FSA) are designed to provide
credit to family-sized farms3 “unable to obtain credit
from conventional sources at reasonable rates and
terms” despite having sufficient cash flow to repay
and an ability to provide security for the loan
(Dodson and Koenig, 2000, p.1). FSA is an agency of
the United States Department of Agriculture

Definitions of abbreviations used in this study are presented in appendix table 1.A.
Definitions of targeted groups are provided in appendix table 1.B.
3 Family-sized farms are defined explicitly in section 1.2.2.
1
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families in becoming successful farmers and ranchers” through the use of the Farm Loan Program
(FLP) (USDA/FSA, 2005, p.6). Strategies stated by
FSA to achieve this goal are: “1) implement an
aggressive supervised credit program, 2) identify and
correct borrower performance problems promptly, 3)
actively market and sell inventoried properties, 4)
aggressively monitor and address processing problems, 5) correct staffing deficiencies and streamline
work processes, and 6) continue outreach efforts.”
(USDA/FSA, 2005, pp. 7–8).

(USDA). FSA’s Direct Farm Loan Program provides
short- to intermediate-term farm operating loans
(OL) and long-term farm ownership (FO) loans as
well as emergency (EM) loans. In addition to serving
the general category of family-sized farms, federal
legislation compels FSA’s FO and OL lending programs to target specific subgroups falling under the
family-farm umbrella. These groups are socially disadvantaged applicants (SDA) and beginning farmer
(BF) applicants.
The FSA defines a socially disadvantaged farmer or
rancher as “one of a group whose members have been
subjected to racial, ethnic, or gender prejudice
because of their identity as members of the group
without regard to their individual qualities. For purposes of FSA programs, socially disadvantaged
groups are women, African Americans, American
Indians, Alaskan Natives, Hispanics, and Asian
Americans and Pacific Islanders (USDA/FSA, 2004
a). The definition of a BF varies by loan type. For OL
purposes, a BF is a farmer who meets the general eligibility criteria for an OL loan and has ten or less
years of farming experience. For FO purposes, a BF
is a farmer who meets the general criteria for an FO
loan, has three to ten years of farming experience,
and owns acreage that does not exceed 30 percent of
the county average farm size.4 If the applicant is an
entity, all members must be related by blood or marriage, and all stockholders in a corporation must be
eligible beginning farmers (USDA/FSA, 2004 b).

1.1.2. History of Federal Farm Credit Assistance
Government assistance in providing credit to farmers
and ranchers in need began in the early 1900s and
evolved into its present form. Several major agencies
provided assistance in the twentieth century. These
were the Resettlement Administration (1935–1937),
Farm Security Administration (1937–1946), and
Farmers Home Administration (1946–1994).
Currently, the Farm Service Agency (1994–present) is
responsible for administering the federal direct and
guaranteed loan programs to farmers.
1.1.2.1. The Early Years
From 1918 through 1931, Congress provided
Emergency Crop and Feed Loans to farmers who had
suffered losses due to floods and droughts in designated areas and were unable to obtain credit elsewhere (U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration, 1995). In 1932, the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation (RFC) organized twelve regional offices called the Regional Agricultural Credit
Corporations (RACC). These offices offered operating loans to farmers and ranchers unable to obtain
commercial credit. The Farm Credit Act of 19335
established one Production Credit Association (PCA)
in each of the twelve Federal Land Bank districts, and
these PCAs assumed the functions of the RACC.

1.1.1. Farm Service Agency Mission
The mission of the Farm Service Agency is: “To help
ensure the well-being of American agriculture and
the American public through efficient and equitable
administration of farm commodity, farm loan, conservation, environmental, emergency assistance, and
domestic and international food assistance programs” (USDA/FSA, 2005). One of the key, stated
goals of FSA is to: “Assist eligible individuals and
4
5

Prior to 2004, the acreage limit was 25 percent of the county average farm size (U.S. 7 CFR 1943.4).
United States Statutes At Large, 73rd Congress, 1933-1934 Vol. 48, Part 1, Public Laws, Ch. 98, 48 Stat. 257,12 U.S. Code § 1131 et seq.
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The Agricultural Credit Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-334)
expanded the eligibility of farm loans to family corporations,
cooperatives,
and
partnerships
(USDA/FmHA, 1991). The principal limits for FO
loans were increased to $200,000 for direct loans and
$300,000 for guaranteed loans. OL limits were
increased to $100,000 and $200,000 for direct and
guaranteed loans, respectively. Special interest rates
on direct FO and OL loans (set below the cost of government borrowing) were made available to farmers
with limited resources (Dodson and Koenig, 1997).

The Federal Emergency Relief Act of 19336 resulted in
the formation of the Rural Rehabilitation Division in
April 1934. Its responsibility was the formation of
government loan programs in which the borrower
would agree to operate the farm under new farming
plans developed with the help of the Division’s county representative (USDA/FmHA, 1991). In 1935,
Executive Order 7027 created the Resettlement
Administration, which existed for two years. Shortterm loans were made to low-income farm families
based on a Farm and Home Plan that had been
worked out by the borrowing family and the county
representatives (USDA/FmHA, 1991). In 1937, the
Farm Security Administration took over the responsibilities of the Rural Rehabilitation Division with a
focus on supervised lending to farmers who could
not obtain credit elsewhere.

FmHA’s EM and OL programs changed with the
Agricultural Programs Adjustment Act of 1984 (P.L.
98-258). The limits for new direct OL loans
increased from $100,000 to $200,000 and from
$200,000 to $400,000 for new guaranteed OL loans.
For direct EM or OL loans that were rescheduled or
consolidated, maximum repayment time “increased
from seven to fifteen years from the date of the original note” (USDA/ERS, 1991). If a farmer’s county
bordered a designated disaster county (for disasters
occurring after May 30, 1983), then the farmer
became eligible for emergency loans. Twenty percent
of direct OL and FO funds was allotted for limited
resource borrowers.

1.1.2.2. Farmers Home Administration
Under the Farmers Home Administration Act of
1946 (P.L. 60-731), the Farm Security Administration
and Emergency Crop and Feed loan programs were
consolidated and administered by one new agency
called the Farmers Home Administration. Farmers
Home Administration was known as FHA until 1974
when the abbreviation was changed to FmHA.7 In
addition to maintaining a system of county offices,
FmHA provided many different services to farmers
over the years.

Under the Food Security Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-198),
the FmHA was mandated to emphasize guaranteed
lending instead of direct lending. FmHA could guarantee up to 90 percent of the principal of the loan
made by a qualifying lender (USDA/ERS, 1988). The
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-233)
changed the way FmHA serviced farm loans.
Delinquent loans could be written down if the borrower had a plan to continue farming and government recovery from the restructured loan would be
greater than or equal to the amount recovered
through foreclosure. The SDA group outreach program was established to assure that socially disadvantaged applicants had opportunities to buy or lease

Responsibility for federal programs supporting rural
growth was transferred to the USDA via the Rural
Development Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-419). With this
Act, FmHA continued to expand in the area of rural
development and was authorized to guarantee loans
made by commercial banks for farming, housing, and
rural business development in cities with populations
up to 50,000. Youth loans for income-producing
enterprises managed through school organizations
were also authorized in this Act.

United States Statutes At Large, 73rd Congress, 1933-1934 Vol. 48, Part 1, Public Laws, Ch. 30, 48 Stat. 55.
This change was made to easily distinguish Farmers Home Administration from other agencies that have the same initials
(USDA/FmHA 1991, p. 6).
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have five years or less of farm operating experience or
six years or less of direct OL borrowing experience.
Direct FO loans could no longer be used to refinance
existing indebtedness. For the EM loan program, the
maximum total borrower indebtedness was capped at
$500,000. Previously the cap only applied to a particular disaster, allowing total EM indebtedness for a
borrower to exceed $500,000 (Stam, Wallace, and
Koenig, 1997).

inventory farm property (USDA/ERS, 1991). As a
consequence of the increased emphasis on guaranteed loans, direct loan obligations dropped below $1
billion in 1990 while guaranteed obligations
increased to $1.3 billion (USDA/ERS, 1991).
Legislation from the Food, Agriculture,
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-624)
established a placement program for those borrowers
who were eligible to graduate from direct loans to
guaranteed loans and placed tighter restrictions on
debt restructuring.
The Agricultural Credit
Improvement Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-554) authorized
FmHA to focus on beginning farmers and ranchers
and graduating direct loan borrowers to the guaranteed lending program. To better serve BF applicants,
a down payment loan program was established for
the direct and guaranteed FO loan programs
(USDA/ERS, 1993). To improve graduation rates,
lifetime limits for FSA borrowers to receive assistance
were established for OL loans. Borrowers became
ineligible for insured OL assistance after receiving OL
loans for 10 years, and ineligible for guaranteed assistance after 15 years (USDA/ERS, 1993).

The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 (P.L.105277) raised the caps on borrower indebtedness for the
guaranteed Farm Loan Programs. The caps are now
adjusted annually as inflation rises. The cap increase
is computed by the “Prices Paid by Farmers Index”
and is calculated by the National Agricultural
Statistics Service (USDA/NASS, 1999). If the index
for the immediate fiscal year exceeds the index for the
previous fiscal year, the caps are raised. The 1999
guaranteed FO and OL loan program limits were
raised to $700,000, although the caps for the direct
FO, OL, and EM Farm Loan Programs remained at
$200,000, $200,000, and $500,000, respectively.
Previously the guaranteed FO and OL loans were
capped at $300,000 and $400,000. The maximum
total indebtedness allowed for a borrower with guaranteed loans from one or both programs was set at
$700,000 (USDA/ERS, 1999). The current maximum
total program indebtedness for guaranteed loans as
adjusted for inflation is $813,000 (USDA/FSA, 2004 a).

1.1.2.3. Farm Service Agency
FmHA ceased to exist with the signing of the Federal
Crop Insurance Reform and Department of
Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994 (P.L. 103354). Under this reorganization of USDA agencies,
FmHA’s farm credit programs were transferred to the
newly formed Consolidated Farm Service Agency
(USDA/ERS, 1995). The Consolidated Farm Service
Agency was subsequently renamed the Farm Service
Agency (FSA) in 1995 (Stam, Wallace, and Koenig,
1997). The policy push to have borrowers graduate
from direct to guaranteed loans continued with the
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of
1996 (1996 Farm Act, P.L. 104-127). This Act narrowed the eligibility criteria for applicants. For direct
FO loans, the applicant either had to have less than 10
years of FSA borrowing experience or be qualified as
a beginning farmer. Direct OL loan applicants had to

The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
(2002 Farm Act, P.L. 107-171) enacted changes in
FSA Direct Farm Loan Programs to make borrowing
easier. The eligibility time limits for direct OL loans
were waived to provide longer access to FSA-funded
farm programs (USDA/FSA, 2004 b). Applicants
became eligible for FO loans after participating in the
operation of a farm for three years, instead of having
to have operated a farm for three years. If borrowers
had received debt forgiveness as a result of a major
emergency or natural disaster declaration in the past,
4
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date). The database also contains any flags associated
with servicing the loan. The database contains a
total of 70,923 loans made to 54,984 borrowers during FY 2000–2003, which represents recent loans.
This report focuses on these recent loans even though
it would have been possible to consider loans made in
earlier years. Our mission was to analyze the effectiveness of the current program and going back
before 2000 would not be reflective of recent and current activity. Out of the 70,923 loans in the database,
9,747 were youth loans made to 9,062 youth borrowers. Since the focus of this report is not on youth programs, the youth loans were excluded from the GIS
maps and other analysis presented in this report. An
additional 1,025 loans were removed from the database based on their assistance-type classification.
The NL database used in this report has 60,151 loans
and 45,016 borrowers.

they could now become eligible for new direct or
guaranteed loans. The acreage ownership restrictions
for beginning farmer and rancher FO loans changed
from no more than 25 percent to no more than 30
percent of the county average farm size. More funding was made available for the beginning farmer
guaranteed loan program and down payment loans
increased from 10 to 15 years and from 30 to 40 percent of sale price (USDA/ERS, 2003).
1.1.3. Data Sources
In the sections that follow, we review several aspects
of the Direct Farm Loan Program based on activity
from fiscal years (FY) 2000–2003. The data examined
in this study were obtained from various sources.
FSA provided us data from their loan-making database, which we refer to as the New Loan Database
(NL database) in the remainder of this report. FSA
also provided data from its loan-servicing database
and a database of Farm and Home Plans (FHP) used
in certain sections of this report. Data were also
obtained from various issues of FSA Farm Loan
Programs Monthly Management Summaries (MMS)
published by the USDA/FSA. Additional data were
obtained from the 2002 Census of Agriculture conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics Services
(NASS), and from the Agricultural Resources
Management Survey (ARMS) jointly conducted by
NASS and the Economic Research Service (ERS). In
addition to these secondary data sources, data concerning FSA Direct Loan origination activities for FY
1994–1996 were obtained through a national survey
of FSA county offices conducted primarily for this
study.

In the process of applying for a direct loan, applicants
must fill out a Farm and Home Plan (FHP). This
plan contains a balance sheet, income statement, and
demographic information about the applicant. As
part of this study, FSA furnished 117,391 FHPs for
some of the 45,016 borrowers who originated loans
in FY 2000–2003. It was possible to match 19,153 or
42.5 percent of the borrowers with the most recent
FHP they completed prior to obtaining an FSA loan.
Financial information extracted from the FHPs of
19,153 borrowers is presented in this report as a
gauge of FSA borrowers’ financial characteristics
by loan type, assistance type, and demographic
groupings.
FSA publishes a summary of the Agency’s loan-making activities in a yearly internal document titled
“USDA Farm Service Agency: FSA Farm Loan
Programs Monthly Management Summary.” This
document, published every September by the
National Office of Farm Loan Programs, contains
data on FSA loan-making activity for the current year
and also for previous years. This publication, called
the Monthly Management Summary (MMS), provid-

FSA’s internal Farm Loan Program Making and Loan
Servicing database for FY 2000 – 2003 (New Loan
database) provides detailed information about every
loan. The database contains information about the
borrower (tax identification or social security number, county and state of residence, race, ethnicity, and
gender), and the loan (number, type, assistance type,
amount, interest rate, origination date, and maturity
5
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ed most of the data used in discussing current FSA
agricultural lending trends.

extensively FSA has penetrated the potential market
for FSA Direct Loans. Because of deficiencies in both
the Census and ARMS databases, two sets of estimated counts of the number of eligible borrowers are
produced in this study. One set comes from the fouryear ARMS data (2000–2003) and the second set is
from the 2002 Census of Agriculture. Both sets are
presented in the discussions that follow, as called for
by the various types of analyses.

The ARMS is conducted annually by the USDA,
which collects detailed information on farming practices and farm financial conditions including credit
sources. This survey samples only a small proportion
of the overall U.S. farm population. For the analysis
in this study using ARMS data from 2000–2003, the
average annual sample size was 11,917. However, the
sample database includes a set of complex replicate
weights (expansion factors) that are designed to
expand the sample so that estimates of the overall
farm population can be obtained. Thus, by using
ARMS data, it is possible to obtain state level expanded (estimated) counts of farms with various characteristics (e.g. race, gender, sales class, etc.).

Additional data for objectives 2 and 3 for this study
were obtained through a national survey of FSA
county offices. The instrument was designed by the
research team at the University of Arkansas and
administered electronically through the FSA secure
intranet. The survey instrument contained 71 borrower and loan information questions. Two thousand, seven hundred and fifteen (2,715) usable
responses were collected during the period of
November 22, 2004 through December 17, 2004.
The final data download was received by the
University of Arkansas Division of Agriculture on
December 21, 2004. A detailed discussion of the survey instrument and the survey procedure is presented in section 2 of this study.

The 2002 Census of Agriculture by NASS provides
counts on the number of farms in a county as well as
a number of characteristics about each farm and the
farm operators. In particular, these data are used to
identify the number of farms in a given county that
would be considered eligible for an FSA Direct Loan.
The farms are counted by gender, race, and beginning
farmer status. These counts then provide the denominator for ratios that measure proportion of FSA-eligible farmers who have obtained at least one FSA
Direct Loan in FY 2000–2003. While some census
data are available in the public domain, a special tabulation was required to obtain information on the
numbers of FSA-eligible farmers cross-classified by
gender, race (ethnicity), and beginning farmer status.
This tabulation was conducted at the NASS data laboratory in Washington D.C. by members of the study
team.

1.1.4. Current Agricultural Lending Trends
The current trend in the agricultural credit market is
a continued shift away from FSA direct credit toward
FSA guarantees and toward other sources of credit.
Figure 1.1 displays the share of total farm business
debt by originating lenders between 1960 and 2003.
As shown in the figure, the share of FSA direct-lending total farm business debt remained steady from
the 1960s to the late 1970s. FSA’s direct lending share
began increasing in the late 1970s and peaked in 1987
before a steady decline to the present. This decline is
at least partially a result of the Food Security Act of
1985 (P.L. 99-198) mandate for FmHA (and later,
FSA) to emphasize guaranteed loans over direct
loans.

In the preliminary report submitted on July 29, 2004,
ARMS data for the three-year period 2000–2002 were
used to estimate the number of farmers eligible for
FSA direct assistance as well as the average balance
sheets and income statements for various farmer
groups. Part of this study is concerned with how
6
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Figure 1.1. Share of total farm business debt by originating lender, 1960–2003
Figure 1.2 illustrates the volume of Direct Farm Loan
Program principal outstanding as a proportion of
total (direct plus guaranteed) FSA principal outstanding. Direct principal outstanding has declined
from over 90 percent in 1984 to under 45 percent in
2002 of total FSA direct and guaranteed principal
outstanding. Although guaranteed loans have surpassed direct loans in both principal outstanding and
dollars obligated per year since 1999 in dollar terms,
FSA still made more direct loans than guaranteed
loans for each of the four fiscal years 2000–2003.8
This is partially due to the Direct Farm Loan
Program including youth loans, which have principal
capped at $5000.

more dollars in principal are obligated in the guaranteed program. Also, guaranteed loan caps are larger
than direct loan caps. Moreover, the direct loans
include youth loans. Even with the exclusion of youth
loans, the average direct loan size is still smaller than
that of the average guaranteed loan size.

Figure 1.3 shows the average loan size for direct and
guaranteed loans originated during FY 2000–2003 by
region.9 Guaranteed loans are far larger in principal
than are direct loans. This is a result of the fact that
more direct loans are made in any given year and

Loan counts obtained from the New Loan database
show that the agency made 60,151 direct loans to
45,016 borrowers from 2000 to 2003. A breakdown
of the number of borrowers, loans, and counties covered is presented in table 1.1. OL loans accounted for

1.2. Demographics, Location, and Volume of
FSA Direct Loans, FY 2000–2003
In this section, we discuss the numbers and volumes
of FSA Direct Loans made to various cohorts. In particular, we examine FSA Direct Loans to all borrowers, family farms, SDA borrowers, and BF borrowers.
1.2.1. FSA Direct Loans to All Borrowers

FSA Monthly Management Summaries, September 30 for years 2000-2004.
The ten regions are defined using the previous ERS region designations. The regions are: Northeast (CT, DE, ME, MD, MA, NH,
NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT), Lake States (MI, MN, WI), Corn Belt (IL, IN, IA, MO, OH), Northern Plains (KS, NE, ND, SD), Appalachian
(KY, NC, TN, VA, WV), Southeast (AL, FL, GA, SC), Delta States (AR, LA, MS), Southern Plains (OK, TX), Mountain (AZ, CO, ID,
MT, NV, NM, UT, WY), and Pacific (CA, OR, WA).
8
9

7

AAES Research Report 977

Figure 1.2. Share of total FSA farm business debt: direct vs. guaranteed loans, 1982–2002

Figure 1.3. Average direct loan size vs. average guaranteed loan size,
FY 2000–2003 four-year average
8
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Table 1.1. New FSA Direct loans by type of loan, FY 2000–2003
L oa n typ e
All types
Operating Loans (OL)
Farm Ownership Loans (FO)
Emergency Loans (EM)

Loa n
count
60,151
47,540
6,127
6,484

Borrower
count
45,016*
37,729**
6,067
6,018

County
count
2,592
2,486
1,604
1,158

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database
*Loan recipients are counted as new borrowers for each of the years they appear in the new
loan database. While there are 28,852 unique borrowers within the four-year period,
borrowers are counted as new borrowers for each year they obtain a new loan. Therefore, a
unique borrower can appear as frequently as four times in the count of new borrowers.
** A borrower who obtains multiple loans within a year is counted once for each type of loan
within the year. Therefore, the number of borrowers from each type of loan exceeds the
sum for all types of loan. A borrower who obtains loans in different years is counted once
for each of the years.

Figure 1.4. FSA Direct OL, FO, and EM borrowers, FY 2000–2003
9
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Figure 1.5. FSA Direct OL borrowers, FY 2000–2003

Figure 1.6. FSA Direct FO borrowers, FY 2000–2003
10
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79.03 percent of the loans in table 1.1 while FO and
EM loans accounted for 10.19 percent and 10.78 percent, respectively.

all loans, it is not surprising to see the similarity
between figure 1.5 (OL loan borrowers) and figure
1.4 (all loan borrowers combined).

The numbers and types of loans made to farmers differ across counties. Figure 1.4 presents the number of
borrowers for all the three types of loans, OL, FO, and
EM combined. The figure shows a substantial geographical dispersion in the intensity of FSA loan use.
For example, out of the 3,078 counties reported in
the 2002 Census of Agriculture, 484 (15.7 percent)
had no borrowers while counties such as Franklin
Parish in Louisiana, Lancaster County in
Pennsylvania, and Aroostook County in Maine had
242, 259, and 263 borrowers, respectively.

Figure 1.6 shows the number of FO loan borrowers
across the U.S. Unlike OL borrowers, FO borrowers
are much fewer in number and located in fewer
counties. Yet the intensity of use of FSA loans exhibits
substantial geographical dispersion with number of
borrowers ranging from 0 to 54 within counties.
Surprisingly, three of the four counties with the highest number of FO loan borrowers are located in
Oklahoma while the counties in the Southeast farm
production region (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and
South Carolina) have very few FO loan borrowers.

Figure 1.5 presents a count of borrowers of OL loans.
Given that OL loans account for about 79 percent of

Figure 1.7 presents the number of EM borrowers for
FY 2000–2003. The figure shows a wide geographical

Figure 1.7. FSA Direct EM borrowers, FY 2000–2003
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of use of FSA loans has substantial geographical dispersion, and that the intensity varies by type of loan.
Dodson and Koenig (2003) observed geographical
variations in FSA lending activity for FSA loans made
from 1995 to 1999. We continue to observe this trend
for FSA loans made between FY 2000 and 2003. For
OL and FO loans, the geographical dispersion is driven partly by the dispersion of eligible borrowers while
the dispersion in EM loan use is driven by natural
disasters.

dispersion of borrowers across the U.S. However,
unlike OL and FO loans, EM loans occur because of
disasters. For example, Terry County in Texas had a
total of 164 borrowers for all loans combined, but
had 109 EM borrowers––the largest number of EM
borrowers of any county in the four-year period.
Terry County and the adjoining counties in the
Southern High Plains were plagued with drought
between 2000 and 2003. Hale, Swisher and Briscoe
counties, all in Texas, were affected by the drought.10
The coastal plains of the Appalachians and the
Northeast also show high numbers of EM borrowers,
probably due to coastal storms. Inland, the delta
states of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi show a
large proportion of EM loan borrowers.

1.2.2. FSA Direct Loans to Family Farm Borrowers
The intended clientele for FSA’s Direct Loan Programs
are creditworthy family farming operations that are
unable to obtain credit from conventional sources.
The definition of a family-sized farm used by FSA is
a farm that: “(a) is similar to other farm operations in

In summary, figures 1.4 – 1.7 show that the intensity

Figure 1.8. FSA loan size by loan type and USDA production region, FY 2000–2003
Yates, J. Personal E-mail Communication, Extension Specialist, Risk Management, South Plains District 2, Route 3, Box 213AA,
Lubbock, TX 79403. E-mail response to John Nwoha, Program Associate, University of Arkansas, Division of Agriculture. April 28, 2005.
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the community, (b) has an operator of the farm who
provides all day-to-day management and operational
decisions of the farm business, (c) has an operator
who contributes a substantial amount of full-time
labor to the farming operation, and (d) has credit
needs that are consistent with a family sized farming
operation” (Dodson and Koenig, 2003 p. 193).

1.2.3. FSA Direct Loans to
Small Family Farm Borrowers
According to the USDA farm typology definition, a
‘small’ family farm is a farm with sales less than
$250,000 per year. This definition follows from a
suggestion by the National Commission on Small
Farms (USDA/ERS, 2004). Given the lending caps of
FSA’s Direct Farm Loan Program, small family farms
are more likely the primary beneficiaries of the direct
loan program.

Although a family farm is not precisely defined, total
borrower indebtedness caps may help to ensure that
family farms are the primary recipients of FSA Direct
Loans. The indebtedness caps for the FO and OL
programs are $200,000 each, while the cap is
$500,000 for the EM program.11 As evident in figure
1.8, the origination amounts for the majority of
direct loans are well under the program caps. As
expected, average origination amounts are substantially larger for FO loans than for both OL and EM
loans. EM loans average slightly larger amounts than
OL loans. Nationwide, from FY 2000 to FY 2003, the
average direct OL loan was $55,822, the average direct
FO loan was $113,739, and the average EM loan was
$60,177. Over the same time period, there were
annual averages of 11,855 OL loans, 1,532 FO loans,
and 1,621 EM loans made. Regional average principal amounts ranged between $102,875 and $139,905
for FO loans, between $41,736 and $72,262 for OL
loans, and between $43,106 and $99,836 for EM
loans. The regional data show evidence of mild heterogeneity in loan size. On average, the Pacific and
Lake States regions have the largest FO loans, while
the Corn Belt and Northern Plains have the smallest
FO loans. For OL loans, the Pacific and the Southeast
regions average the largest loan sizes. The
Appalachian region has the smallest average OL
loan size.

To estimate the proportion of direct loans made to
small farms, it is necessary to use ARMS data. This is
required because the New Loan database did not
report sales levels for FSA Direct Loan borrowers.
ARMS data for the four-year period from 2000 to
2003 were used to estimate the number of family
farms in the U.S. and the number of those farms originating direct loans in 2000–2003. The ARMS data
estimate an average of 2,104,280 farms per year.12 Of
these farms, only 45,226 (2.15 percent) are estimated
to have been FSA Direct Loan originators and the
remaining 2,059,054 are non-FSA Direct Loan originators.13
One indication of the extent of FSA loan activities
among small farms is the percentage of FSA loans
made to small farms. This percent is calculated as the
four-year expanded total number of farms in ARMS
surveys with sales less than $250,000 and reporting
one or more of FSA-sourced loans originated during
the calendar year of the survey divided by the fouryear expanded total of all farms (regardless of sales)
reporting one or more of FSA-sourced loans originated during the calendar year of the survey.
Nationwide, nearly 78 percent of FSA Direct Loans

11 A borrower may have multiple loans of the same type (OL, FO, or EM) as long as the sum of the original principal on those loans
is less than the indebtedness cap for the particular loan type.
12 The four-year total before excluding an estimated 621 farms with more than one million dollars in a FSA direct loan is 8,417,740.
The 621 farms are excluded because they are unlikely FSA farms since individual loan program caps are $500,000 or less. Thus the
averages calculated here are based on a four-year total of 8,417,119 farms.
13 We caution the reader here that there is a large distinction between FSA Direct Loan originators and farmers with at least one FSA
Direct Loan. An operator originating no FSA Direct Loans during 2000-2003 but still having one or more active FSA Direct Loans
originated prior to 2000 would not be counted. The reason for this distinction is to focus on more recent FSA loan originations.
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FSA borrowers were small farms. This compares
favorably with the 88.2 percent proportion of small
farms to the total FSA-eligible farm population estimated from the 2002 Census of Agriculture as discussed later in section 1.3.

went to small family farms, with 65 percent of the
states devoting at least half of new direct loans to
small farmers.14
The ARMS data, however, do not give reasonable estimates of small farm counts by state, with nine states
showing no FSA small farms at all. The FSA New
Loan data set, on the other hand, cannot be used by
itself because it does not have the sales variable to
delineate the small farms. A better indication of the
state-level loan servicing involvement of FSA in small
farms is obtained by using the combined FSA New
Loan and the Farm and Home Plan data sets. The
Farm and Home Plan’s gross income variable (crop
income plus livestock income plus other farm
income) was used as a proxy for sales, thus enabling
small farms in the New Loan data set to be counted.

1.2.4. FSA Direct Loans to SDA Borrowers
Under the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 (P.L. 100233), FSA began officially targeting Socially
Disadvantaged Applicants (SDAs) applying for direct
FO loans. The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and
Trade Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-624) and the Agricultural
Credit Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-554) expanded SDA targeting to include OL loans and women. Currently,
the law requires FSA to “reserve or target a portion of
its direct and guaranteed operating and farm ownership loan funds for use exclusively by socially disadvantaged applicants. SDAs are classified in one or
more of the following categories: women, African
Americans, Native Americans, Alaskan Natives,
Hispanics, Asians, and Pacific Islanders. In the farm
ownership loan program, the percentage of loan
funds targeted for SDAs is based upon the state percentage of the total rural population made up of SDA

Results in figure 1.9 show that by state, the percent
share of small farm borrowers to the total FSA borrowers who received new loans in FY 2000–2003
ranges from 74.1 percent (Connecticut) to 100 percent (Alaska, Montana, and Rhode Island). Overall,
92.4 percent (indicated by the horizontal line) of the

Figure 1.9. Percent share of small farms to total FSA borrowers, FY 2000–2003
14 Of the remaining 22 percent of FSA direct loans, an estimated 13.7 percent went to farms with $250,000 to $499,999 of sales, 6
percent went to farms with $500,000 to $999,999 of sales, and only 2.4 percent went to farms with $1,000,000 or more in sales.
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In this study, SDAs are counted based on assistance
types and indicated race/ethnicity and sex from the
FSA New Loan Database (FY 2000–2003). A borrower is counted as female or SDA gender if the indicated gender is female or if the indicated loan assistance
type is SDA gender. Counting female loans by indicated gender alone resulted in 3,622 loans to women.
Combining assistance type and indicated gender
increased the number of loans to 3,669 or an additional 47 loans. Some of the 47 additional loans came
from entries with missing gender and a few from
males coded as receiving gender loans. Beginning
farmers are counted as borrowers who received an
FSA loan with beginning farmer assistance type. The
race and ethnic category counts are based on the
indicated race or ethnicity. If a borrower indicated
more than one race, she/he is counted once in each of
the races or ethnicity.

groups, and the statewide percentage of total farmers
who are female. In the operating loan program, the
target is determined by the statewide percentage of
total farmers from the SDA minority group, and the
statewide percentage of total farmers who are female”
(USDA/FSA, 2004 a). EM loans are not specifically
targeted to SDAs.
Table 1.2 provides a count of the number of loans
and borrowers to different cohorts including SDAs
and the number of counties represented by these borrowers. African Americans make up the largest racial
group followed by American Indian or Alaskan
Native and Hispanics. Asians and Pacific Islanders
make up substantially smaller proportions. The combined racial group has more loans and borrowers
than the SDA group comprised of females.

Table 1.2. Counts of FSA loans, borrowers, and counties by loan cohorts
F Y 2 00 0– 2 00 3
Cohort
All FSA borrowers
OL borrowers
FO borrowers
EM borrowers
Female or SDA gender
Beginning farmer
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islanders
Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database
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Number of Number of Number of
loa ns
borrowers
co u n tie s
60,151
45,016
2,592
47,540
37,729
2,486
6,127
6,067
1,604
6,484
6,018
1,158
3,669
2,642
992
23,984
17,733
2,092
1,468
1,044
259
324
251
78
2,180
1,417
365
1,440
1,108
247
91
74
34
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Table 1.3. Grouping of loans based on assistance type, FY 2000–2003
A g g r e g a t e a ssi s t a n c e
type
OL regular
OL BF
OL BF SDA
OL SDA
FO regular
FO BF
FO BF SDA ethnic
FO BF SDA gender
FO SDA ethnic
FO SDA gender
EM

Frequency Percent Cumulative
f r e que ncy
24,266
40.34
24,266
16,762
27.87
41,028
3,042
5.06
44,070
3,470
5.77
47,540
1,538
2.56
49,078
3,491
5.80
52,569
356
0.59
52,925
297
0.49
53,222
267
0.44
53,489
178
0.30
53,667
6,484
10.78
60,151

Cumulative
percent
40.34
68.21
73.27
79.03
81.59
87.40
87.99
88.48
88.92
89.22
100.00

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database

Table 1.4. Counts of loans by loan type for different loan cohorts FY 2000–2003
Cohort

Female or SDA gender
Female
Beginning Farmer
Amer. Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Black or African American
Hispanic
Native Hawaiian/Other Pac. Isl.
All

OL regular

281
(7.66)
281
(7.76)
0
(0.00)
101
(6.88)
10
(3.09)
25
(1.15)
73
(5.07)
12
(13.19)
24,266
(40.34)

OL B F

OL B F
SDA

OL SD A

250
(6.81)
250
(6.90)
16,762
(69.99)
56
(3.81)
4
(1.23)
23
(1.06)
32
(2.22)
3
(3.30)
16,762
(27.87)

1,257
(34.26)
1,257
(34.70)
3,042
(12.70)
411
(28.00)
68
(20.99)
803
(36.83)
460
(31.94)
26
(28.57)
3,042
(5.06)

1,057
(28.81)
1,057
(29.18)
0
(0.00)
542
(36.92)
160
(49.38)
917
(42.06)
519
(36.04)
34
(37.36)
3,470
(5.77)

FO
regular
12
(0.33)
12
(0.33)
0
(0.00)
9
(0.61)
1
(0.31)
1
(0.05)
2
(0.14)
0
(0.00)
1,538
(2.56)

FO BF

35
(0.95)
35
(0.97)
3,491
(14.58)
13
(0.89)
0
(0.00)
0
(0.00)
12
(0.83)
4
(4.40)
3,491
(5.80)

FO BF
SDA
ethnic
28
(0.76)
28
(0.77)
356
(1.49)
127
(8.65)
25
(7.72)
49
(2.25)
83
(5.76)
4
(4.40)
356
(0.59)

FO BF
SDA
ge nd e r
297
(8.09)
272
(7.51)
297
(1.24)
26
(1.77)
4
(1.23)
3
(0.14)
9
(0.63)
1
(1.10)
297
(0.49)

FO
SDA
ethnic
22
(0.60)
22
(0.61)
0
(0.00)
81
(5.52)
16
(4.94)
72
(3.30)
46
(3.19)
1
(1.10)
267
(0.44)

FO
SDA
gender
178
(4.85)
156
(4.31)
0
(0.00)
10
(0.68)
4
(1.23)
6
(0.28)
4
(0.28)
0
(0.00)
178
(0.30)

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database
Note: The numbers in the shaded rows are percent share by loan type for each cohort so that the row percentages sum to 100 percent.
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EM

Total

252
(6.87)
252
(6.96)
0
(0.00)
92
(6.27)
32
(9.88)
281
(12.89)
200
(13.89)
6
(6.59)
6,484
(10.78)

3,669
(100)
3,622
(100)
23,948
(100)
1,468
(100)
324
(100)
2,180
(100)
1,440
(100)
91
(100)
60,151
(100)
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(85.57 percent) were made under the OL SDA and
OL BF SDA categories.15 Women and the different
ethnic and racial groups receive the majority of their
loans from the SDA loan assistance types. For example, OL BF SDA and OL SDA loans account for about
64 percent of all FSA loans to women. The different
races and ethnic groups obtained the majority of
their loans from the OL BF SDA and OL SDA assistance types. However, some SDA eligible borrowers
receive non-SDA loans. For example, nearly 16 percent of loans to females had a non-SDA assistance
type. An SDA eligible borrower may receive a nonSDA loan due to availability of funds for various loan
assistance types.

Table 1.3 presents a count of loans based strictly on
assistance types. For OL loans, SDA is comprised of
OL BF SDA and OL SDA assistance types. For FO
loans, SDA includes FO BF SDA ethnic, FO BF SDA
gender, FO SDA ethnic, and FO SDA gender. Clearly
the most frequent loans were regular OL loans with
40 percent of all the direct loans made. The next
most frequent loan type was OL BF with 28 percent
of direct loans originated. FO loans comprise about
9 percent of loans made.
Table 1.4 presents the counts of loans by loan type to
selected SDAs. The numbers in the top row are the
counts of loans while the numbers in brackets represent the top number as a percentage of all loans to the
cohort. A total of 7,610 SDA loans were made to
4,040 unique borrowers from 2000 to 2003. The
majority of the SDA loans to eligible borrowers

Figure 1.10 displays the average loan size (as measured by principal outstanding at origination) by OL
and FO loans to SDA and non-SDA borrowers. Aver-

Figure 1.10. Average FSA loan size by loan type and USDA production region for SDA and
Non-SDA borrowers, FY 2000–2003 four year average
15

A borrower is SDA eligible if they are female or a non-white race or both.
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Indian/Alaskan Native borrowers are concentrated in
Oklahoma, New Mexico, and North and South
Dakota. African American/Black borrowers are concentrated along the Mississippi River delta and the
Coastal Plains as well as in Oklahoma. Asian borrowers are clustered in California while Native
Hawaiian/other Pacific Islanders are low in numbers
relative to the other racial/ethnic groups and are
spread
uniformly
across
the
country.
Hispanic/Latino borrowers are concentrated in the
Southwest, California, and Washington. There is also
a concentration of Hispanic borrowers in Puerto
Rico which is not shown on any of the figures.
Women borrowers are geographically dispersed, with
a general increase in density east of the Rockies and
specific concentrations in and around Oklahoma,
Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island.

age SDA OL loan size is substantially smaller than
non-SDA OL loan size in every region. On a national level, the average non-SDA OL loan is $57,271 and
the average SDA OL is $46,692. In general, the average FO loan size for SDA borrowers is similar to that
of non-SDA borrowers. In the Delta States, Northern
Plains, and Mountain regions non-SDA FO loan size
is slightly larger than that of SDA FO loan size, while
the reverse is true in the Southern Plains and the
Pacific regions. Nationally, the average non-SDA FO
is $113,221 and the average SDA FO is $116,110.
Reasons for these disparities are discussed when borrower financial characteristics are examined and
compared among cohorts in section 1.4.
The six maps in figures 1.11–1.16 show the geographical dispersion of FSA SDA borrowers. Each dot on a
map represents one SDA borrower who received at
least one new direct loan during the FY 2000–2003
period. As the figures indicate, SDA borrowers tend
to be geographically concentrated. American
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Figure 1.11. Distribution of American Indian and Alaskan Native farmers receiving
FSA Direct Loans, FY 2000–2003

Figure 1.12. Distribution of African American or Black farmers receiving
FSA Direct Loans, FY 2000–2003
19
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Figure 1.13. Distribution of Asian farmers receiving FSA Direct Loans, FY 2000–2003

Figure 1.14. Distribution of Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander farmers receiving
FSA Direct Loans, FY 2000–2003
20
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Figure 1.15. Distribution of Hispanic or Latino farmers receiving
FSA Direct Loans, FY 2000–2003

Figure 1.16. Distribution of women receiving FSA Direct loans, FY 2000– 2003
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1.18 and 1.19, respectively. These maps echo the
overall pattern presented in figure 1.17. In general,
the southern portion of the country has a higher percentage of loans going to SDA borrowers than does
the northern portion. The OL percentages are relatively stronger than the FO percentages in the
Northwest portion of the United States, while the
opposite is true of the Northeast and Appalachian
regions. The overall average percentage of OL loans
made to SDA borrowers during FY 2000–2003 was
13.7 percent and the overall average percentage of FO
loans made to SDA borrowers was 17.9 percent.

Figure 1.17 shows the percent of OL and FO loans
made to SDA borrowers during FY 2000–2003. States
in the southern and southwestern portions of the
country, along with California, devote a larger proportion of their loans to SDA borrowers than do the
states in the rest of the country in general. There are
especially low percentages of SDA loans in the
Northern Plains, Corn Belt, and Lake States regions.
But as shown in figures 1.11, 1.12 and 1.15, SDA
farmers are not concentrated in these three regions
but are more heavily in the south and southwest.
The separate percentages of FSA OL and FO loans
devoted to SDA borrowers are represented in figures

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database
Figure 1.17. Percentage of FSA OL and FO loans made to SDA borrowers, FY 2000–2003
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Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database
Figure 1.18. Percentage of FSA OL loans made to SDA borrowers, FY 2000–2003

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database
Figure 1.19. Percentage of FSA FO loans made to SDA borrowers, FY 2000–2003
23
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EM loans are not specifically targeted to beginning
farmers.

In terms of proportions of loans made to SDA borrowers, 22 states exhibit SDA percentages of 15 percent or greater, and most of these states are concentrated in the southern portion of the country. The
southern portion also has most of the SDA farmers
except for women.

For FY 2000–2003 a total of 19,804 BF OL loans were
originated with a total principal of $1,030,904,649.
This averaged 4,951 loans per year with FY 2002 having the highest with 5,103 loans and FY 2000 having
the lowest with 4,769 loans. The average BF OL loan
size was $52,055 over the four years. By comparison,
there were only 4,144 BF FO loans over the same four
years for a total principal of $475,355,940. FY 2000
had the highest number with 1,262 loans whereas FY
2001 had the lowest number of loans with 903. The
average BF FO loan size for the nation was $114,709
over the four years.

1.2.5. FSA Direct Loans to Beginning Farmer
Borrowers
The Agricultural Credit Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-554)
initiated FSA targeting of direct loan assistance to
beginning farmers. Currently, the law requires FSA to
“reserve or target loan funds for exclusive use by
beginning farmers as follows: Direct Operating, 35
percent; Guaranteed Operating, 40 percent; Direct
Farm Ownership, 70 percent; Guaranteed Farm
Ownership, 25 percent. Funds remain targeted for
beginning farmers in the guaranteed programs until
April 1 of each fiscal year. In the direct programs,
funds are targeted for beginning farmers until
September 1 of each fiscal year” (USDA/FSA, 2004 a).

Figure 1.20 illustrates the average loan size by loan
type to BF and non-BF borrowers by region. In general, the average BF OL loan size tends to be smaller
than the average non-BF OL loan size. At a national

Figure 1.20. Average FSA loan size by type and USDA production region for beginning
and non-beginning farmers, FY 2000–2003 four year average
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level the BF OL loan size averaged $52,055 compared
with $58,511 for non-BF OL loan size. The differences in average loan size between BF OL and non-BF
OL range from a low of $252 for the Southeast region
to a high of $23,008 for the Pacific region. Average
BF FO loan size is generally larger than average nonBF FO loan size with the exception of the Corn Belt,
Lake States, and Southern Plains regions.
Figure 1.21 shows the geographical dispersion of FSA
BF borrowers.16 Each dot on a map represents one BF
borrower who received a new direct loan during the
FY 2000–2003 period.17 As the figure indicates, BF
borrowers are spread throughout the country, but
there are areas of high geographic concentration. In
general, areas east of the Rocky Mountains have more
BF borrowers than areas to the west of the Rocky

Mountains. The Northern Plains, Delta States, and
Lake States show especially high concentrations of
beginning farmers.
Figure 1.22 shows the percentage of FSA Direct Loans
devoted to beginning farmers. Over the four year
span, 30 states made more than 40 percent of their
direct loans to BF borrowers and eleven states made
over half of their direct loans to BF borrowers.
Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina,
California, New Mexico, Massachusetts, Kentucky,
Texas, and Indiana made the smallest percentage of
loans to BF borrowers while Nevada, Louisiana,
Arkansas, Georgia, Utah, Wisconsin, South Dakota,
and Oregon made the largest percentage of loans to
BF borrowers.

Figure 1.21. FSA Direct beginning farmer borrowers, FY 2000–2003
16 A borrower is identified as a beginning farmer in the analysis below if the assistance code for the loan has a beginning farmer designation. Thus, if a borrower met the beginning farmer criteria but did not get a loan with a beginning farmer assistance code, the
borrower would not be identified in our analysis as a beginning farmer. Conversely, if a borrower does have a beginning farmer
assistance code but does not meet the FSA criteria, our analysis would still identify that borrower as a beginning farmer.
17 If a particular individual received a loan in multiple years, they would show up as a dot for each year. In addition, if a borrower
had more than one loan type in a given year (e.g. OL and FO) they would show up as a dot for each loan type they received.
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they made OL loans. This difference is especially pronounced in the Corn Belt region, where a relatively
low proportion of OL loans went to BF borrowers
and a relatively high proportion of FO loans went to
BF borrowers. Considering the 60,151 loans made
over the four year period and counting by loan numbers, 39.8 percent of all direct loans (OL, FO, EM),
41.7 percent of direct OL loans, and 67.7 percent of
FO loans, went to BF borrowers.

The dollar volume of loans made also mirrors the
number of loans made. For the U.S. as a whole, 38
percent of the OL volume (as measured by principal
obligated) went to BF borrowers whereas 69 percent
of the FO volume went to BF borrowers. Note that a
much smaller portion of OL loans go to BF farmers
than FO loans, which is consistent with the targeting
of program funds at 35 and 70 percent, respectively.
Figures 1.23 and 1.24 provide the separate percentages of FSA OL and FSA FO loans made to beginning
farmers out of all OL and all FO loans, respectively,
for FY 2000–2003. The maps confirm that a much
higher proportion of FO loans went to BF borrowers
compared with the proportion of OL loans that went
to BF borrowers as was previously stated for the
nation as whole. Every state with the exception of
Delaware (which did not make any BF loans) made a
greater proportion of FO loans to BF borrowers than

With the exception of Delaware, Alaska, California,
and Maine, every state made over half of their FSA
FO loans to beginning farmers. This is not surprising
since 70 percent of the FO funds are targeted to BF
operators.

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database
Figure 1.22. Percentage of FSA Direct OL and FO loans made to beginning farmer
borrowers, FY 2000–2003
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Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database

Figure 1.23. Percentage of FSA Direct OL loans made to beginning farmer
borrowers, FY 2000–2003

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database
Figure 1.24. Percentage of FSA Direct FO loans made to beginning farmer
borrowers, FY 2000–2003
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duplicate borrowers are excluded. Thus, a single borrower receiving two OL loans and one FO loan within the four years is counted as one borrower for the
purposes of OL penetration, one borrower for the
purposes of FO penetration, and one borrower for
the purposes of combined penetration.18

1.3. FSA Direct Loan Market Penetration
One measure of the effectiveness of the Direct Farm
Loan Program is a penetration ratio which we define
as the proportion of the FSA loan-eligible farm population that receives direct loans in a given time-span.
The penetration analysis in this study focuses on FSA
borrowers who receive new loans instead of any
farmer having an FSA Direct Loan at a given point in
time. It is the characteristics of current originators
that more accurately describe the current penetration
of the market as opposed to counting all borrowers
with active loans. In particular, FO loans can last a
long time and may not be very reflective of the current emphasis and activities of FSA. But as pointed
out later in this report, counting only recent borrowers vastly understates the number of farm operators
who hold direct loans at any given point in time.

The denominator is the sum of all potential FSA
loan-eligible applicants in a state (or county) for the
year 2002 from the 2002 Census of Agriculture.
Thus, the penetration rate can be viewed as the percentage of eligible farms FSA reaches with new direct
loan assistance between 2000 and 2003.
To estimate the penetration ratios outlined above, it
is necessary to define the cohort of eligible borrowers.
Since FSA does not have precise rules for determining
eligibility for direct loan assistance, an empirical
approach using the 2002 Census of Agriculture data
is employed to estimate the number of borrowers eligible at the county level.19 Because the designation of
which farms are FSA eligible is crucial in estimating
penetration ratios, two different methods are examined. The first method is the basic method and the
second is the logit method. One reason for exploring
two methods is to measure how sensitive the penetration ratios are to the assumptions made.

The market penetration ratio (in percentage terms)
for a given loan type (OL, FO, or EM) and unit (state
or county) is computed as:
(1.1)

where the numerator is calculated from the FSA New
Loan database (FY 2000–2003) and the denominator
comes from the 2002 Census of Agriculture database.
The numerator is the sum of all unique FSA Direct
borrowers receiving a particular type of new loan
(OL, FO, EM, or some combination of the loan types)
between FY 2000 and FY 2003. Unit describes the
potential borrower population (all borrowers in a
county, state, or nation; SDA borrowers in county,
state, or nation; BF borrowers in a county, state, or
nation; etc.). For each loan type, youth loans and

The first method, called the basic method, designated
farms into the eligible and non-eligible groups using
a number of criteria. First, all farms in the FSA eligible pool must be a family organization.20 Then the
pool of FSA eligible farms was built by including
family organizations with more than $500 in interest
expenses on farm-related debt and annual sales in
excess of $5,000. In addition, if a principal operator
was under age fifty and had fewer than ten years

The four-year period increases the number of data points used in the calculation. This approach is similar to Dodson and Koenig
(2003) who used five years of county data in the numerator to increase the number of data points since many counties in their
dataset had little FSA lending activity during a given year. While there are 45,016 unique borrowers within years, some of these borrowers are not unique across years. Across years, there are 28,852 unique borrowers indicating that some borrowers obtained loans
in more than one year.
19 Using ARMS data at the county level is untenable given the small number of observations in ARMS relative to number of counties in the U.S.
20 In the Census the organization had to be family or individual operation, or a partnership, or a family-held corporation.
18
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beginning farmer is categorized as FSA eligible irrespective of other possible restrictions except family
organization.

farming experience, they were added to the FSA eligible pool if not already in the pool. Principal operators who indicated farming as their primary occupation and who worked fewer than 200 days off-farm
were added to the pool if not already in the pool.
Finally there was one more exclusion criterion. If
gross sales were $5,000 and less than $10,000 and the
principal operator worked 200 or more days a year
off-farm, the farm was deleted from the pool unless
he/she was under age 50 and had been in farming for
less than ten years.

The above method is driven by precedents in the literature (Dodson and Koenig, 2003). However it is
not a method tested against data in the sense of being
able to determine if it is including and eliminating
the proper set of eligible and non-eligible principal
operators.22 To implement an empirically based
model, the ARMS datasets from 2000–2003 were used
to estimate logit models that could predict which
principal operators are loan originators in one or
more of the four years 2000–2003. The estimated
logit function was then applied to each farm operator
enumerated in the Census of Agriculture to classify
the farm operator as FSA eligible or ineligible. In the
ARMS sample an observation was identified as FSA
eligible if the operator had originated an FSA loan in
the year of the ARMS sample. If the operator had not
originated a loan, the operator was classified as FSA
ineligible. The approach hypothesized that eligibility
or ineligibility could be related to a set of independent variables on each farm operator. The conceptual basis of this approach is that FSA is lending to the
appropriate group of farmers so that the logit function would identify principal operators who are FSA
eligible as a function of the operator’s observations
on the relevant independent variables. This function
was then applied to each farm operator as enumerated in the Census to classify each farm operator as to
whether they were FSA eligible or not. Our justification for considering the two approaches was that they
are based on very different methods and assumptions
and should therefore give reasonable bounds on the
FSA eligible market.

The goal of the above criteria was to exclude hobby
farms and farms with low debt since farmers in either
of these groups are not likely to be in the market for
FSA Direct Loans.21 One could, in fact, argue for
much higher minimum gross sales since $5000 in
gross sales almost automatically implies the farm
family has an alternative primary source of income.
Farmers under 50 with ten or fewer years of experience are added to the pool even if their sales and debt
levels are low because these can be legitimate characteristics of beginning farmers. Also, farm operators
who indicated farming as their primary occupation
are potential FSA clients. We exclude those claiming
farming as a primary occupation but with more than
200 days of off-farm work since this situation strongly indicates that they are supporting themselves by
off-farm work income.
This method categorizes 787,816 of 2,124,452 (37
percent) farmers in the U.S. as FSA eligible. This estimate is undoubtedly high since it does not consider
the credit-elsewhere criteria. There are no data available to the researchers to show that a farmer met all
the requirements for a loan elsewhere. Moreover,
378,595 or 48 percent of FSA eligible farmers qualified on the basis of being a beginning farmer; a

Ultimately we rejected the logit approach for identi-

21 The ‘Hobby Farm’ criteria and nomenclature and the exclusion of low-debt farms are similar to that used by Dodson and Koenig
(2003). Dodson and Koenig excluded farms as being FSA loan eligible if they reported no interest payments on farm debt for the
1997 agricultural census. Our definition allows some debt because a farmer with a small loan such as an outstanding line of store
credit or a small variable input loan might be considered “debt-free” in the same sense that people who pay off all credit card balances monthly are considered “debt-free”.
22 The Census of Agriculture data do not indicate if a farmer holds any FSA debt.
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fying the pool of FSA eligible borrowers. Several logit
models were estimated using the ARMS data and one
of them was applied to the Census data. We found
that setting of the cutoff point on the index estimated for each farmer from the logit function caused
very large shifts in the number of eligible farmers for
seemingly small variations in this cutoff level.
Furthermore, the ARMS data under-report the number of FSA current borrowers because operators only
report up to five loans so that operators with more
than five loans might omit their FSA loans and therefore be incorrectly classified as non-FSA borrowers.
Finally, the underlying premise of the model is that
FSA is currently lending to the eligible borrowers
which is an assumption of part of what this study
seeks to examine. Hence we use the basic method
discussed above in the remainder of this study.

Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont. Hispanics/Latinos
have the largest proportion of FSA eligible farms in
the Southeast, Delta States, and Pacific regions. In
certain states, the proportion of FSA eligible Hispanic
farms is very high. For instance in New Hampshire,
greater than 90 percent of Hispanic farms are FSA eligible. Proportions of 50 percent or more FSA eligible Hispanic farms are observed in states such as
South Dakota (68), Wisconsin (63), North Dakota
(60), Iowa (58) and six other states. The proportion
of FSA eligible female farms is smaller than the proportion for all farms except in the Southeast. The
Northern Plains exhibit the largest disparity between
female farms and all farms. So, we would expect
some diversity in the number of loans based on the
number of eligible borrowers and not due to program bias.

The distribution of FSA eligible borrowers is not uniform throughout the country. Figure 1.25 presents
the proportion of FSA eligible farms as a percentage
of total farms within cohorts by U.S. production
regions. Considering every farm in the U.S., the proportion of FSA eligible farms ranges from 29 percent
for the Southeast region to 51 percent for the
Northern Plains. For all the SDAs combined, the proportion of FSA eligible farms ranges from 27 percent
in the Delta States to 38 percent in the Mountain
region. Among the different racial groups, African
American has the lowest proportion of FSA eligible
farms for all regions. In fact, there are no eligible
black farms in many states including Alaska,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, North Dakota,

1.3.1. FSA Penetration in Family Farm Markets
Figure 1.26 shows the market penetration percentage
of FSA into the potential direct FSA loan markets. It
is apparent that there is considerable state-level heterogeneity in FSA market penetration. State-level
variations in penetration are likely due to differences
in: (1) variations in eligibility, (2) types of agricultural
enterprises, (3) health of the agricultural economy,
(4) composition of farms (i.e. states that typically
have a greater proportion of ‘large’ farm enterprises
would not be as heavily served by FSA programs and
thus will have a lower market penetration), (5) occurrences of natural disasters, and (6) allocations of
FSA Direct Loan obligation authority and lending
practices.
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Figure 1.25. FSA-eligible farms as a percentage of total farms by cohort, 2002

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database and
2002 Census of Agriculture
Figure 1.26. All FSA Direct Loans market penetration percentage by state, FY 2000–2003
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the Northeast, Delta States, Texas Panhandle,
Northern Plains, Coastal Plains, and some counties in
the Mountain states have high penetration rates.

There were 28,852 unique borrowers for all FSA
Direct Loans from FY 2000 – 2003 for the entire U.S.
The estimated number of FSA eligible farm operators
from the 2002 Census of Agriculture was 787,816.
The 50-state penetration rate is 3.66 percent. This
indicates approximately 3.66 percent of eligible farms
received new FSA Direct Loan support during FY
2000 and 2003. At the state level, penetration ratios
ranged from 0.44 percent for Delaware to 21.48 percent for Rhode Island. The disparity in penetration
ratios is even more pronounced at the county level as
shown in figure 1.27. County-level penetration
ranged from 0 to 89 percent. Many counties (484 out
of 3,076 U.S. counties) had 0 penetrations because
there were no FSA Direct Loan recipients from these
counties from FY 2000 to 2003. Among the counties
with FSA Direct Loan recipients, Sonoma County in
California had the least penetration of 0.09 percent
while Bristo County in Massachusetts had the highest
penetration of 89 percent. There are various pockets
of concentration across the country. For example,

Figures 1.28, 1.29, and 1.30 illustrate the penetration
of FSA into OL, FO, and EM loan markets, respectively. Clearly, OL loans have much higher penetration
rates than FO or EM loans do. During the four-year
period from FY 2000 to 2003, FSA made an average of
11,885 OL loans per year. This compares with 1,532
FO loans and 1,621 EM loans. Thus FSA makes
about 7.75 times as many OL loans as they do FO
loans, and 7.8 times as many OL loans as they do EM
loans in any given year. Given that the same denominator is used for all three types of loans, (OL, FO,
EM), the comparative magnitude of the calculated
penetration ratios is as expected. While the OL map
is quite similar to the overall map, the FO and EM
maps show much greater variation across the country. Penetration rates for FO loans in the Northern
Plains and the Midwest are generally higher than

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database and
2002 Census of Agriculture
Figure 1.27. All FSA Direct Loans market penetration percentage by county, FY 2000–2003
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Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database and
2002 Census of Agriculture
Figure 1.28. FSA Direct OL market penetration percentage, FY 2000–2003

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database and
2002 Census of Agriculture
Figure 1.29. FSA Direct FO market penetration percentage, FY 2000–2003
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Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database and
2002 Census of Agriculture
Figure 1.30. FSA Direct EM market penetration percentage, FY 2000–2003
only localized within and across states, but irregular
and unforeseen as well.

elsewhere in the country. The penetration rates of
EM loans are highly dependent on the location of
natural disaster declarations, but the EM loan penetration rates are higher in the Delta States, the Coastal
Plains, areas of the Northern and Southern Plains,
and the Northeast.

1.3.2. FSA Penetration in Small Family Farm
Markets
FSA policy is concerned with helping smaller family
farms. To measure how effectively this market is penetrated it would be useful to compute a penetration
ratio for the small farm segment of the farm population. Unfortunately, data to do this in a straightforward manner are not available. Sales figures for
direct loan borrowers were not available from the
FSA databases. Therefore, the numerator of the market penetration number is estimated using ARMS
data. Small farms receiving FSA Direct Loan assistance are those farms with sales of less than $250,000
reporting FSA as the source for one or more originated loans during the calendar year of the survey.
Within the four-year period, ARMS estimated a total
of 35,557 of these small farms. When the full set of
basic method criteria are applied to 2002 Census of

The state level penetration rates for OL and FO loans
have a correlation coefficient of 0.61, which indicates
a high degree of correlation between the two loan
types. This indicates that states exhibiting a higher
penetration rate for the OL loan program are likely to
exhibit a higher penetration rate for the FO loan program (and vice versa). FO and EM loan penetration
correlation coefficient is 0.57 while that of OL and
EM loan is 0.56. These figures indicate that if a state
penetrates higher in the FO or OL loan markets, it is
likely to penetrate higher into the EM market, but
this relationship is less pronounced than that of the
relationship between OL and FO loans. This is
undoubtedly due to the fact that EM loans are
dependent on disaster declarations, which are not
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Agriculture data with the additional criterion that
sales are below $250,000, an estimated 694,859 farms
are FSA eligible for the 50 states. However, the
numerator from ARMS does not include Alaska and
Hawaii. These states are therefore removed from the
denominator. So, the denominator used for the small
family farm market penetration calculation is the 48state adjusted 693,388 FSA eligible farms from the
2002 Census of Agriculture, giving a penetration
ratio of 5.13 percent for small family farms.

combined penetration calculation is 4,040. The
denominator for the SDA penetration calculations is
101,195 FSA loan-eligible SDAs obtained from the
2002 Census of Agriculture. The calculated ratio
based on these numbers is 3.99 percent. Counting
SDAs solely on the basis of assistance types likely
underestimates FSA penetration into SDA markets.
For instance there are women and minorities who
received EM loans or non-SDA loans. They are omitted in any SDA assistance code-based classification.
To estimate the magnitude of undercounting resulting from the use of assistance codes, we counted all
SDA qualified applicants who received an FSA Direct
Loan including EM loans from FY 2000 to 2003.
There are 4,676 SDA borrowers when SDA assistance
code, gender, and race/ethnicity are used to classify a
borrower as SDA. This results in a penetration ratio
of 4.62 percent.

1.3.3. FSA Penetration in SDA Farm Markets
Over the four-year period from FY 2000 to FY 2003
in the 50-state region, there were 3,489 unique SDA
OL borrowers and 1,065 unique SDA FO borrowers
and a total of 4,040 SDA borrowers (OL and FO combined and adjusted for double counting).23
Therefore, the numerator in our SDA OL and FO

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database and
2002 Census of Agriculture
Figure 1.31. FSA Direct SDA FO and OL combined market penetration percentage,
FY 2000–2003
A borrower is classified as an SDA borrower if the loan has an assistance code indicating an SDA loan. Thus, if a woman gets an
OL loan with a non-SDA assistance code, she would not be counted in these totals as an SDA borrower. Conversely, any borrower
having an SDA code is counted as an SDA borrower regardless of their reported demographics. While we collected demographic
data, it was not complete nor will it ever be complete due to missing data in FSA records. However, all loans have an assistance
code. The maps presented for SDA penetration are computed from assistance code-based counts.
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and South Dakota. With the exception of Nevada,
these states also exhibit a high concentration of SDA
borrowers. Penetration is smallest in Delaware,
Maryland, Florida, Ohio, Indiana, New Jersey,
Oregon, and Colorado. The small family farm-penetration ratio of 5.13 is larger than the SDA penetration ratio of 3.99.24 However, the ratios were estimated using different data sources for the numerators.
The small-family farm numerator uses expanded
farm counts from ARMS whereas the SDA numerator
uses actual FSA SDA farm borrower counts. The
small-family farm numerator contains EM loans that
the SDA numerator does not contain. Therefore, the
ratios are not directly comparable.

Figure 1.31 illustrates the market penetration of FSA
into the SDA market as a whole based solely on assistance code over the FY 2000–2003 period.
Penetration rates are generally high in states where
SDA borrowers are clustered. It may be that higher
concentrations of SDAs lead to greater sensitivity of
both FSA and potentially eligible applicants to making/applying for direct loans. Two states, Rhode
Island and Alaska, exhibit penetration rates of 23.19
and 17.65 percent, respectively. The high rates may
be a result of the fact that the states have relatively few
SDA farms. Rhode Island made direct OL and FO
loans to 16 SDA borrowers over the study period
while having an estimated eligible base of 69. Alaska
made direct OL and FO loans to nine SDA borrowers
with an estimated eligible base of 51. Aside from the
above two states, SDA penetration is highest in
Massachusetts, Louisiana, Hawaii, Oklahoma, North
Dakota, West Virginia, Arkansas, Nevada, Mississippi,

Figure 1.32 shows the market penetration of FSA into
the SDA market with OL loans. The nationwide average penetration into the SDA OL market is 3.38 percent. Rhode Island has the highest penetration

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database and
2002 Census of Agriculture

Figure 1.32. FSA Direct SDA OL market penetration percentage, FY 2000–2003
Penetration for SDA based on assistance type alone counts only OL and FO loans. The penetration obtained by counting all
female, all races/ethnicity other than white, and all SDA assistance codes (without double counting) is 4.62.
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Female borrowers are an important segment of SDA
borrowers. FSA made fewer loans to women than the
racial/ethnic SDA population resulting in a lower
market penetration rate for women since more
women are estimated as FSA eligible than are
racial/ethnic operators. About 32 percent of women
operators (73,435 of 232,668) are estimated as FSA
eligible. Similarly, about 32 percent of all SDAs are
FSA eligible (table 1.5.). For FY 2000–2003, 1,922
women originated 3,669 FSA Direct OL, FO, and EM
loans resulting in a penetration ratio of 2.62 percent.
Thus, the comparable estimate of 4.62 percent for all
SDA implies that FSA penetration is higher for SDA
ethnic market than for SDA gender market.

(20.29 percent) while Maryland has the least penetration (0.45 percent). The OL penetrations follow the
same pattern as do the overall SDA penetrations. Out
of all loans made to SDA borrowers, OL loans make
up 86 percent of the total so it is not surprising that
figures 1.31 and 1.32 follow a similar pattern.
Figure 1.33 illustrates the market penetration of FSA
Direct Loans into the SDA FO market. Market penetration ranged from a high of 11.76 percent for
Alaska to a low of zero percent for Connecticut while
the U.S. average is 1.02 percent. The pattern of the
FO map shows strong similarities to the pattern of
the OL map. In general, the Southeast region has less
penetration of the FO market than the OL market,
while the Northeast region has greater penetration
into the FO market. The correlation coefficient
between SDA FO and SDA OL penetration is 0.67,
which indicates a fairly strong degree of correlation
between the two figures.

As figures 1.11–1.16 presented earlier illustrate, SDA
borrowers tend to be clustered in specific geographical regions. This is primarily due to historical population settlement factors. Thus, the SDA market is
very thin in some states.

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database and
2002 Census of Agriculture
Figure 1.33. FSA Direct SDA FO market penetration percentage, FY 2000–2003
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Table 1.5 lists the average annual number of farms by
race and eligibility type estimated from the 2002
Census of Agriculture. As table 1.5 shows, between
21 and 43 percent of the total number of farms in any
given SDA class and 32 percent of all SDA classes
combined are classified as eligible. The basic method
classified 37 percent of all 2,128,982 farms as eligible.
Thus, the eligibility percentages for SDAs are slightly
lower than the eligibility percentage of the general
population. This is due to the fact that relatively
more SDA-type farms, especially African American
farms, are classed as hobby or low debt than their
non-SDA peers.

data. The first set pertains to OL eligible farms and
consists of FSA eligible farms with ten years or less of
farming experience. The second set corresponds to
FO eligible farms and consists of FSA eligible farms
with three to ten years of experience and owning
acreage less than or equal to 30 percent of the county
average farm size (as computed from the 2002 Census
of Agriculture).
Figure 1.34 portrays the annual market penetration
rates of FSA into the BF market as a whole (both OL
and FO) over the four-year time frame of the study.
The ‘market’ used for the denominator of the penetration rates for this map is BF OL eligible farms.
This is a less restrictive definition of beginning
farmer, and it is appropriate as a denominator since
the numerator is a combination of BF OL and BF FO
borrowers.25 The estimated penetration ratios ranged
from 0.48 to 20.13 percent. Excluding Rhode Island
with a penetration ratio of 20.13 percent reduces the
upper limit of the range to 10.00 percent. Even considering the reduced range, there is still a wide variability in market penetration.

1.3.4. FSA Penetration in Beginning Farmer
Markets
The criteria for beginning farmer eligibility differ
between OL and FO loans. For OL loans, a farmer is
eligible for BF assistance if he or she has operated a
farm or ranch for ten years or less (USDA/FSA, 2004
c). For FO loans, a farmer is eligible for BF assistance
if he or she has operated a farm or ranch between
three and ten years and “does not own a farm greater
than 30 percent of the average farm size in the county” (USDA/FSA, 2004 c). In order to characterize
market penetration, two sets of BF eligible borrowers
are estimated from the 2002 Census of Agriculture

Penetration is highest for Rhode Island, the Dakotas,
Nebraska, Alaska, Louisiana, and New Hampshire.
The Del-Mar-Va region, Texas, Florida, New Jersey,

Table 1.5. Estimated number of FSA-eligible farms by race and gender
Ra ce

F SANon-FSA
All
Percent
e ligible
e ligible
e ligible
6,281
24,008
30,289
21
7,815
12,967
20,782
38
17,424
32,108
49,532
35
298
516
814
37
2,905
3,901
6,806
43
73,435 159,233 232,668
32
31,274
66,385
97,659
32
101,195 219,093 320,288
32

Black or African American
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Hispanic or Latino
Hawaiian Native
Asian
Women
SDA ethnic
SDA

Source: Computed from the 2002 Census of Agriculture

25 “Combination” means

that if an individual had both an OL and an FO loan within the four years, then they were only counted
once in this map. So, it would not be correct to call it the “sum” of OL and FO loans.
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Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database and
2002 Census of Agriculture
Figure 1.34. FSA Direct beginning farmer FO and OL combined market
penetration percentage, FY 2000–2003
Ohio, and Indiana all exhibit low penetration numbers. The low penetration rates in California, Texas,
and Florida probably reflect the large scale agriculture characteristic of those states. The large scale
implies that the limits on the loan sizes ($200,000)
may not be sufficient to allow a large number of
beginning farmers to purchase a commercially viable
farm with such limited resources.
Figures 1.35 and 1.36 illustrate the separate average
annual penetration rates for the BF OL and BF FO
markets, respectively. Regional penetration patterns
remain largely the same as the combined map (figure
1.34). The Northern Plains and most of the Lake
States regions demonstrate increased penetration
into the BF FO market relative to the BF OL market.
In general, the disparity of penetration rates across
states is generally less for FO loans at the lower penetration levels. Forty states have a penetration rate less
than or equal to 3.68 percent for FO whereas in the
39

OL market the rate in order of penetration rate for
the 40th state is 6.12 percent. This pattern reverses
for high penetration rates where FO loan rates have
wider dispersion. Further analysis is necessary to
determine the reasons for this variability. A disparity
in land cost across regions could be a factor. For
example, land value in Montana ($390 per acre for
land and buildings in 2003) is low compared with
land value in Connecticut ($9,500 per acre for land
and buildings in 2003) (USDA/NASS, 2004 a). But
the mix of operating and land costs for various crops
might also be a factor resulting in larger heterogeneity.
1.3.5. Summary of Market Penetration for FSA
Direct Loan Programs
Table 1.6 provides a summary of the calculated market penetration percentages for various FSA Direct
Loan markets. The table indicates that the penetration percentage for any of the cohorts ranges between
3.16 and 5.13 percent. Beginning farmers seem to
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Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database and
2002 Census of Agriculture
Figure 1.35. FSA Direct beginning farmer OL market penetration
percentage, FY 2000–2003

Source: Computed from FSA New Loan Database and
2002 Census of Agriculture
Figure 1.36. FSA Direct beginning farmer FO market penetration
percentage, FY 2000–2003
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Table 1.6. Calculated penetration percentages by cohort
Ca te gor y
Small family farm
Beginning farm**
SDA farm
All family farms

OL
na
2.49
3.38**
2.93

FO
na
2.04
1.02**
0.76

OL a nd F O
co m bin e d
na
3.16
3.99**
3.37

OL, FO, and EM
co m bin e d
5.13*
na
4.62***
3.66

Sources: 2002 Census of Agriculture, New Loan Database, and ARMS data.
* Numerator is estimated from ARMS data and therefore includes all FSA borrowers.
** Numerator is based on loan assistance type.
*** Numerator includes loans by SDA assistance type and non-SDA loans to women
and ethnic/racial minorities.

holding some form of FSA Direct Loans, we found
the number of new originators plus old originators is
about five times the number of only new originators.
Thus if penetration is viewed as percent of the market holding some form of FSA Direct Loans, the
ratios would increase by roughly a factor of five.

have benefited from targeting, especially in FO loans,
while SDAs seem to have benefited most from OL
loans. The fact that the SDA rate of 4.62 is greater
than the overall 3.66 rate suggests targeting has
directed more loans to SDA borrowers than would
otherwise happen. But SDA borrowers may be better
financially qualified and would therefore receive
more loans without targeting. This issue is investigated later. Overall, penetration into FO markets is
smaller than OL markets probably due to the lower
proportion of FO loans made.

It is our opinion that the actual penetration rates are
much higher than estimated above. The definition of
the denominator is very inclusive. Farms with sales
over $5,000 are included as well as any farmer under
age fifty with less than ten years of experience.26
These two criteria are minimal. If these criteria were
tightened up such as making the minimal gross cash
sales $25,000 or $50,000, the numbers of FSA eligible
farmers would plummet. As the ARMS data show,
the average new FSA borrower had gross cash farm
income of about $196,000. Decreasing the number of
FSA eligible farms would correspondingly increase
the penetration ratios since the numerators would
remain unchanged. Although our definition is consistent with the literature (Dodson and Koenig, 2000)
and there is no “true” definition, the resulting estimates are almost certainly far too low. The best use
of the rates is for comparisons with different regions,
loan types, and borrower sub-groupings—but not as
reliable indicators of FSA reaching all those in need of
their Direct Loan Programs.

It is clear that market penetration varies considerably
across the states. Dodson and Koenig (2003) attribute this to varying levels of financial stress, accessibility to FSA service centers, state loan allocations, and
the presence of beginning and women farmers. Thus
it makes sense that varying penetration rates would
be observed across states because the above factors
are not distributed uniformly across states.
The actual penetration rates themselves appear at
first glance to be small. However it must be remembered that these are rates of new loan originators.
When these figures are adjusted to account for current holders of FSA debt, the level of market penetration appears much stronger. That is, when ARMS
data were used to estimate the number of farmers
26 This

also assumes non-corporate ownership but this removes relatively few farms.
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The amount of money allocated to FSA lending is a
major limiting factor in market penetration levels.
Figure 1.37 presents the amount of money allocated
to FSA from FY 2000 to 2004 and the amount obligated by the end of the fiscal year.

important to determine if FSA borrowers are distinctly in financially weaker circumstances than those
operators not receiving FSA credit. To determine if
such differences exist, it is necessary to compare the
financial characteristics of FSA borrowers with nonFSA borrowers. The only data source available for
such a comparison is ARMS. As mentioned previously, the Census of Agriculture does not collect
detailed financial information. Detailed financial
information on FSA borrowers is available for many
FSA borrowers in the FHP data but it is problematic
to use it to compare with ARMS data on non-borrowers. The difficulty is that the ARMS financial data
are gathered at year’s end whereas the FHP data can
be collected at any time of the year and the definitions of the variables are somewhat different. To control for these differences it is necessary to use ARMS
data for both FSA borrowers and non-FSA borrowers
for comparison purposes. FHP data are subsequently
used when comparing various FSA borrower groups.

The figure shows that almost the entire amount allocated to FSA is obligated by the end of the fiscal year
except for FY 2000. In fact, 95 to 100 percent of the
allocated amount was obligated by the end of each
fiscal year for 2001-2004. Therefore, for FSA to make
more loans than it is currently making, it would need
more allocations or to reduce the principal obligated
to borrowers on average so more funds are available
to serve additional borrowers.

1.4. Financial Characteristics of FSA Borrowers
Farm operators capable of obtaining credit from conventional sources should not be receiving FSA Direct
Loans. As a part of measuring effectiveness, it is

Figure 1.37. Combined FSA Direct OL and FO loan allocations vs. obligations, as of
September 30, FY 2000–2004
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In order to assess the comparative financial strengths
of the different FSA borrower groups and non-FSA
borrowers, five financial characteristics are measured
in the various sections that follow:
a. Solvency. Measured by the debt-to-asset ratio
which is computed by dividing borrowers’
debts by assets; farm assets and farm debts are
used for ARMS data, and total farm and nonfarm assets and debts are used for FHP data;
b. Liquidity. Measured by the current ratio which
is computed by dividing current assets by current liabilities;
c. Profitability. Measured by the rate of return on
assets which is computed for the FHP data by
the planned net farm income minus planned
family living expenses all divided by total assets;
d. Repayment capacity. Measured by the term debt
coverage ratio when using ARMS data which is
computed by dividing net farm income plus
off-farm income plus depreciation plus interest
minus estimated income tax expense minus
family living expenses by scheduled principal
and interest payments; a similar measure of
repayment capacity when using FHP data is
computed by dividing the balance available to
service principal and interest payments by the
total amount of principal and interest payments due in current year; and
e. Financial efficiency. Measured by the asset
turnover ratio which is computed by dividing
gross farm income by farm assets; and the operating expense ratio which is computed by dividing total cash operating expenses by gross cash
farm income.

1.4.1. Comparative Financial Characteristics of FSA
Eligible Farmers
Table 1.7 lists selected financial characteristics of FSA
eligible farm operators obtained from the ARMS
data. Those classified as FSA new recipients are eligible farms receiving at least one FSA-sourced loan in
the calendar year of the ARMS survey. Farms classified as FSA old recipients are eligible farms reporting
FSA-sourced loans but not listing any FSA-sourced
loans originated in the calendar year of the ARMS
survey. Non-FSA recipients include all the remaining
FSA eligible farms in the ARMS data.
Because the figures reported in table 1.7 are estimates
based on the ARMS survey, they are accompanied by
their standard errors. The standard errors were computed using the delete-a-group jackknife procedure
(Dubman, 2000). Dubman states that the use of classical variance formulas is not appropriate because of
the ARMS survey’s complex, multi-phase, probability-weighted sampling design and changes in weight
estimation. The standard errors are used for testing if
the observed differences are statistically significant.
To evaluate whether or not the observed differences
between means are statistically significant, t-statistics
at the 5 percent level of significance (two-tailed) and
28 degrees of freedom with a critical t-value of 2.048
are computed for each of the three possible two-way
comparisons.27
In terms of estimated means, the FSA borrowers (new
and old recipients) generally have higher gross cash
income, cash expenses, net cash farm income, net
farm income, farm assets, and farm liabilities than
those of their non-FSA but eligible counterparts.
However, only the difference in cash expense for FSA
new recipients compared with non-FSA recipients is
statistically significant. The more revealing differences are in equity and financial ratio comparisons.
The non-recipients have higher mean farm equity
than the loan recipients and the difference between

Under normal conditions, a borrower’s financial
strength is expected to be inversely related to the
debt-to-asset-ratio and operating expense ratio, and
directly related to the current ratio, profitability,
repayment capacity, and asset turnover ratio.

27 The statistics do not have exactly a t-distribution but the critical value is more conservative than assuming a standard normal
distribution.
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while non-FSA farms have a debt-to-asset ratio of
23.5 percent.

old recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant. In general, FSA debtors have higher average
debt-to-asset ratios (indicating lower solvency) than
the non-borrowers and these differences are statistically significant. The new and old recipients have
average debt-to-asset ratios of 38.2 and 36.1 percent,

In terms of term debt coverage ratio (a measure of
repayment capacity), which indicates the average
level of funds available for every $1 of principal and

Table 1.7. Financial characteristics of FSA-eligible farms by debt type, 2000–2003 average

Number of farms
Farm operation income statement
Gross cash income
Livestock income
Crop income
Government payments
Other farm-related income
Less: Cash expenses
Variable expenses
Fixed expenses
Real estate & property taxes
Interest expenses
Insurance premium
Rent & lease payments
Net cash farm income
Less:

Depreciation
Labor, non-cash benefits

Plus:

Value of inventory change
Non-money income

Net farm income

F SA sta tu s
F SA ne w
FSA old
r e cip ie nts r e cip ie nts
(a )
(b)
7,724
30,719
196,292
(25,601)
50,739
(11,823)
98,263
(13,314)
23,557
(3,388)
23,734
(3,196)
165,240
(21,839)
119,067
(16,884)
46,173
(6,247)
2,955
(455)
13,943
(1,917)
6,755
(936)
22,521
(3,608)
31,052
(8,410)
19,184
(3,447)
491
(214)
11,393
(3,110)
3,952
(520)
26,723
(7,518)
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160,484
(13,718)
62,395
(6,394)
53,660
(7,567)
17,059
(1,399)
27,369
(3,413)
128,931
(20,167)
93,257
(17,408)
35,674
(3,074)
2,980
(218)
14,755
(1,273)
5,056
(370)
12,884
(1,730)
31,552
(8,607)
19,211
(1,129)
344
(167)
6,634
(3,187)
4,492
(273)
23,123
(7,457)

Non-FSA
recipients
(c )
792,686
144,410
(6,215)
50,016
(2,773)
62,210
(2,901)
11,854
(184)
20,330
(1,020)
117,546
(4,570)
89,172
(3,885)
28,375
(745
2,888
(90)
10,350
(449)
4,001
(102)
11,136
(263)
26,864
(1,862)
14,553
(573)
354
(31)
5,016
(630)
5,450
(115)
22,423
(1,793)

a-b

t-va lue s
a-c

b-c

1.23

1.97

1.07

-0.87

0.06

1.78

2.91*

2.65*

-1.06

1.77

3.45*

3.69*

-0.78

1.01

1.98

1.22

2.148*

0.55

1.06

1.73

0.23

1.51

2.83*

2.31*

-0.05

0.14

0.39

-0.35

1.83

3.26*

1.69

2.93*

2.74*

2.41*

3.15*

1.00

-0.04

0.49

0.53

-0.01

1.33

3.68*

0.54

0.63

-0.06

1.07

2.01

0.50

-0.92
0.34

-2.81* -3.24*
0.56

0.09
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Table 1.7. Continued.

Item
F a r m o p e r a t i o n b a l a n c e sh e e t
Farm assets
Current assets
Non-current assets
Farm liabilities
Current liabilities
Non-current liabilities
Farm equity
Current ratio
Debt-to-asset ratio (%)
Term debt coverage ratio
Asset turnover ratio
Operating expense ratio (%) **

F SA ne w
r e cip ie nts
(a )

F SA sta tu s
FSA old
r e cip ie nts
(b)

714,885
(80,934)
112,581
(18,799)
602,305
(66,122)
219,277
(25,414)
79,508
(9,242)
139,769
(18,342)
495,608
(61,740)
2.21
(0.40)
38.21
(3.07)
4.15
(2.06)
0.35
(0.02)
84.18

689,680
(45,920)
74,646
(7,338)
615,034
(40,050)
216,062
(14,473)
53,621
(4,566)
162,440
(11,172)
473,618
(35,957)
3.93
(1.64)
36.11
(1.61)
2.76
(0.71)
0.28
(0.02)
80.34

Non-FSA
recipients
(c )

a-b

t-va lue s
a-c

0.17
700,124 0.27
(33,913)
74,669 1.88
2.00
(2,655)
625,455 -0.16 -0.32
(31,778)
124,567 0.11 3.66*
(4,903)
38,398 2.51* 4.37*
(1,791)
86,169 -1.06 2.88*
(3,274)
575,557 0.31 -1.17
(29,381)
22.44 -1.02 -5.20*
(3.87)
23.48 0.60 3.97*
(2.08)
7.07 0.63 -1.35
(0.65)
0.50 2.23* -1.77
(0.09)
81.40

b-c

-0.18
0.00
-0.20
5.99*
3.10*
6.55*
-2.20*
-4.40*
4.80*
-4.47*
-2.52*

Source: Computed from ARMS data. The standard errors for the estimates (in parentheses) are computed using a
jackknife procedure
*The t-values followed by asterisks indicate that the differences between the means are significant at the 5 percent
level at 28 degrees of freedom and a critical t-value of 2.048 (two-tailed test).
** We used the ratio of the four-year mean cash expenses and gross cash income to compute this variable because the
means of the ratios computed from individual ARMS observations gave extremely high, unrealistic values.
Standard errors are not computed since it is not clear what the appropriate jackknife procedure would be.

interest payments due on term debt, the non-FSA
farms have the highest average value at 7.07 followed
by new recipients at 4.15, but the difference between
the two is not statistically significant. Old FSA
debtors have the worst repayment capacity, an average 2.76 term debt coverage ratio, which is significantly less than the 7.07 ratio for non-recipients.

rowers are significantly less financially efficient
than the new borrowers and their non-FSA counterparts as gauged by their mean asset turnover
ratio, which measures the proportion of gross cash
farm income generated per dollar of farm business
assets. The new borrowers, on the other hand, are
relatively less efficient than both the old and nonFSA borrowers in terms of operating expense ratio,
which measures the proportion of gross cash farm
income absorbed by cash operating expenses. In
general, the non-recipients are significantly

New and old FSA debtors have significantly lower
average current ratios (2.2 and 3.9), indicating less
liquidity than non-FSA farms (22.4). Old FSA bor45
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stronger than old recipients and new recipients
except for term debt coverage and asset turnover
ratios.

ients would likely be greatly changed. Nonetheless,
the data indicate that direct loans on average are supporting farms envisioned in the FSA definition of
farms and are not going to hobby farms. Moreover,
loans are typically not going to farms with strong
financial characteristics on average.

Compared specifically with the non-recipients, the
new FSA loan recipients have 26.4 percent more gross
cash income (mainly coming from 36.7 percent higher crop income and 49.7 percent higher government
payments) and 28.9 percent higher cash expenses
(due mainly to 38.5 percent higher fixed expenses).
These differences result in new FSA loan recipients
having 13.5 percent more net cash farm income and
16.1 percent higher net farm income than non-FSA
recipients, although they are not significantly different. While the new FSA borrowers have slightly higher (2.1 percent) assets, they also have accumulated
significantly more (43.2 percent) liabilities, making
their farm equity 16.1 percent lower than the nonrecipients.

New and old FSA loan recipients have few significant
differences in financial characteristics. New FSA loan
recipients have significantly more crop income, rent
and lease payments, and current liabilities and a
greater asset turnover ratio than FSA loan recipients
via older loans. Although new recipients appear to
have better repayment capacity than the old recipients as measured by the term debt coverage ratio, the
difference is not statistically significant. Likewise, the
differences in average solvency (measured by debt-toasset-ratio), liquidity (measured by current ratio),
and financial efficiency (measured by operating
expense ratio) between the new and old loan recipients are not statistically significant.

On average, FSA debtors tend to have more financial
leverage (less solvency), less liquidity, lower repayment capacity, and slightly less efficiency than their
non-FSA counterparts. Farmers having high leverage, low liquidity, and less repayment capacity are
more likely to be denied credit from conventional
sources and, therefore, need to rely on FSA assistance.

1.4.2. Comparative Financial Characteristics of SDA
and Non-SDA Farmers
Table 1.8 lists select financial characteristics of FSA
eligible farms obtained from the ARMS data. Farms
classed as ‘SDA race’ are all FSA eligible farms in the
ARMS dataset, indicating operation by a farmer who
is of a race or ethnicity outside of “White, not of
Hispanic Origin.” This sample includes all of the
SDA race categories targeted by FSA. Farms classed
as ‘SDA gender’ are all FSA eligible farms in the
ARMS dataset, indicating operation by a farmer who
is of the gender “Female” (regardless of race). Farms
classed as ‘non-SDA’ are all FSA eligible farms in the
ARMS dataset not fitting into either the SDA race or
SDA gender classifications.29

The comparative financial characteristics discussed
above indicate that FSA borrowers are distinct from
non-FSA but eligible recipients. FSA loan recipients
are clearly much more in debt and, potentially, financially stressed. FSA recipients also have more gross
cash income than non-FSA but eligible recipients on
average, although not significantly more. Since our
criteria for hobby farms are minimal, more demanding criteria would reduce the pool of eligible nonrecipients even further.28 If additional hobby farms
were removed, the financial figures for the non-recip28 The

$5,000 in gross farm income is minimal. Assuming that most of the $5,000 gets absorbed by expenses, a household relying on
farming income is generating very little of its living expenses from the farm. Much larger sales would be needed to generate net income
that would make up a substantial portion of household expenses.
29 The analysis that follows would be more illuminating if we could have used new and old SDA borrowers. However, the number of
SDA borrowers in the ARMS data is too low to allow for useful inference so we are forced to compare among FSA eligible groups.
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cent level, SDA gender farms also have relatively
lower repayment capacity as measured by the term
debt coverage ratio, better liquidity as measured by
the current ratio, and less financial efficiency as
measured by the asset turnover and operating
expense ratios than non-SDA farms.

In general, SDA race farms are similar to their nonSDA counterparts with respect to observed gross cash
income, cash expenses, net cash farm income, net
farm income as well as their farm assets, farm liabilities, and farm equity. Although there are no statistically significant differences for the mean values of
these variables at the 5 percent level, SDA race mean
values are lower by 11.3, 9.0, 22.6, 27.5, 18.0, and 18.4
percent, respectively, than non-SDA mean values. In
addition, SDA farmer current ratio, term debt coverage ratio, asset turnover ratio and operating expense
ratio, while 19.0 percent lower, 1.3 percent lower, 24.6
percent lower and 42 percent higher, respectively, are
also not statistically different than those of the nonSDA farmers. The 37.6 percent difference in mean
debt-to-asset ratios, however, is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The debt-to-asset ratio for
SDA race is 17.9 percent while that for non-SDA is
24.6 percent, making SDA race relatively more solvent. In fact, the only significant differences between
SDA race and non-SDA eligible farmers besides debtto-asset ratio are that SDA race farmers have lower
government payments, insurance premiums, and
depreciation expenses than non-SDA eligible farmers.

As observed earlier, the average OL loan principal for
SDA farmers is considerably lower than that for nonSDA farmers. The somewhat smaller size as measured by the gross cash income of SDA farmers, particularly women, might account for this. The smaller
size also suggests that SDA farmers may not be benefiting from economies of scale. However, FO loans
did not show a similar disparity. This relative difference between OL and FO loan principal for SDA and
non-SDA farms might have resulted from FO loan
sizes being more homogenous since 70 percent of the
funds have to be directed to beginning farmers.
In general, the income statement of SDA race farms is
significantly superior, in absolute values and statistically, to that of the SDA gender farms. The SDA race
farms’ average gross cash income, cash expenses, net
cash farm income, and net farm income are higher
than those of the SDA gender farm by 55.5, 50.2, 81.2,
and 71.4 percent, respectively. The balance sheet of
the of SDA race farms also appears to be stronger,
although not statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. Farm equity is 15.7 percent higher, mainly
because of 15.1 percent higher non-current assets.
Likewise, the differences in the various financial
ratios between SDA race and SDA gender are not statistically significant.

SDA gender farms, however, exhibit statistically significant differences in financial characteristics from
both the non-SDA farms and SDA race farms that are
especially apparent from the comparative income
statement and balance sheet data in table 1.8. The
SDA gender farms have approximately 40.0 and 45.7
percent of the gross cash income and expenses of
non-SDA farms, while showing 22.4 percent of the
net farm income of the non-SDA group. Although
the size of their operations measured as by gross cash
income is only 40.0 percent of non-SDA farms, they
have 69.1 percent of the assets, 59.6 percent of the liabilities, and 71.2 percent of the equity of their nonSDA counterparts. The estimates also indicate that
SDA gender farms exhibit significantly less financial
leverage (higher solvency) as measured by the debtto-asset ratio than non-SDA farms. Although the differences are not statistically significant at the 5 per-

Financially, SDA race farmers appear to be similar to
non-SDA farmers. However, two significant differences are government payments and debt-to-asset
ratio, where SDA race farmers had less government
payments and smaller debt-to-asset ratios than nonSDA farmers on average. These differences could be
explained by the fact that SDA race borrowers tend to
be concentrated regionally whereas non-SDA bor47
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Table 1.8. Financial characteristics of FSA-eligible farms by SDA status, 2000–2003 average

Item
Number of farms
Farm operation income statement
Gross cash income
Livestock income
Crop income
Government payments
Other farm-related income
Less: Cash expenses
Variable expenses
Fixed expenses
Real estate & property taxes
Interest expenses
Insurance premium
Rent & lease payments
Net cash farm income
Less: Depreciation
Labor, non-cash benefits
Plus:

Value of inventory change
Non-money income

Net farm income

SDA race
(a )
45,180

SDA status
SDA gender
(b)
56,135

Non-SDA
(c)
774,995

136,245
(17,885)
40,844
(6,109)
71,394
(11,489)
6,887
(814)
17,121
(3,126)
112,811
(19,161)
89,235
(16,004)
23,577
(3,357)
2,380
(297)
9,286
(1,341)
2,855
(432)
9,055
(1,718)
23,434
(6,499)
10,503
(1,411)
303
(132)
1,206
(3,457)
4,776
(686)
18,610
(7,600)

60,589
(7,859)
18,612
(3,347)
27,150
(5,882)
4,045
(810)
10,783
(1,285)
56,189
(6,888)
42,934
(5,698)
13,255
(1,426)
2,066
(115)
5,966
(670)
1,973
(167)
3,250
(777)
4,401
(2,612)
7,943
(1,462)
228
(57)
2,967
(1,217)
6,120
(523)
5,317
(3,520)

151,644
(6,692)
52,791
(3,043)
64,770
(3,094)
12,746
(201)
21,337
(1,055)
122,925
(5,057)
92,984
(4,313)
29,941
(811)
2,952
(93)
10,879
(459)
4,218
(111)
11,891
(302)
28,719
(1,925)
15,265
(623)
364
(31)
5,294
(680)
5,348
(104)
23,733
(1,830)

rowers are distributed much more uniformly across
the nation. Types of agriculture vary regionally, and
certain types of agriculture may not qualify for as
many government payments and may require more
solvency than other types of agriculture. SDA gender
farms are significantly smaller in size, have less
income, and have higher solvency than non-SDA
farms.
30 Ideally,

a-b

t-values
a-c

3.87*

-0.81

-8.82*

3.19*

-1.75

-7.56*

3.43*

0.56

-5.66*

2.47*

-6.99*

-10.42*

b-c

1.88

-1.28

-6.35*

2.78*

-0.51

-7.81*

2.73*

-0.23

-7.00*

2.83*

-1.84

-10.17*

0.99

-1.84

-6.01*

2.22*

-1.12

-6.05*

1.91

-3.06*

-11.22*

3.08*

-1.63

-10.37*

2.72*

-0.78

-7.50*

1.26

-3.09*

-4.61*

0.52

-0.44

-2.10*

-0.48

-1.16

-1.67

-1.56

-0.82

1.45

1.59

-0.66

-4.64*

1.4.3. Comparative Financial Characteristics of
Beginning Farmers
Table 1.9 lists select financial characteristics of FSA
eligible farms obtained from the ARMS data for comparing BF eligible and ineligible farmers.30 The
income statement and balance sheet variables of
beginning farmers differ substantially and, for most
variables, significantly from those of non-beginning

we would use ARMS data to examine the characteristics of farmers receiving BF loans instead of the broader grouping of
“eligible” farmers. Unfortunately, the nature of the ARMS data does not permit such analysis. While ARMS does identify the source
of funds, just knowing that a farm operator satisfies BF criteria and has an FSA loan does not mean the loan was obtained through
the BF program although it is likely so.
48
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Table 1.8. Continued.

Item
F a r m o p e r a t i o n b a l a n c e sh e e t
Farm assets

SDA race
(a )

605,884
(64,419)
Current assets
65,255
(7,530)
Non-current assets
540,630
(59,396)
114,206
Farm liabilities
(15,714
Current liabilities
36,175
(5,621)
Non-current liabilities
78,031
(11,036)
Farm equity
491,678
(52,632)
Current ratio
17.78
(3.72)
Debt-to-asset ratio (%)
17.89
(1.57)
Term debt coverage ratio
6.83
(2.35)
Asset turnover ratio
0.40
(0.18)
Operating expense ratio (%) **
82.80

SDA status
SDA gender
(b)

Non-SDA
(c)

a-b

t-values
a-c

b-c

493,711 714,797 1.48 -1.49 -4.19*
(39,718) (34,798)
34,895
77,930 3.51* -1.59 -8.55*
(4,275)
(2,656)
458,816 636,867 1.17 -1.42 -3.61*
(37,104) (32,593)
78,981 132,482 1.84 -1.11 -4.45*
(10,918)
(5,005)
19,529
40,788 2.42* -0.78 -4.94*
(3,941)
(1,729)
59,452
91,695 1.35 -1.18 -3.63*
(8,176)
(3,453)
414,730 582,315 1.25 -1.49 -3.79*
(32,271) (30,154)
26.96
21.16 -1.44 -0.63
0.89
(5.20)
(3.91)
16.90
24.61 0.38 -2.53* -2.60*
(2.06)
(2.14)
5.26
6.92 0.37 -0.46 -0.04
(3.54)
(0.65
0.44
0.50 -0.14 -0.50 -0.24
(0.23)
(0.08)
92.74
81.06

Source: Computed from ARMS data. The standard errors for the estimates (in parentheses) are computed
using a jackknife procedure
*The t-values followed by asterisks indicate that the differences between the means are significant at the 5
percent level at 28 degrees of freedom and a critical t-value of 2.048 (two-tailed test).
** We used the ratio of the four-year mean cash expenses and gross cash income to compute this variable
because the means of the ratios computed from individual ARMS observations gave extremely high, unrealistic
values. Standard errors are not computed since it is not clear what the appropriate jackknife procedure would
be.

tions that the BF farmers have the characteristics
expected of less experienced farmers. It thus appears
that the beginning farmer loans are targeted to those
farmers who do not have a large asset base or income
level that would be more able to command credit
from conventional sources.

farmers. As expected, beginning farms are much
smaller in financial size than non-beginning farms by
about $150,000 in mean gross cash income. In gross
terms, OL eligible beginning farmers have 27.0 percent of the gross cash income and 29.8 percent of the
cash expenses of the non-BF eligible farmers.
Beginning OL farmers have only 15.7 percent of the
net cash farm income and 23.4 percent of the net
farm income of the non-BF eligible farms. Although
BF OL operators are much smaller in terms of
income, they do have 37.9 percent of the assets, 40.9
percent of the debt, and 37.3 percent of the equity of
the non-BF eligible farms. The significantly lower
asset, debt, equity, and income levels are clear indica-

Overall, BF OL operators are in a significantly more
liquid position than their non-BF counterparts based
on higher mean current ratio. However, the differences in solvency (measured by debt-to-asset ratio),
repayment capacity (measured by term debt coverage
ratio), and financial efficiency (measured by asset
turnover) are all statistically insignificant at the 5 per49
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Table 1.9. Financial characteristics of FSA-eligible farms by beginning farm status,
2000–2003 average
Item

Number of farms
Farm operation income statement
Gross cash income
Livestock income
Crop income
Government payments
Other farm-related income
Less: Cash expenses
Variable expenses
Fixed expenses
Real estate & property taxes
Interest expenses
Insurance premium
Rent & lease payments
Net cash farm income
Less: Depreciation
Labor, non-cash benefits
Plus: Value of inventory change
Non-money income
Net farm income

Beginning farm status
Non-BF
BF FO
BF OL
eligible
eligible
eligible
(c)
(b)
(a )
326,667 179,078 501,153
54,963
(4,248)
18,568
(1,690)
24,082
(2,100)
3,901
(164)
8,412
(1,128)
48,606
(3,045)
36,388
(2,544)
12,218
(620)
1,405
(67)
4,991
(373)
1,570
(61)
4,252
(242)
6,358
(1,402)
6,782
(692)
94
(19)
3,101
(383)
4,934
(186)
7,517
(1,288)

47,415
(3,524)
14,459
(1,808)
23,397
(2,704)
3,421
(222)
6,138
(561)
42,506
(2,775)
31,982
(2,400)
10,524
(557)
1,026
(58)
3,246
(335)
1,368
(73)
4,883
(386)
4,909
(1,329)
4,976
(347)
52
(16)
2,333
(519)
4,735
(195)
6,949
(1,142)

50

203,451
(6,741)
71,140
(3,396)
86,211
(3,533)
17,512
(273)
28,588
(1,100)
163,007
(5,378)
123,508
(4,640)
39,499
(913)
3,851
(104)
14,098
(526)
5,682
(143)
15,868
(400)
40,444
(1,967)
19,923
(526)
524
(37)
6,453
(908)
5,712
(114)
32,162
(2,093)

a-b

t-values
a-c

b-c

1.37

-18.64*

-20.51*

1.66

-13.86*

-14.73*

0.20

-15.12*

-14.12*

1.74

-42.74*

-40.02*

1.80

-12.81*

-18.18*

1.48

-18.51*

-19.91*

1.26

-16.46*

-17.52*

2.03

-24.72*

-27.09*

4.29*

-19.81*

-23.77*

3.48*

-14.12*

-17.40*

2.12*

-26.40*

-26.84*

-1.39

-24.82*

-19.75*

0.75

-14.11*

-14.97*

-15.12*

-23.73*

-10.36*

-11.73*

1.19

-3.40*

-3.94*

0.74

-3.57*

-4.32*

0.33

-10.03*

-10.58*

2.33*
1.64
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Table 1.9. Continued.
Item

Farm operation balance sheet
Farm assets
Current assets
Non-current assets
Farm liabilities
Current liabilities
Non-current liabilities
Farm equity
Current ratio
Debt-to-asset ratio (%)
Term debt coverage ratio
Asset turnover ratio
Operating expense ratio (%)**

Beginning farm status
Non-BF
BF FO
BF OL
eligible
eligible
eligible
(c)
(b)
(a )

350,617
(50,306)
26,919
(1,767)
323,698
(49,270)
68,666
(4,628)
17,258
(1,189)
51,408
(3,797)
281,951
(48,077)
34.54
(7.15)
28.59
(5.24)
5.90
(2.69)
0.65
(0.19)
88.43

221,017
(7,036)
22,779
(1,893)
198,238
(6,162)
43,667
(2,578)
12,886
(1,250)
30,780
(1,935)
177,350
(7,274)
27.48
(6.49)
30.88
(9.38)
8.03
(5.14)
0.76
(0.29)
89.65

924,362
(22,489)
106,198
(2,770)
818,164
(20,608)
167,875
(5,842)
53,689
(1,967)
114,187
(4,198)
756,487
(17,929)
13.36
(2.47)
21.22
(0.73)
7.24
(1.16)
0.39
(0.09)
80.12

a-b

t-values
a-c

b-c

2.55*

-10.41*

-29.85*

1.60

-24.13*

-24.86*

2.53*

-9.26*

-28.82*

4.72*

-13.31*

-19.45*

2.53*

-15.85*

-17.51*

4.84*

-11.09*

-18.04*

2.15*

-9.25*

-29.93*

2.80*

2.03

0.73
-0.21

1.39

1.03

-0.37

0.46

0.15

-0.34

1.21

1.25

Source: Computed from ARMS data. The standard errors for the estimates (in parentheses) are
computed using a jackknife procedure
*The t-values followed by asterisks indicate that the differences between the means are significant at
the 5 percent level at 28 degrees of freedom and a critical t-value of 2.048 (two-tailed test).
** We used the ratio of the four-year mean cash expenses and gross cash income to compute this
variable because the means of the ratios computed from individual ARMS observations gave
extremely high, unrealistic values. Standard errors are not computed since it is not clear what the
appropriate jackknife procedure would be.
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qualify as beginning farmers. Given the recent focus
of FSA on beginning farmers, it appears that the
emphasis on this group can be justified in terms of
helping financially limited farmers. While their debt
positions in terms of debt-to-asset ratios are not dire,
these are farms that are typically not producing levels
of income sufficient to support a family. The average
net farm income of BF eligible farmers is $7,316 dollars, which is less than half of the U.S. federal poverty threshold for 2003 of $15,260 for a family with
three members (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 2003), such that off-farm income is
necessary. With such meager farm income, these
operators are likely to be turned down for conventional loans elsewhere.

cent level. Nonetheless, the differences in these ratios,
except for asset turnover, point toward the BF eligible
farmers being in financially weaker positions, as we
would expect.
Farmers meeting the more restrictive BF FO eligible
definition appear to have slightly lower average
gross cash income, cash expenses, net cash farm
income, and net farm income than their BF OL eligible counterparts, but the differences are not statistically significant. Interestingly, the farm assets,
farm liabilities, and farm equity of BF FO eligible
farmers are about $130 thousand, $25 thousand,
and $105 thousand less, respectively, than those of
the BF OL eligible farmers. These differences are all
statistically significant.

1.4.4. Comparative Financial Ratios among FSA
Direct Loan Borrower Groups

Differences in financial ratios between BF FO and
BF OL farmers are not statistically significant at
the 5 percent level. However, the mean current
ratio for FO eligible BF farmers is lower than the
corresponding ratio for OL eligible BF farmers
but higher than that of the non-BF eligible farmers. The BF OL eligible farmers have a lower average term debt coverage ratio at 5.9 compared to
FO eligible (8.0) and non-BF eligible (7.2) farmers, indicating less repayment capacity, although
the difference is statistically insignificant. Finally,
although the difference is not statistically significant,
both the BF OL and FO eligible farmers appear to be
more financially efficient than non-BF farmers as
indicated by the relatively higher asset turnover
ratios. However, the reverse is true in terms of operating expense ratio, i.e., both the BF OL and FO eligible farmers appear to be spending more on their farm
operations relative to their gross cash income, as indicated by their higher operating expense ratios, than
non-BF farmers.

The information for this section was obtained from a
combination of the national New Loan (NL) database which is described earlier in section 1.1.3 and
the Farm and Home Plan (FHP) database from FY
2000–2003. There were 70,923 new loans originated
and 54,984 borrowers in the original NL database.
After excluding Youth and non-program loans,
60,151 direct loans remained. Seventy-nine percent
were OL, 10.2 percent were FO, and 10.8 percent were
EM loans. These loans went to 45,016 borrowers,
each one of whom had at least one loan of any type.
These 45,016 borrowers are unique within year but
not unique across all four years. A borrower who
received at least one FSA Direct Loan in each of the
four fiscal years would be counted four times. Each
borrower is counted only once in one year even if the
borrower receives multiple types of loan in the same
fiscal year. Allowing for double counting of borrowers with more than one type of loan, the number of
borrowers by loan type is 49,814 consisting of 75.7
percent OL, 12.2 percent FO, and 12.1 percent EM
recipients. Borrowers of FSA loans are required to fill
out a Farm and Home Plan (FHP) each year.
Financial information from the FHP was matched for

The differences in income statement and balance
sheet variable means indicate that the BF program is
targeted to a class of farmers distinctly different from
those farmers who are FSA eligible but who do not
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As we would expect, most of the borrowers received
OL loans. Of the 19,153 borrowers, 16,674 received
at least one OL loan. Correspondingly, 1,946 borrowers received at least one FO loan and 2,616 borrowers
received at least one EM loan. The total number of
borrowers by loan type is 21,236 which exceeds the
count of unique borrowers by 2,038 because of double counting, i.e., some borrowers had more than one
type of loan, hence were counted more than once.

19,153 FSA borrowers during the study period, FY
2000–2003. This represents 42.5 percent of the total
number of borrowers in the final NL file.31 A full
description of the matching process is presented in
appendix 1.C.
The financial ratios used in this section’s analyses
were obtained from this final data set that contains a
subset of FSA borrowers originating loans from the
period FY 2000–2003. This is a group of unique
(within year) FSA borrowers originating new loans
who had completed FHPs. It would have been desirable to have a completed current plan for each new
loan. Most likely, such plans were made but were not
input into the national, electronic database. It was
FSA practice to have these plans completed and
stored either at the county or the regional office.
During the FY 2000–2003 period it was not required
that all plans be entered into the electronic database.
FSA has a plan to have all Farm Business Plans, which
have replaced the FHPs, entered into an electronic
database that will make future analyses like these
more comprehensive. It should also be noted that
multiple loans could be based on one plan. If a borrower received a new loan in a current year based on a
plan from more than a year earlier, our method
would not identify such a plan as a valid, current
plan.

The proportions of borrowers with at least one type
of loan show that OL borrowers comprised the bulk
of total FSA borrowers with new loans. Some 78.5
percent of the 21,236 borrowers had at least one OL
loan. FO and EM borrowers accounted for 9.2 percent and 12.3 percent, respectively. These proportions compare well with the distribution of total
loans given during the same period (79.0, 10.2,
and 10.8 percent, respectively) indicating that the
final sample of borrowers with matched plans is a
fairly good representation of the total borrower
population.
Among the OL borrowers, 53.9 percent had regular
loans, 32.0 percent had beginning farmer loans, 8.2
percent had SDA loans, and 5.9 percent had beginning farmer SDA loans.32 This distribution closely
resembles that of the total OL loans given (51.0, 35.3,
7.3, and 6.4 percent, respectively) during the same
period.

Before analyzing the financial data, it is useful to analyze the observations available to see how representative they are of the full population of FY 2000–2003
originators. This is necessary if we are to use the
financial characteristics of these borrowers as reliable
indicators of the financial characteristics of the population. So, we consider the distribution of loan types
by assistance codes.

The FO borrowers were mostly beginning farmers
(52.6 percent) or regular loans (25.7 percent), with
the rest accounted for by BF/SDA ethnic (7.7 percent), SDA ethnic (6.2 percent), BF/SDA gender (4.7
percent), and SDA gender borrowers (3.1 percent).
For the most part, this distribution compares well

42.5 percent of the population is represented in the sample and the sample is not random, no statistical inference is used in
making comparisons. Ideally, the sample would include the entire population. It does not, and the reasons why are not sufficiently
known to the extent that the resulting sample could be represented to be random. However, we suspect the 42.5 percent is representative of the population. And these data are by far the most comprehensive extant. Therefore the following analysis is the best
available and should be used for assessing borrower characteristics. When more comprehensive data become available in future
years, the analysis here should be superseded by analysis of those data.
32 These are the classifications when the loans are sorted by assistance type. It should be remembered that SDA or BF eligible applicants can also get loans in other assistance types.
31 Since
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with that of the total FO loans given during the same
period (57.0, 25.1, 5.8, 4.4, 4.8 and 2.9 percent,
respectively), indicating good representation.

asset ratio identical to the overall value of 0.68. The
FO borrowers had a lower median debt-to-asset ratio
at 0.63, indicating that they were relatively more solvent than the OL borrowers. The EM borrowers, on
the other hand, were the least solvent, as indicated by
the highest median debt-to-asset ratio of 0.74. This
is not surprising since EM borrowers would not be
getting emergency loans unless they had recently

Table 1.10 shows that the median debt-to-asset-ratio
for the unique 19,153 FSA borrowers was 0.68.33
Because OL borrowers make up a large majority of
borrowers, the OL borrowers had a median debt-to-

Table 1.10. FSA borrower median financial ratios by assistance-type class, FY
2000–2003
Assistance-type class

All loans
All OL
All FO
FO regular
FO BF
FO BF SDA ethnic
FO BF SDA gender
FO SDA gender
FO SDA ethnic
OL regular
OL BF
OL SDA
OL BF SDA
EM
BF
Non-BF

N

19,153
16,674
1,946
501
1,024
149
92
60
121
9,034
5,365
1,371
993
2,616
7,177
11,976

D e bt-to- C u r r e n t
a sse t
ratio
ratio
me dia n
me dia n
0.68
0.71
0.68
0.70
0.63
1.11
0.61
1.05
0.64
1.24
0.67
0.77
0.73
0.66
0.49
1.12
0.54
0.84
0.64
0.70
0.75
0.77
0.61
0.57
0.79
0.45
0.74
0.40
0.74
0.80
0.64
0.67

Return Repayment
on
ability
a sse ts
me dia n
me dia n
0.03
1.03
0.03
1.03
0.00
1.06
0.03
1.04
0.00
1.06
0.00
1.09
0.00
1.07
0.00
1.06
0.00
1.06
0.03
1.02
0.04
1.04
0.01
1.04
0.00
1.04
0.06
1.02
0.03
1.04
0.03
1.03

Source: Computed from combined and matched New Loan and Farm and Home Plan datasets.

are used instead of means because of the skewness of the distributions and data errors even though extreme observations
were removed as part of data cleaning. The means are presented in appendix 1.D. We essentially treat the statistics from the FHP data
as population parameters. Since the sample contains 42.5 percent of the observations on the population, the need for inference is certainly valid. However, even though the sample seems to be representative, it can hardly be called random and the sampling distributions of the medians would be hard to characterize. For most of the comparisons the sample sizes are large in proportion to the population so that most differences in statistics are likely true differences. However, the reader is warned that differences among statistics
might be due to sampling error instead of actual population differences.

33 Medians
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lished by USDA-ERS in their website.37

experienced adverse events driving them into financial stress. These levels of solvency ratios are substantially higher than the national average debt-to-asset
ratio34 for all farm businesses of just under 0.15 during the same four-year period as published by USDAERS in their website.35

Based on the four financial measures used, except for
rate of return on assets, the FO borrowers appeared
to have an overall stronger financial condition than
the OL and EM borrowers. This was intuitively
expected considering the relatively longer term
nature of the FO loans, which should normally
require more stringent loan eligibility requirements.
But it probably also reflects the borrower ages and
length of time in business.

The FSA borrowers had a median current ratio of
0.71, which means borrowers had 71 cents of current
assets for every dollar of current liability. The FO
borrowers, with a median current ratio of 1.11, were
markedly more liquid than the OL borrowers who
had a median current ratio of 0.70. The EM borrowers were the least liquid with a median current ratio
of 0.40. The emergency circumstances of the EM
borrowers explain their lower current ratio compared
with the recipients of the other two loan programs.
The difference between OL and FO borrowers could
be explained by the fact that FO borrowers, who are
mostly beginning farmers, are typically substantially
younger than the typical OL borrower and therefore
have not had the time to acquire as much current
debt. In terms of median repayment ability, the FO
borrowers were again in relatively better shape (1.06)
than the OL borrowers (1.03) and the EM borrowers
(1.02). All FSA borrowers had a median repayment
value of 1.03. The rate of return on assets indicated
that EM borrowers planned to be more profitable followed by OL borrowers and finally FO borrowers. All
FSA borrowers had a median planned rate of profitability of 0.03.

The median debt-to-asset ratio was 0.68. Among the
assistance type groups, the FO SDA gender group had
the lowest median debt-to-asset ratio at 0.49, which
was equivalent to having the best solvency. The OL
BF SDA group had the highest value at 0.79 (or least
solvent). The remaining groups had the following
median debt-to-asset ratios, in ascending order (or
decreasing solvency): FO SDA ethnic (0.54), FO regular and OL SDA (0.61), FO BF and OL regular
(0.64), FO BF SDA ethnic (0.67), FO BF SDA gender
(0.73), and OL BF (0.75). As a group, all beginning
farmers were relatively less solvent (0.74) than nonbeginning farmers (0.64).
The FO BF group had the highest median current
ratio at 1.24 (most liquid) and the OL BF SDA group
had the lowest value at 0.45 (least liquid). The median current ratio for all borrowers was 0.71. The
median current ratios for the other groups, in
descending order (or decreasing liquidity), were:
1.12 for FO SDA gender, 1.05 for FO regular, 0.84 for
FO SDA ethnic, 0.77 for OL BF and FO BF SDA ethnic, 0.70 for OL regular, 0.66 for FO BF SDA gender,
and 0.57 for OL SDA. Beginning farmers were more

This median rate of return on assets is slightly higher
than the national average rate of return on assets
from current income36 for all farm businesses of just
under 0.02 during the same four-year period as pub-

34 The national debt-to-asset ratios only include farm debts and farm assets as opposed to total farm and non-farm debts and assets
in the FHP.
35 Reference: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmBalanceSheet/FBSDMU.HTM. Accessed May 17, 2005.
36 The denominator of the national return on asset ratio only includes farm assets as opposed to total farm and non-farm assets for
the FHP ratio. Also, the national return on asset ratio adds interest and subtracts a charge for unpaid operators’ labor and management from net farm income in the numerator, whereas the FHP ratio only subtracts family living expense from net farm income.
37 Reference: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmBalanceSheet/FBSDMU.HTM. Accessed May 17, 2005.
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non-Hispanic males comprised the bulk (79.6 percent) of the FSA borrowers with matched plans, followed by white, non-Hispanic females (4.5 percent),
Black/African Americans (3.8 percent), American
Indian/Alaskan native (2.7 percent), Hispanic/Latino
(2.7 percent) and Asian/Pacific Islander/Hawaiian
native (0.7 percent) (table 1.11). The remaining borrowers (6.3 percent) were either multiple race or
unknown race. This sample distribution compares
well with that of the total population of FY
2000–2003 borrowers (80.4, 5.0, 3.1, 2.3, 2.5, 0.6, and
6.1 percent, respectively), indicating that the sample
represents the population well.

liquid (0.74) than non-beginning farmers (0.67). OL
BF borrowers have the highest planned rate of return
on assets at 0.04; followed by OL regular, FO regular,
beginning, and non-beginning farmers at 0.03; and
OL SDA at 0.01. The remaining groups showed
planned profitability rates of 0.00.
The median repayment ability for all observations
was 1.03. By group, FO BF SDA ethnic had the highest median repayment ability at 1.09 and OL regular
had the lowest at 1.02. FO BF SDA gender had 1.07;
while the three groups (FO BF, FO SDA gender, and
FO SDA ethnic) had the same median repayment
ability of 1.06; and all the remaining types (FO regular, OL BF, OL SDA and OL BF SDA) had 1.04.
Beginning farmers had slightly higher repayment
ability at 1.04, compared to non-beginning farmers’ 1.03.
Before comparing financial ratios among various
demographic classes, we consider how representative
the matched FHP and NL data are of all FSA borrowers originating loans during FY 2000-2003. White,

Asian/Pacific Islander/Hawaiian native and Hispanic/
Latino groups had the highest solvency, with median
debt-to-asset ratios of 0.57 and 0.58, respectively.
They were followed by white, non-Hispanic female
(0.63), white, non-Hispanic male (0.68), American
Indian/Alaskan natives (0.71), and Black/African
Americans (0.79).

Table 1.11. FSA borrower median financial ratios by demographic class, 2000–2003
D e m o gr a p h ic c la ss

American Indian/AK Native
Asian/Pacific Is/ HI Native
Black/African American
Hispanic/Latino
White, non-Hispanic male
White, non-Hispanic female
Others/multiple race
SDA gender
SDA race
SDA All
Non-SDA

N

D e bt-to a sse t
ratio
me dia n
513
0.71
128
0.57
733
0.79
467
0.58
15,242
0.68
865
0.63
443
0.64
1,007
0.63
1,810
0.70
2,664
0.67
16,489
0.68

Cur r ent
ratio
me dia n
0.59
1.01
0.27
0.65
0.74
0.61
0.62
0.61
0.49
0.53
0.73

Return
on
a sse ts
me dia n
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.04
0.03
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.03

Repayment
ability
me dia n

Source: Computed from combined and matched New Loan and Farm & Home Plan data sets.
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1.05
1.09
1.03
1.04
1.03
1.04
1.04
1.04
1.04
1.04
1.03
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analysis in this section reveals what would happen if
such a maximum were utilized.

The Asian/Pacific Islander/Hawaiian native group
also had the most liquid operations, with a median
current ratio of 1.01, followed by white non-Hispanic
males (0.74), Hispanic/Latinos (0.65), white nonHispanic female (0.61), American Indian/Alaskan
native (0.59), and Black/African American (0.27).

1.5.1. Using Solvency as a Creditworthiness
Standard
The debt-to-asset ratio measures the amount of debt
relative to assets and is a measure of solvency.
Increasing the stringency of a solvency standard for
loan eligibility implies that a potential borrower
would be required to have a debt-to-asset ratio below
some maximum. Figure 1.38 shows how the percent
of eligible borrowers would vary hypothetically for
actual FY 2000–2003 borrowers who received new
loans as the maximum debt-to-asset cut-off value is
decreased. This implies the credit standard for eligibility becomes stricter. The higher line represents FO
borrowers indicating that they are in relatively
stronger financial condition and relatively less vulnerable to changes in the debt-to-asset creditworthiness standard than OL borrowers (middle line) and
EM borrowers (lower line). It is not surprising that
the OL line is similar to the “All” line as borrowers
with OL loans comprise 78.5 percent of all borrowers
with any type of direct farm loan program loan.

The Hispanic/Latino group showed the highest
planned rate of return on assets at 0.04, followed by
Asian/Pacific Islander/Hawaiian native and white
non-Hispanic male at 0.03. Non-SDA borrowers as a
whole had a higher planned profitability rate than the
SDA borrowers.
The highest median ability to pay was exhibited by
the Asian/Pacific Islander/Hawaiian native at 1.09,
followed by American Indian/Alaskan native (1.05).
Both Hispanic/Latinos and white non-Hispanic
females had 1.04; and both white non-Hispanic
males and Black/African Americans had 1.03.
In general, Asian/Pacific Islander/Hawaiian native
and Hispanic/Latino borrowers had stronger financial characteristics of solvency, liquidity, profitability,
and repayment ability when measured at their medians. Conversely, American Indian/Alaskan native
borrowers had weaker financial characteristics except
for their repayment ability, which was the second best.

Ninety-eight percent of all the actual FSA borrowers
would have been eligible had a maximum debt-toasset ratio of less than 2.5 been used. However, using
a debt-to-asset ratio cut-off standard of less than 1.0,
only 84 percent of actual FSA borrowers would have
received loans, leaving 16 percent as ineligible. With
a credit standard of a debt-to-asset ratio less than 0.9,
76 percent of actual FSA borrowers would have been
eligible; at less than 0.7, about half (53 percent)
would have been eligible; and at less than 0.5, only 28
percent would have been eligible for FSA loans.
Another implication of this distribution is that FSA
Direct Loans are going to a financially distressed segment of the population not likely to be served by conventional credit sources.

1.5. Alternative Creditworthiness Standards
for FSA Borrowers
The impacts of alternative credit standards on the
OL, FO, and EM Direct Farm Loan Programs are
investigated in this section using the FHP sample of
farmers discussed in section 1.4.4. The financial characteristics of farmers who received FSA loans during
2000 through 2003 are used to estimate the percentage of borrowers who would not have received FSA
loans had more stringent credit standards been in
place. The alternative creditworthiness standards
used in this section are varying levels of solvency and
repayment capacity. Currently FSA does not have a
maximum level for the debt-to-asset ratio. The

For debt-to-asset ratio maximum levels below 1.2, a
greater percentage of EM borrowers are likely to be
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Source: Computed from Combined New Loan–Farm and Home Plan Database

Fig. 1.38. Change in percent eligible borrowers using debt-to-asset ratio as
a creditworthiness standard, by loan type, FY 2000–2003
more assets (the denominator of the solvency ratio)
and benefit from potential asset appreciation as do
non-beginning farmers.

ineligible than both OL and FO borrowers. However,
comparing debt-to-asset ratios of EM borrowers with
those of FO and OL borrowers may not be a fair comparison. The EM borrowers, by definition, have
recently experienced a financial emergency and thus
are in a precarious position. This emergency manifests itself in additional debt since the borrower is
seeking credit to restore a disastrous situation and
thus higher debt-to-asset ratios are to be expected.
Also, the emergency precipitating the EM loan
undoubtedly diminished the value of farm assets.

The effects of greater solvency requirements on OL
and FO SDA farmers relative to the non-SDA farmers
are apparent in Figure 1.40. The SDA gender line is
generally higher, which shows that female borrowers
are relatively less vulnerable to changes in solvency
standard than the SDA race/ethnic and white, nonHispanic males. For the most part, the SDA race/ethnic line is lower, which indicates that racial minorities
are the most vulnerable to changes in the solvency
standard.

The impact of a more stringent solvency standard can
also be explored with respect to beginning and SDA
farmers. Figure 1.39 shows the impacts of increasing
solvency standards on beginning farmers compared
with non-beginning (regular) OL and FO farmers.
We see that the non-beginning farmers are less
impacted (higher line) than the beginning farmers,
indicating that the non-beginning farmers have overall greater solvency. This is expected because beginning farmers have not had the time to accumulate

The white, non-Hispanic male line, which represents
the non-SDA group, lies close to that of the SDA gender up until a debt-to-asset ratio of less than 0.8, but
begins to be more sharply affected than both the
SDA groups as the solvency standard becomes
stricter. These results indicate that, depending on the
range of values, enforcing a greater solvency standard
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Source: Computed from Combined New Loan–Farm and Home Plan Database

Fig. 1.39. Change in percent eligible borrowers using debt-to-asset ratio as
a creditworthiness standard, by beginning farmer status, FY 2000–2003

Source: Computed from Combined New Loan–Farm and Home Plan Database

Fig. 1.40. Change in percent eligible borrowers using debt-to-asset ratio
as a creditworthiness standard, by SDA group, FY 2000–2003
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eligibility standard more stringent. The higher line
represents FO borrowers, indicating that they are relatively financially stronger. Accordingly, FO borrowers would be relatively less affected than OL borrowers (middle line) and EM borrowers (lower line) by
changes in the repayment capacity standard for eligibility. Again, the OL line is similar to the “All” line
because it represents the vast majority of borrowers.

would have varying levels of impact on SDA and
non-SDA farmers.
1.5.2. Using Repayment Capacity as a
Creditworthiness Standard
Repayment capacity is computed by dividing the balance available to service payments by the amount of
payments due in the current year. This indicates the
capacity of the borrower to repay both principal and
interest with cash generated from the operations and
other sources. A more stringent repayment capacity
standard for loan eligibility means that a potential
borrower would be required to have a higher repayment capacity ratio.

A cut-off of repayment capacity greater than 0.10
leaves 98 percent of actual FSA borrowers receiving
new loans as eligible, while a cut-off greater than 0.90
reduces the eligible borrowers to 86 percent of current borrowers. A cut-off of greater than 1.00 further
reduces the eligible borrowers to 78 percent. This
indicates that 22 percent of actual borrowers are projected to be unable to make payments to their creditors as originally agreed. The percent of eligible borrowers declines to 51 when the repayment capacity

Figure 1.41 shows the change in the percent of eligible borrowers among actual borrowers who received
new loans as repayment capacity cut-off values are
increased, which has the effect of making the credit

Source: Computed from Combined New Loan–Farm and Home Plan Database

Figure 1.41. Change in percent eligible borrowers using repayment capacity as a creditworthiness standard, by loan type, FY 2000–2003
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farmers and Farm Loan Managers are overly optimistic when planning income and expenses since
there is little historical information on the beginning
farm business relative to the non-beginning farm
business on which to base their plans.

standard exceeds 1.03. When the standard requires
more than 1.10, only one-fourth of the actual borrowers remain eligible. While it might seem that
more borrowers should exceed the 1.10 standard, the
sub-population of borrowers being analyzed are
those that have not been able to obtain funds from
conventional creditors. Thus it is to be expected that
most of the borrowers can barely make loan payments.

The relative effects of stricter repayment capacity
requirements on SDA and non-SDA farmers are
shown in figure 1.43. The SDA gender line is slightly
higher but very close to that of the SDA race/ethnic
line, which indicates that both SDA groups have comparable vulnerability to changes in repayment capacity standard. The non-SDA group (white, nonHispanic male), on the other hand, shows comparable vulnerability with the SDA groups at less strict
repayment capacity standards (greater than 1.0 and
below) but shows a marked increase in vulnerability
at higher (stricter) standard values (greater than 1.01
through greater than 1.10). A similar impact is observed
in figure 1.40 when the solvency standard is used.

The impacts of a stricter standard for repayment
capacity for OL and FO beginning and non-beginning (regular) farmers are shown in figure 1.42. In
stark contrast with the results of using solvency as the
standard, beginning farmers show less vulnerability
(higher line) than the regular farmers when repayment capacity is used as the creditworthiness standard. A possible reason could be that beginning farmers have had relatively less exposure to the risks and
uncertainties associated with long-term agricultural
production that affect income and ability to pay.
Another possible reason could be that beginning

Source: Computed from Combined New Loan–Farm and Home Plan Database

Figure 1.42. Change in percent eligible borrowers using repayment capacity
as a creditworthiness standard, by beginning farmer status, FY 2000–2003
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Source: Computed from Combined New Loan–Farm and Home Plan Database

Figure 1.43. Change in percent eligible borrowers using repayment capacity
as a creditworthiness standard, by SDA group, FY 2000–2003
would be ineligible for OL and FO loans if this repayment capacity standard was imposed.

1.5.3. Impact of Using a Stricter Creditworthiness
Standard
The analysis above shows that for the most part, FSA
serves borrowers with marginal financial strength or
creditworthiness. For example, a seemingly practical
creditworthiness standard of a debt-to-asset ratio less
than 1.0 results in 16 percent of actual borrowers
becoming ineligible for any FSA loan. For the beginning farmers, 22 percent of them would be hypothetically ineligible for OL and FO loans at this creditworthiness standard. In addition, 14 percent and 23
percent of SDA gender and SDA race/ethnic actual
borrowers, respectively, would be ineligible if a less
than 1.0 debt-to-asset standard ratio was imposed.

Seventy-eight percent of all actual borrowers receiving new loans are projected to barely be able to pay
their annual principal and interest obligations. These
are the borrowers with repayment capacity greater
than 1.00. Only 25 percent of all borrowers are in a
position to withstand a 10 percent drop in repayment
capacity and still pay their principal and interest obligations for the year. These are the borrowers with a
repayment capacity ratio of 1.10 or more.
However, the analysis in this section assumes that
Farm and Home Plans would not change if alternative credit standards were adopted. In actuality, loan
applicants and lenders have some discretion in completing Farm and Home Plans. The resulting credit
criteria such as debt-to-asset and repayment capacity
ratios might change if there were specific standards
that loan applicants had to strictly meet. The repay-

Likewise, a practical creditworthiness standard of a
repayment capacity ratio over 1.0 renders 22 percent
of the actual borrowers receiving new loans as ineligible for any FSA loan. By group, 19 percent, 19 percent, and 22 percent of beginning farmer, SDA gender, and SDA race/ethnic borrowers, respectively,
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assets are not statistically different between FSA
recipients and non-FSA recipients.

ment capacity ratio could be particularly sensitive to
adjustments by the loan applicant since it is based on
forecasted prices, production, expenses, etc. In contrast, the values of debts and assets used in computing the debt-to-asset ratio, particularly debts, are
more easily verified. Thus, promulgating different
creditworthiness standards might not have the
impact on the FSA Direct Loan Program that would
be expected from the graphs above because reported
financial measures might adjust to the new standards.

The 50-state average penetration rates for all loans
combined (OL, FO, and EM) is 3.66 percent where
penetration is the percentage of unique borrowers
originating a new loan during FY 2000–2003 as distinct from the set of all eligible farmers. Penetration
rates measured at the state level run from 0.44 percent to 21.48 percent with the bulk of the states having rates less than 8.00 percent. This level of penetration may seem low at first glance. However, the
ARMS data indicate that about five times as many
farmers hold FSA loans in a given year compared
with only those obtaining new loans. Thus a higher
percentage (the initial percentage plus four times the
initial percentage) of farmers are FSA loan recipients
than are indicated by the penetration ratios. Given
that FSA provides less than 4 percent of the agricultural credit in the United States and FSA credit tends
to be targeted to smaller family farms, it should not
be surprising that over 18 percent of indebted nonhobby farmers and beginning farmers use FSA loans.
Given that these recipients are typically financially
stressed, FSA activities are servicing appropriate
clientele.

1.6 Summary
The Farm Service Agency’s Direct Farm Loan programs are designed to provide credit to farm borrowers unable to obtain credit from conventional sources
at reasonable rates and terms. By setting eligibility
guidelines at levels that screen out corporate and
hobby type farms, federal legislation attempts to
channel FSA program funds for use by family farms.
In addition, a portion of direct loan allocations are
specifically reserved for socially disadvantaged and
beginning farmer applicants.
By most measures, FSA targeting of family farms
appears successful. A majority (78–92 percent) of
new FSA Direct Loan assistance in FY 2000–2003 was
received by small family farms where “small” refers to
farms with less than $250,000 in sales. Loan lending
caps and the FSA criteria for family farms are
assumed to be the primary mechanisms that exclude
larger, financially stressed borrowers. In general, FSA
borrowers are in a weaker financial position than
non-FSA borrower farms by virtue of much higher
debt-to-asset ratios and lower current ratios. FSA
borrowers have higher mean income than the nonFSA recipients, but the difference is not statistically
significant. FSA recipients have significantly higher
government payments, fixed expenses and liabilities
relative to non-FSA recipients. The mean farm equity of loan recipients is lower than that of the nonrecipients and the difference between old recipients
and non-recipients is statistically significant. Farm

FSA targeting of SDA borrowers has almost surely
resulted in this group as a whole obtaining more
credit than they would otherwise likely have obtained
from FSA without targeting. National penetration of
all direct loans (OL, FO, and EM loans) into the family farm market is 3.66 percent while the same figure
for the SDA market is 4.62 percent. Despite the
seemingly low penetration figures, 13.66 percent of
FSA OL and FO borrowers are SDAs. SDA borrowers
represent 13.45 percent of the total OL borrowers and
17.85 percent of the total FO borrowers. Recall that
35 percent and 70 percent of OL and FO allocations
are targeted to beginning farmers, thus restricting the
allocations available to non-BF including those SDAs
who also are not beginning farmers.
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35 percent of their OL and FO loans to BF borrowers.
The percentage of loans made to BFs is especially
high in the FO market, with an average of 68 percent
of all FO loans originated to beginning farmers.
Forty-six of the 50 states made 50 percent or more of
their FO loans to BF borrowers.

SDA farmers tend to be geographically concentrated
in specific areas of the country. This pattern manifests itself in the maps illustrating the proportion of
all loans made to SDA borrowers. Financially, farmers classified as FSA-eligible SDA farmers on the condition of race appear to be similar to non-SDA farmers but with significantly lower government payments and debt-to-asset ratios. These differences
could be explained by the fact that SDA race farmers
tend to be concentrated regionally, whereas non-SDA
farmers are distributed much more uniformly across
the nation. Types of agriculture vary regionally, and
certain types of agriculture may not qualify for as
many government payments and may require more
solvency than other types of agriculture. Farmers
classified as FSA-eligible SDA borrowers on the condition of gender are substantially smaller in size than
FSA-eligible non-SDA operators as indicated by the
significantly lower gross cash income, and less government payments, cash expenses, net income, farm
assets, liabilities, and farm equity. However, they have
higher solvency relative to non-SDA farmers. But,
the differences in liquidity, repayment capacity, and
financial efficiency between the two groups are not
statistically significant.

As a group, FSA-eligible BF farmers have significantly less gross cash income, government payments, cash
expenses, net farm income, assets, liabilities, and
equity than the average non-BF farm operator. There
are no statistically significant differences in solvency,
repayment capacity and financial efficiency between
the two groups. Beginning farmers appear to have
limited financial resources and therefore are likely to
be rejected by providers of conventional credit.
While the inability to obtain conventional credit is
one criterion for receiving direct loans, credit worthiness is also required by the FSA. In general the BF
farmers have little experience and have not proven
their ability to repay loans, so it should not be surprising that penetration into this market would be
lower without added mandates. But the numbers of
loans made are controlled by the percentages of the
allocations to these groups and the eligibility criteria
used to qualify beginning farmers.

FSA targeting of beginning farmers has resulted in
this group receiving 42 percent of the OL loans, 39
percent of the OL principal, 68 percent of the FO
loans, and 73 percent of the FO principal. This is
consistent with legal mandates that require 35 percent of initial OL allocations and 70 percent of initial
FO allocations to beginning farmers. Nationally, the
penetration into the BF, OL, and FO markets combined is 3.16 percent while the corresponding figure
for the overall family farm market is 3.37 percent.
The difference in penetration is due to a great extent
to the large number of eligible farms that are classified as beginning farmers in the penetration denominator and to a lesser extent to the two different data
sources used for the penetration numerators. In
terms of percentage of FSA loans made to BFs, three
quarters of the states in the lower 48 make more than

While ARMS provides a rich set of data, the sample
size makes certain estimates problematic. The 2002
Census of Agriculture data are used to define FSA eligible populations more specifically, making it possible to count relatively small populations like women
and racial/ethnic categories more precisely. Our
description of current FSA loan recipients’ financial
characteristics is enhanced by using FSA Farm and
Home Plan data but somewhat hindered by the
incomplete nature of this dataset and the lack of corresponding data for non-recipients. Hence reliance
on ARMS data for estimating characteristics of nonrecipients will continue so that effective comparisons
can be made between recipients and non-recipients.
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Within the scope of the analysis presented in this
report, it appears FSA is serving its intended clientele.
The effectiveness of FSA loan programs is further
pursued in the following sections by investigating
graduation rates and assessing whether default costs
can be lowered. The borrowers receiving direct OL
and FO loans are financially stressed on average compared with other farms that meet the general FSA criteria for loan eligibility. Thus the current FSA lending patterns in terms of serving targeted borrowers
are consistent with the goals of the direct farm loan
program. Greater coverage could undoubtedly be
achieved with increased allocations, but the issue of
allocation levels is beyond the scope of this study.

2.1. Survey of Borrowers Originating FSA
Direct Loans During FY 1994–1996
To answer the above questions, FSA Farm Loan
Managers (FLMs) were surveyed to collect information on a sample of loans originated in FY
1994–1996. These three years were chosen for a variety of reasons. First, three years were chosen so that
unique characteristics of any one year would not
unduly influence the variables observed. These three
years are representative of the 1990s in terms of net
farm income.38 Second, the Agricultural Credit
Improvement Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-554) authorized
the beginning farmer program. Starting sampling
before 1994 would have resulted in a small sample of
beginning farmers. Sampling later than 1996 would
not have given sufficient time to obtain a long-run
view of borrower payback and exit behavior.

2. Duration in Farm Loan Programs and
Financial Progress

During those three years 34,026 OL, 3,083 FO, and
8,359 EM loans were originated. The survey was
needed because during the period of interest, borrower financial information at time of loan origination was not inputted by FSA into a linked, electronic system. So financial information and demographic data recorded on the Request for Direct Loan
Assistance (FSA-410-1) and the Farm and Home Plan
(FmHA 431-2) were not readily available. The survey
approach, described in detail in appendix 2.A, was
used to collect these data.

The FSA Direct Farm Loan Programs (FLPs) are
designed to bridge agricultural credit gaps, i.e., to
provide loans to creditworthy farmers who are
unable to obtain credit from conventional sources.
Direct FLPs aim at improving farmer financial wellbeing so that farmers can move from using direct
FLPs to conventional sources of credit with or without FSA guarantees. This implies farmers should
graduate, i.e., exit FLPs and use conventional sources
of credit, or at least improve their financial characteristics as time elapses. Little is known about the longitudinal behavior of FLP participants. Some interesting questions arise. Do participants make FLPs
their long-term source of credit or do they move on?
If they do exit FLPs, what is the reason for leaving,
and what do they do thereafter? Also, do FSA participants improve their financial strength as a result of
using FLPs?

The sampling frame of all FY 1994–1996 originations
was sampled to insure representation across five
loan-program types: (1) FO loans for non-BF borrowers (FONONBF), (2) FO loans for BF borrowers
(FOBF), (3) OL loans for non-BF borrowers
(OLNONBF), (4) OL loans for BF borrowers
(OLBF), and (5) EM loans (EM). The sample was
chosen to have gender, racial, geographical, and time
representation as described in appendix 2.A.

38 For

the 1990s, national net farm income in 1996 was the highest, 1995 the lowest, and 1994 in between.
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/farmincome/50State/50stmenu.htm. Accessed May 19, 2005.
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which FSA reacted to the survey request. The lowest
response rate in any particular gender/race cell with
more than ten borrowers sampled was 77 percent.
Thus there was good representation for all cells with
more than ten sampled loans.
For African
Americans, Asian/Pacific Islanders, American Indian,
Hispanics, and females, the response rates were 87,
96, 80, 88, and 89 percent, respectively. The response
rates for the five different loan categories
(FONONBF, FOBF, OLNONBF, OLBF and EM)
ranged from a low of 88 percent to a high of 92 percent.

2.1.1. Sampling Strategy and Geographical
Distribution
The numbers of observations sampled as a function
of loan program type, gender, and race are displayed
in table 2.1. Several facts stand out. As discussed earlier in this report, the predominant FSA borrower
race and gender are white and males. Because white
males were relatively so abundant, white males were
sampled at a rate of one in eighteen whereas all other
gender and races were sampled at a rate of one in
nine.39 OL loans were originated at far higher levels
than FO and EM loans. The level of EM loans is not
reflective of any programmatic emphasis on SDA or
BF borrowers since the frequency of EM loans is driven by natural disasters, which are unforeseen and
occur irregularly.

Figures 2.1–2.4 contain four dot maps showing the
location of unique borrowers by county of residence
in the lower 48 states responding to the survey by
loan type group. Because the sampling was done by
loan, a specific individual could appear more than
once in the sample. Of the 2,715 usable questionnaires, 2,500 borrowers only had one loan in the sample during the three-year period; 104 borrowers had
two loans; one borrower had three loans; and anoth-

There were 2,715 usable responses after cleaning the
data out of a sample of 3,004 for a 90 percent
response rate. This is very high as social science surveys go and can be attributed to the seriousness with

Table 2.1. Gender and race response rates by loan type for survey of FY 1994–1996 loan originations
FONONBF*
F OB F *
M a le
F e m a le F a mily u nit
T ota l
Gender/race
Ma le
F ema le
25
10
49
84 White
97
12
24
8
47
79
86
10
96.0% 80.0%
95.9%
94.0%
88.7%
83.3%
Black
3
0
5
8 Black
2
0
3
0
4
7
1
0
100.0%
80.0%
87.5%
50.0%
Asia/PI
1
0
2
3 Asia/PI
1
0
1
0
2
3
1
0
100.0%
100.0% 100.0%
100.0%
AmIn/AK
2
2
4
8 AmIn/AK
3
1
2
1
3
6
3
1
100.0% 50.0%
75.0%
75.0%
100.0% 100.0%
Hisp
1
0
9
10 Hisp
2
0
0
0
6
6
1
0
0.0%
66.7%
60.0%
50.0%
Total sampled
113 Total sampled
Total response
101 Total response
89.4%
Ge nd e r / r a ce
White

39 Because

F a mily unit
98
87
88.8%
3
3
100.0%
0
0
6
6
100.0%
4
3
75.0%

Tota l
207
183
88.4%
5
4
80.0%
1
1
100.0%
10
10
100.0%
6
4
66.7%
229
202
88.2%

of the different sampling rates, all the statistical analyses are done using weights for the observations. Since the two sampling rates were one in eighteen and one in nine, the respective weights were two and one.
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Table 2.1. Continued.
Ge nde r /r a ce
White

Black

Asia/PI

AmIn/AK

Hisp

Total sampled
Total response

Ma le
564
510
90.4%
57
55
96.5%
6
6
100.0%
13
11
84.6%
31
28
90.3%

Table 2.1. Continued.
Ge nd e r / r a ce
White

Black

Asia/PI

AmIn/AK

Hisp

Ma le
162
146
90.1%
9
6
66.7%
0
0

OLNONBF*
F ema le
74
69
93.2%
3
3
100.0%
0
0
5
3
60.0%
1
1
100.0%

EM*
F emale
12
11
91.7%
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
16
2
14
2
87.5% 100.0%

Total sampled
Total response

Family unit
741
694
93.7%
48
40
83.3%
7
6
85.7%
37
31
83.8%
57
48
84.2%

Total
1,379
1,273
92.3%
108
98
90.7%
13
12
92.3%
55
45
81.8%
89
77
86.5%
1644
1,505
91.5%

Ge nde r / r a ce
White

Black

Asia/PI

AmIn/AK

Hisp

Total sampled
Total response

OLB F*
Ma le
F e ma le
220
35
187
32
85.0% 91.4%
22
1
19
0
86.4%
0.0%
2
0
2
0
100.0%
13
3
10
2
76.9% 66.7%
9
0
9
0
100.0%

F a mily unit
Total
135
390
127
346
94.1%
88.7%
11
34
9
28
81.8%
82.4%
4
6
4
6
100.0% 100.0%
9
25
7
19
77.8%
76.0%
14
23
12
21
85.7%
91.3%
478
420
87.9%

F a m ily unit
To t a l
225
399
207
364
92.0%
91.2%
7
16
5
11
71.4%
68.8%
1
1
1
1
100.0% 100.0%
2
4
2
2
100.0%
50.0%
102
120
93
109
91.2%
90.8%
540
487
90.2%

Source: Computed from 2004 Survey of FY 1994–1996 New Loans
*Figures in the first row for a given race are number sampled for a given gender. Figures in the second row are usable
questionnaires returned. Third row figures are the response rate for the given gender/race combination. The "family unit" is an
alternative gender class used by FSA.
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Figure 2.1. Total unique borrowers included as usable responses to the FSA borrower
information survey of FY 1994–1996

Each dot represents one unique borrower with a usable questionnaire for an OL loan.

Figure 2.2. OL borrowers included as usable responses to the FSA borrower information
survey of FY 1994–1996 originations
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Each dot represents one unique borrower with a usable questionnaire for an FO loan.

Figure 2.3. FO borrowers included as usable responses to the FSA borrower information
survey of FY 1994–1996 originations

Each dot represents one unique borrower with a usable questionnaire for an EM loan.

Figure 2.4. EM borrowers included as usable responses to the FSA borrower information
survey of FY 1994–1996 originations
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In constructing the sampling frame, data on race and
gender were used from the loan-making records
obtained from FSA records in St. Louis. There are
some discrepancies in race and gender between the
numbers reported by the FLMs on the surveys and
those in the loan-making records. The analyses in
this report use the race and gender reported on the
survey instrument. For race and gender, the typical
borrower sampled in the survey is a white male, consistent with the borrower demographics observed for
the FY 2000–2003 data discussed in section 1.2. The
predominant minorities are Hispanic and African
American/Black although American Indian/Alaskan
natives are active in the SDA programs. Note that just
as with the FY 2000–2003 loan originations, women
and minorities also obtain loans in the regular loan
categories although most of their loans are from the
SDA loan categories.

er borrower had four loans. The maps indicate the
broad geographical dispersion of the sample observations and are generally reflective of the population of
FSA borrowers as shown in figures 1.11 – 1.16.
2.1.2. Borrower Demographics
Basic borrower demographic data by loan assistance
type are presented in table 2.2. The results are consistent with a priori beliefs. Operator age at time of
loan origination is in the early- to mid-forties for
non-BF and non-SDA farmers. Beginning farmers
have mean age of 29 except for the relatively older
beginning SDA farmers who average 34 or 35 years of
age. When the beginning farmer designation is
removed, SDA and non-SDA farmers average about
the same age. The group with the highest average age
is composed of farmers receiving EM loans although
the difference between them and regular OL borrowers is only about one-and-a-half years. In the 1997
Census of Agriculture (USDA/NASS, 1999) the average farm operator age is 54.3 so the FSA borrowers
are distinctly younger than the overall farm population.

2.1.3. Borrower Balance Sheet Characteristics
Table 2.3 displays means of structural and financial
characteristics of the sampled borrowers. Borrowers
obtaining regular loans have larger operations with
EM farmers having the largest acreage, OL farmers
having slightly smaller acreage, and FO farmers having the least acreage. SDA and beginning farmers
have smaller operations although the OL SDA farmers are not that much smaller than borrowers obtaining regular OL loans. Borrowers in all the loan categories devote most of their farm acreage to crops,
except for beginning FO SDA farmers.

Mean years of farming experience range between 17
and 21 years for non-beginning farmers. The 1997
Census of Agriculture (USDA/NASS, 1999) reports
an average 23.9 years among all farmers for years on
the present farm. Thus the surveyed farmers are less
experienced than the average for U.S. farms. As to be
expected, beginning farmers have less farming experience than non-beginning farmers with means ranging between five and six years. Mean number of family members is between three and four for all programs except the two beginning, non-SDA farmer
programs that have about 2.6 to 2.7 members which
is reflective of their younger ages. A similar pattern
arises with respect to marital status. Most borrowers
are married but the range varies between 60 percent
for non-SDA beginning farmers and 90 percent for
EM borrowers. Eighty-seven percent of regular OL
borrowers are married.
40

Borrower financial characteristics indicate that the
surveyed farms are, on average, not as large in terms
of assets and net worth as the average U.S. farm.
Mean farm assets equal $275,176. The mean assets
per farm in the U.S. averaged over 1994–1996 is
$441,000.40 EM borrowers have the highest mean
assets at $438,878. Among the various OL and FO
borrower categories, regular OL borrowers have the
most assets at $313,482. Regular FO borrowers also

http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/farmbalancesheet/fbsdmu.htm. Accessed May 20, 2005.
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0.00
13.88
80.70
1.12
6.70
1.28
0.00
9.89
0.32

0.00
7.91
79.26
0.92
11.50
2.29
0.21
5.83
0.00

0.32
85.49

0.00

0.08
0.17

0.00

0.00

91.63

0.32

0.21

87.10
0.00

60.10

3.29

39.90

2.64

20.42

0.70

5.22

44.24

12.10

318
29.20

1,218

OLBF
6,351

OLREG
23,557

0.00

6.54

0.00

0.93

0.93

39.25

52.34

8.41

0.00

34.58

14.02

22.43

5.61

14.95

25.00

1.00

74.00

3.69

6.40

35.39

102

1,139

OLBFSDA

Source: Computed from 2004 Survey of FY 1994–1996 New Loans
* Statistics in a given column may be based on fewer observations if there are missing values.
** Race as reported on survey and figures are percent for a given loan type.
*** Gender as reported on survey and figures are percent for a given loan type.

Gender (public body)

Gender (unknown)

Gender (female-owned organization)

Gender (male-owned organization)

Gender (family-unit)

Gender (female)

Gender (male)***

Race (unknown)

Race (other)

Race (White)

Race (Hispanic)

Race (Black)

Race (Asian/Pacific Islander)

Race (American Indian/Alaskan Native)**

Marital status (percent unmarried)

Marital status (percent separated)

Marital status (percent married)

Mean total household members

Mean years in farming

Mean age (years)

n (number of observations)*

Item
N (number of FY 1994–96 loans by assistance code)

0.00

4.93

0.66

0.66

4.93

26.32

62.50

7.89

0.66

23.36

22.37

30.59

3.29

11.84

20.60

0.40

79.00

3.20

19.12

45.50

287

2,979

OLSDA

0.00

1.41

0.00

0.00

7.04

2.82

88.73

2.82

0.00

94.37

0.00

2.82

0.00

0.00

18.20

0.00

81.80

3.58

17.28

40.79

73

660

FOREG

0.59

3.56

0.00

0.59

0.31

0.59

86.35

8.90

0.59

90.21

0.30

0.00

0.00

0.00

40.40

0.00

59.60

2.66

5.34

29.33

169

1,728

FOBF

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

5.26

44.74

50.00

5.26

0.00

52.63

7.89

13.16

2.63

18.42

10.50

0.00

89.50

3.56

4.79

34.03

33

339

FOBFSDA

0.00

10.00

0.00

0.00

10.00

30.00

50.00

10.00

0.00

26.67

20.00

16.67

10.00

16.67

11.50

3.80

84.60

3.27

16.50

41.35

28

356

FOSDA

0.00

8.33

0.12

2.98

8.93

2.38

77.26

10.60

0.00

75.48

12.02

1.55

0.12

0.24

9.60

0.40

90.00

3.45

20.97

45.80

487

8,359

EM

Table 2.2. Basic demographic description of sampled borrowers originating loans from FY 1994–1996 by loan assistance type
Tota l

0.07

6.38

0.22

1.81

8.99

6.12

76.41

8.96

0.11

74.97

7.34

5.27

0.77

2.58

18.00

0.50

81.00

3.21

16.77

41.46

2,715

45,468
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0.69
313,482
217,119
96,363
38,745
14,745
118,009
0.51
0.82
0.74

OL
REG
23,557
1,218
750
0.66
94,381
68,418
25,854
40,780
13,875
54,704
0.27
0.60
0.60

6,351
318
496

OL B F

0.60
97,935
71,514
26,421
38,986
18,726
45,221
0.19
0.48
0.58

OL B F
SDA
1,139
102
361

Source: Computed from 2004 Survey of FY 1994–1996 New Loans
*Statistics in a given column may be based on fewer observations if there are missing values.

Crop acres/total acres
Total farm assets ($)
Total farm liabilities ($)
Farm net worth ($)
Total non-farm assets ($)
Total non-farm liabilities ($)
Total net worth ($)
FSA loans/total farm liabilities
Farm debt/farm asset
Total debt/total asset ratio

n (number of observations)*
Farm size (sum of acres owned and rented)

N (number of FY 1994–96 loans by assistance code)

Item

0.56
186,519
119,083
68,167
452,632
16,171
94,488
0.49
0.77
0.62

OL
SDA
2,979
287
605
0.63
282,115
183,547
98,568
24,276
6,963
115,959
0.31
0.65
0.61

FO
REG
660
73
553
0.62
93,891
42,017
51,874
28,793
11,965
69,771
0.11
0.29
0.38

1,728
169
371

FOBF

0.42
46,522
24,524
21,998
53,088
28,532
46,554
0.09
0.25
0.72

FOBF
SDA
339
33
260
0.57
203,599
102,393
101,206
36,819
9,904
124,056
0.28
0.60
0.92

FO
SDA
356
28
312
0.77
438,878
277,459
161,023
62,288
18,173
196,057
0.35
0.77
0.77

8,359
487
779

EM

Table 2.3. Means of farm operation descriptors and balance sheet variables of loan originators by loan assistance type

0.68
275,176
183,585
91,687
42,152
15,038
116,307
0.40
0.72
0.69

ALL
LOANS
45,468
2,715
664
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ticularly true of EM borrowers, which is indicative of
disasters during this period being more likely harmful to crops than livestock. Notice also that the total
cash farm income mean of $153,465 puts most of
these farms in the National Commission on Small
Farms’ definition of small farms having less than
$250,000 in gross receipts.42 An important indication
of the reliance of these borrowers on agricultural
income comes from the non-farm income. For all
borrowers the mean non-farm income is $14,405.
However, the mean living expense is $19,056. This
implies FSA Direct Loan clientele are operators who
have farming as an important income source and rely
on farm income to cover a portion of their living
expenses. As reported in Mishra et al., the average
household non-farm income of farmers for 1999 was
$57,988. While this is an average for all farmers
(including many hobby farms), it is clear the typical
FSA Direct Loan borrower in FY 1994–1996 relied
more on farm income than did many U.S. farm operators. Also, viewing the balance available and the
debt service either due or planned, the borrowers do
not have much capacity to withstand adversity and
still be able to service debt.

own more assets than any other FO borrower category. As expected, beginning farmers have the least
assets with non-BF SDA borrowers having asset levels
between those of regular and beginning farmers. The
ordering of farm liabilities among the loan assistance
types is similar to that of farm assets.
Overall net worth and farm net worth vary substantially among loan programs. The sample mean farm
net worth is $91,687 and the comparable three-year
average of net worth for U.S. farmers is $376,000.41
Borrowers in the regular loan categories have higher
total and farm net worth than those in the beginning
programs.
The different net worth values likely reflect the age
and station in the borrowers’ life-cycles. The mean
net worth values, both total and farm, of OL SDA
farmers are between those of the regular and beginning farmers and FO SDA farmers have the highest
FO mean net worth among FO borrowers. The EM
farmers have much higher mean net worth than
either FO or OL borrowers. However, this is not surprising since loan requirements for EM loans (a disaster) are different from those of either FO or OL
loans. The mean debt-to-asset ratios indicate that
most of these FSA borrowers are relatively heavily in
debt and therefore the appropriate clients for FSA
Direct Loans. It is interesting to note that at the
mean, only regular OL and OL SDA borrowers have a
majority or near majority of their farm liabilities
originating with FSA prior to receiving their OL loan.

2.1.5. Past Use of FSA Loans and Credit History
Characteristics
The borrowers in the sample are largely repeat users
of FSA programs as evident from table 2.5. For all
loans, an estimated 73.5 percent went to borrowers
who had previously obtained an FmHA (FSA) direct
or guaranteed loan. In general OL loans had borrowers more likely to have previously used FSA loans
than FO loans. As would be expected, beginning
farmers are less likely to have used FSA programs.

2.1.4. Borrower-Expected First Year Cash Flows
Table 2.4 gives the mean planned financial revenues
and expenses of the farms for the first year of the loan
by assistance type. In general borrowers anticipate
more income from crops than livestock. This is par-

However, among OL beginning farm loans, over 50
percent were associated with borrowers who had pre-

http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/farmbalancesheet/fbsdmu.htm. Accessed May 20, 2005.
The National Commission on Small Farms defines a small farm as, “…farms with less than $250,000 gross receipts annually on
which day-to-day labor and management are provided by the farmer and/or the farm family that owns the production or owns, or
leases, the productive assets.” (p. 18). (See: http://www.csrees.usda.gov/nea/ag_systems/pdfs/time_to_act_1998.pdf. Accessed June 1,
2005). Total cash farm income as used in sections 2 and 3 includes other farm income which we assume is included in the
Commission’s definition of receipts. Note that this differs slightly from the small farm definition in sections 1.2–1.3.

41
42
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Since EM funds are limited, those borrowers with a
previous FSA loan(s) may be able to get into queue
earlier than borrowers with no previous FSA credit
because of the former group’s familiarity with FSA
programs.

viously used FSA programs although it is unknown
how many of these previous loans may have been
Youth loans. OL SDA borrowers also tended to be
repeat users with just less than 80 percent of loans
having borrowers who had been previous users of
FSA loans. Among FO loans, beginning farm-loan
borrowers are substantially less likely to be repeat
users with SDA beginning farmer loans and non-SDA
beginning farmer loans having 31.6 percent and 19.8
percent, respectively, of repeat users. A surprisingly
high proportion of EM loans (77 percent) have borrowers with previous FSA credit. Our initial expectation was that EM users would include a broader
group of farms since natural disasters would likely
affect most farms in the impacted region similarly.

The credit history of the borrowers is also reflected in
a loan application question that asks whether the
borrowers have ever been in receivership, discharged
in bankruptcy, or filed a petition for reorganization
in bankruptcy. Only 5.4 percent indicated they had
(table 2.5). A larger percentage of the borrowers, 14.5
percent, had a prior delinquency with federal debt.
OLBF and FOBF borrowers had lower delinquency
rates and this is likely attributable to their younger ages.

Table 2.4. Means of financial characteristics of the FSA borrowers' planned business year by loan assistance type
Item
N (number of FY 1994–96 loans by assistance code)
n (number of observations)*
Crop income ($)**
Livestock income ($)
Other farm income ($)
Total cash farm income($)
Net farm cash income ($)
Non-farm income ($)
Cash family living expense($)
Net cash income($)
Interest expense ($)
Balance available ($)
Gross cash income ($)
Total amount due this year (principal and interest) ($)
Total planned principal and interest to be paid ($)

OLREG

OLBF

OLBFSDA

OLSDA

FOREG

FOBF

23,557
1,218
95,635
62,289
6,615
163,037
38,346
14,010
20,153
32,040
13,165
106,998
173,496
104,330
99,458

6,351
318
60,387
46,924
3,109
109,917
22,495
12,162
15,991
19,059
7,086
71,278
120,239
68,339
65,998

1,139
102
51,147
49,003
3,374
102,548
23,087
15,760
15,977
22,986
8,148
73,135
111,449
57,855
56,063

2,979
287
66,773
28,324
3,657
98,758
23,499
16,357
15,958
22,533
7,080
67,531
113,503
65,041
61,306

660
73
61,269
55,098
3,545
118,914
29,573
18,812
19,784
26,539
11,252
71,201
135,616
66,637
65,407

1,728
169
44,321
30,720
2,843
77,584
20,918
18,802
16,527
22,992
8,833
54,333
95,005
45,390
46,115

FOBFSDA
339
33
25,826
21,770
957
48,553
7,556
24,782
18,708
12,721
7,219
33,347
73,335
29,123
28,929

FOSDA

EM

All Loans

356
28
60,844
48,660
13,024
122,528
35,069
13,992
15,505
33,556
10,755
85,139
136,581
76,495
69,564

8,359
487
164,787
52,809
11,200
228,738
55,489
13,055
20,682
49,168
20,031
150,688
239,178
143,282
137,073

45,468
2,715
94,688
53,390
6,333
153,465
36,233
14,405
19,056
31,590
12,660
101,119
165,026
96,687
92,584

Source: Computed from 2004 Survey of FY 1994–1996 New Loans
*Statistics in a given column may be based on fewer observations if there are missing values.
**All items were taken directly from the Farm and Home Plan and not computed. So, for example, Total cash farm income is the sum of Crop income, Livestock income and Other farm income.
However, all four entries were recorded from the FHP so that Total cash farm income was not computed in this table as the sum of the three reported components.
Net farm cash income is Total cash farm income less Operating expenses (not displayed). Net cash income is Net farm cash income plus Non-farm income less Cash family living expense.
Balance available is beginning cash plus loans and other credit plus interest less capital and carryover expenses. Gross cash income is the sum of Total cash farm income and non-farm income.
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Table 2.5. FSA borrowers' credit history by loan assistance type
I te m
OL R E G
OLB F
OL B F S D A
OL SD A
FOREG
FOBF
FOBFSDA
FOSDA
N (number of FY 1994–96 loans by
23,557 6,351
1,139
2,979
660 1,728
339
356
assistance code)
n (number of observations)*
1,218
318
102
287
73
169
33
28
Applicant been in receivership, discharged in bankruptcy, or filed a petition for reorganization in bankruptcy? **
(percent yes)
6.0
4.0
6.1
4.6
6.1
1.3
2.8
7.7
(percent no)
94.0
96.0
93.9
95.4
93.9
98.7
97.2
92.3
(0.7)
(1.2)
(2.4)
(1.4)
(2.9)
(0.9)
(2.7)
(5.3)
Has this applicant been delinquent on any Federal Debt?
(percent yes)
18.7
6.8
15.4
14.1
9.1
1.3
9.4
20
(percent no)
81.3
93.2
84.6
85.9
90.9
98.7
90.6
80
(1.2)
(1.5)
(3.8)
(2.3)
(3.5)
(0.9)
(5.2)
(9.3)
Has borrower ever obtained a direct loan or guarantee from FmHA?
(percent yes)
88.4
53.2
45.5
79.3
76.1
19.8
31.6
53.8
(percent no)
11.6
46.8
54.5
20.7
23.9
80.2
68.4
46.2
(1.0)
(3.0)
(5.3)
(2.6)
(5.1)
(3.1)
(8.3)
(10.6)
Was loan paid in full?
(percent yes)
52.9
46.4
50.0
46.0
43.5
58.1
36.4
57.1
(percent no)
47.1
53.6
50.0
54.0
56.5
41.9
63.6
42.9
(1.6)
(4.2)
(8.3)
(3.6)
(7.3)
(8.9)
(15.2)
(13.2)
Was the loan debt settled or was the applicant ever released from personal liability as part of a debt settlement action?
(percent yes)
4.9
3.9
8.5
4.6
4.7
1.3
8.3
8.0
(percent no)
95.1
96.1
91.5
95.4
95.3
98.7
91.7
92.0
(0.7)
(1.2)
(2.9)
(1.3)
(2.6)
(0.9)
(4.7)
(5.5)

EM
8,359

Total
45,468

487

2,715

6.5
93.5
(1.3)

5.4
94.6
(0.5)

14.8
85.2
(1.9)

14.5
85.5
(0.8)

77
23
(2.0)

73.5
26.5
(0.9)

47.3
52.7
(2.9)

50.4
49.6
(1.2)

3.4
96.6
(0.9)

4.5
95.5
(0.4)

Source: Computed from 2004 Survey of FY 1994–1996 New Loans
*Statistics in a given column may be based on fewer observations if there are missing values.
**Data in this table come from five questions asked on the Request for Direct Loan Assistance (FSA-410-1). The last two questions are ambiguous although they
might be of interest to those more familiar with the loan application process. In particular, the question asking if a previous direct or guaranteed loan had been
paid in full is not informative if more than one loan had been obtained. Furthermore, a prior loan active at the origination of a new loan may be performing
satisfactorily but still not be paid in full. The subsequent question about the loan debt settled or applicant released is also ambiguous for multiple loans. Figures
in parentheses are standard errors that apply to both percentages directly above.

2.2. Duration and Graduation

intended that termination status would be determined by the response to two questions. The first
question asked if the loan had been paid in full, with
a positive response indicating termination. Then
respondents were asked if the loan had terminated
due to foreclosure, bankruptcy, or debt write-off. A
positive response would indicate the loan as terminated. In subsequent responses to three additional
questions it became clear that some loans not considered terminated by the above two questions were
considered terminated by the FLMs.44

One goal of the FSA Direct loan program is to help
creditworthy borrowers fill an existing credit gap so
that they may graduate to conventional sources of
credit or be free of credit needs altogether in the
future.43 In this section, the survey data for loans
made in FY 1994–1996 are examined to measure borrower lengths of loan, graduation rates and types of
exits from direct FLPs. This analysis is initiated by
examining the percentages of loans that have been
terminated either by having been paid in full or by
other means, the length of time to these outcomes,
and the types of exits from FLPs taken by the borrowers.

A loan originated in FY 1994–1996 was classified as
terminated if the FLMs indicated on the survey either
of the following situations: that the loan had been
paid in full or terminated due to foreclosure, bankruptcy or write-off, or the borrower had no loans of

2.2.1. Identifying a Loan’s Termination Status
A loan was classified as terminated by two sets of criteria. In designing the survey instrument, it was

in this study means no longer using direct FLPs but continuing farming with or without credit.
solution to this ambiguity would have been to ask FSA to determine if a given loan was active or terminated from its loan servicing records. This is a more daunting task than might first be thought. The research team’s understanding of the loan record-keeping system is that a given loan can be assigned different loan numbers over time if it is restructured or consolidated. Thus a given loan
number might have a terminated status but really be active under a different number. Because the programming task to unsnarl and
identify such loans was formidable, this approach was not taken.

43 Graduation
44 One
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cent rate for OL loans is expected and ideally should
be 100 percent since a loan in the sample could not
have been originated after September 30, 1996. This
means all loans had at least eight years to terminate
and 16 percent of the OL loans did not. These loans
have likely been restructured or consolidated.

that type active as of November 30, 2004.45 Using the
above method for determining loan status, 78 percent
of the 2,715 loans were classified as terminated.
Furthermore, for 2,606 unique borrowers sampled,
55 percent had no active FO, OL, or EM loans as of
November 30, 2004. From these two statistics, it is
clear that direct loans are terminated and, more
importantly, over half the borrowers active in FY
1994–1996 had exited within no more than approximately nine years.

The finding that 75 percent of EM loans terminated
is encouraging. Furthermore, an estimated 81 percent of the terminated EM loans were paid in full.
EM loans are made to operators who have encountered adversity and had to take loans under financially stressful circumstances. Nonetheless, most of these
loans ended by November 30, 2004.

2.2.2. Overall Loan Termination Rates and Length
of Terminated Loans
Table 2.6 displays the termination percentages by
loan program. The overall termination rate is 77.7
percent. This statistic is very much influenced by the
preponderance of OL loans in the sample. OL loans
come in two types based on length of maturity - one
year and seven years. Because of these very fundamentally different time spans for the two OL loan
types, tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 have an expanded number of columns to differentiate between the two OL
loan maturities.

The mean length of time to loan termination is displayed in table 2.6. As to be expected, OL loans have
much shorter durations than FO loans. In particular,
the mean length of loans for FO loans will increase as
more of these loans are paid back. A similar effect
will happen with OL loans but since the proportion
of OL loans still active is so much smaller than for FO
loans, the increase in OL loan length will be less than
for FO loans. One-year loans make up about half of
the OL loans in each OL category in table 2.6.
Ninety-one percent of the one-year loans are terminated and 74 percent of seven-year loans are also terminated. Given the short durations of the mean loan
length times, it is clear that many seven-year loans
terminated early. The mean lengths of OL one-year
loans exceed the maturity and this is surprising.
Since these are typically annual operating loans, it
would be expected they would be paid back on time.
As discussed shortly, the mean length of OL loans
paid-in-full is less than when paid in full loans are
combined with loans terminated in other ways. The
means for all loan lengths are clearly affected by the
problem loans.

It is clear there are substantial differences among OL,
FO, and EM loan termination percentages and
lengths of time to termination. The most striking
difference is between FO loans and the other two
groups. When the various OL and various FO loans
are combined, the aggregate termination rates are 84,
52, and 75 percent for OL, FO, and EM loans. The differences between these three groupings are statistically significant for all three pair-wise comparisons. It is
clear that FO loans did not terminate as of November
30, 2004 nearly as often as OL and EM loans. This is
to be expected given the long-term nature of the
loans. Nonetheless, approximately half of the FO
loans had terminated for some reason. The 84 per-

45 FSA furnished the number of active OL, FO, and EM loans as of November 30, 2004 for each of the 2,715 lender identification numbers from its loan servicing database. If a borrower was in the sample as a result of an OL origination in FY 1994-1996, for example,
and had no OL loans outstanding as of November 30, 2004, we concluded that the OL originated in FY 1994-1996 was terminated.
The same analysis was undertaken for FO and EM loans. This approach almost surely undercounts the actual number of terminated
loans.
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T a bl e 2 . 6 . T e r m i n a t i o n p e r c e n t a g e s a n d m e a n l o a n l e n g t h b y l o a n t y p e f o r F Y 1 9 9 4 – 1 9 9 6 s a m p l e
Item
n (number of
observations)*

OLREG
1 yr
695

OLREG
7 yr
523

OLBF
1 yr
163

OLBF
7 yr
155

OLBF SDA
1 yr
45

OLBF SDA
7 yr
57

OLSDA
1 yr
145

OLSDA
7 yr
142

FOREG
73

F OB F
169

F OB F SD A

FOSDA

33

28

EM

T o ta l

487

2,715

Percent of loans terminated by November 30, 2004
91.39

71.88

90.06

79.02

84.44

66.13

89.54

68.21

45.77

53.41

55.26

43.33

74.76

77.70

(1.06)

(1.97)

(2.35)

(3.28)

(5.46)

(6.32)

(2.55)

(3.92)

(5.87)

(3.85)

(8.79)

(9.54)

(1.97)

(0.80)

5.92
(0.41)

1.60
(0.17)

5.21
(0.28)

7.27
(0.42)

6.48
(0.27)

6.69
(0.68)

7.41
(0.88)

5.38
(0.15)

3.75
(0.07)

Mean time from FY 1994–1996 loan origination to loan termination (years)
1.62
(0.09)

5.63
(0.13)

1.54
(0.15)

5.60
(0.21)

1.98
(0.42)

Source: Computed from 2004 Survey of FY 1994–1996 New Loans
*Statistics in a given column may be based on fewer observations if there are missing values. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

understandably lower. FO loans are long-term loans,
hence they are not expected to be paid back rapidly.
Ideally, FO loans would be paid back when the borrower had established sufficient financial strength to
obtain conventional credit to refinance outstanding
debts. However, borrowers who are performing satisfactorily on FO loans have little incentive to refinance their fixed interest-rate loans with credit elsewhere since the interest rates associated with FO
loans are frequently less than those offered elsewhere.
However, over time interest rates offered elsewhere
may become more competitive than their FO fixed
rate, creating an incentive for borrowers to refinance.
Such an interest rate environment has recently
occurred. The interest rates on long-term loans
offered by some creditors since 2001 have become less
than those of FO loans originated during FY
1994–1996 (USDA/ERS, 2003).

The above statistics document that most FSA Direct
loans do terminate reasonably near maturity. The
question remains as to how the loans ended, either
due to getting paid off or due to some form of loss.
Further, an important question remains as to
whether borrowers simply pay off one FSA loan, then
get a new direct loan and remain lifelong FSA loan
clients. These issues are addressed below.
2.2.3. Characteristics of Loans Paid in Full
In assessing the effectiveness of the loan programs, it
is important to examine the rate at which loans are
paid back. One measure of program success is the
number of loans paid in full. Table 2.7 provides data
on the proportion of loans indicated as paid in full.46
The majority of the one-year and seven-year OL
loans originated in FY 1994–1996 were paid in full as
of November 2004. As would be expected, the payback rates are higher for the one-year loans than for
the seven-year loans. In general the paid-in-full rates
for OL loans do not differ markedly among the regular, beginning farmer, and SDA groupings for a given
maturity length, except that SDA loans have a lower
rate for seven-year loans although only the OLBFSDA
is significantly different from the OLREG and OLBF
rate. The percentages of FO loans paid in full are

There is evidence in the data that many of the direct
FO loans paid in full are being replaced with conventional credit. In table 2.7 it can be seen that the proportions of paid-back FO loans financed with conventional or FmHA (or FSA) guaranteed credit are
much higher than the proportions for OL loans.
Many OL loans, particularly one-year loans, are
undoubtedly paid back, and then new loans are

46 A

loan is classified as paid in full only if the response to the paid-in-full question was “yes”. That means observations on a number
of loans that were terminated and presumably paid-in-full but not so indicated are omitted in the statistics for paid-in-full loans. Also,
paid in full does not rule out the possibility of a loan having gone through foreclosure, bankruptcy, or debt write-off. Sixteen of the
1,418 loans indicated as paid in full also were indicated as having gone through foreclosure, bankruptcy, or debt write-off. These loans
may have been paid in full because the value of liquidated collateral was sufficient to repay the loan.
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Table 2.7. Characteristics of loans paid in full at time of survey
OLBF
SDA
7yr
57
18
35.7
(7.0)
6.3
(0.47)

OLSDA
1yr

OLSDA
7yr

FOREG

FOBF

155
70
54.6
(4.4)
5.7
(0.22)

OLBF
SDA
1yr
45
25
64.1
(7.7)
1.2
(0.15)

145
85
73.0
(4.1)
1.1
(0.12)

142
60
47.8
(4.6)
5.2
(0.32)

73
23
34.6
(5.9)
7.5
(0.46)

6.3
(2.5)

26.2
(5.6)

10.5
(7.0)

27.8
(11.0)

6.3
(2.7)

21.7
(6.2)

9.9
(1.31)

1.9
(1.07)

8.2
(2.20)

0.0
(0.0)

4.8
(2.74)

2.0
(1.12)

2.9
(0.29)

***

2.2
(0.53)

***

***

***

Item

OLREG
1yr

OL RE G
7yr

OLBF
1yr

OLBF
7yr

n (number of observations)*
Loans paid in full**
Loans paid in full (percent)

695
469
79.6
(1.7)
1.3
(0.07)

523
251
56.0
(2.4)
5.5
(0.14)

163
99
78.5
(3.6)
1.1
(0.10)

7.3
(1.3)

27.9
(3.1)

4.3
(0.77)
1.5
(0.25)

For loans paid in full,
average length of loan
(years)
Loans paid in full paid off
with conventional credit or
FmHA guaranteed credit
(percent)
For loans paid in full,
percentage with at least
one restructuring?
Number of years from date
of loan to first restructuring
for loans with at least one
restructuring and paid in full

FOBFSDA

FOSDA

EM

Total

169
68
44.3
(4.0)
6.5
(0.27)

33
11
40.0
(9.4)
7.0
(0.71)

28
8
29.6
(9.1)
7.7
(0.96)

487
231
57.1
(2.5)
5.3
(0.16)

2,715
1,418
62.4
(1.0)
3.5
(0.08)

55.8
(10.6)

65.5
(6.2)

33.3
(14.7)

0.0
(0.0)

31.7
(3.5)

20.4
(1.2)

9.3
(2.66)

4.2
(2.39)

3.0
(1.31)

7.9
(4.42)

6.7
(4.58)

4.4
(0.97)

5.6
(0.46)

2.4
(0.54)

***

2.2
(0.62)

***

***

3.3
(0.49)

2.5
(0.16)

Source: Computed from 2004 Survey of FY 1994–1996 New Loans
*Statistics in a given column may be based on fewer observations if there are missing values. Standard errors are in parentheses.
**A loan not paid in full could still be active or terminated.
***Statistic not reported because there were five or fewer observations.
.

Seven-year loans were more likely to experience a
restructuring than the one-year loans of the same
type. For regular one-year OL loans paid in full, 4.3
percent experienced a restructuring, and 9.9 percent
of regular seven-year OL loans paid in full experienced restructurings. The difference is statistically
significant. It would be expected that seven-year
loans would have a higher rate of restructurings since
there is more exposure to unplanned events over
time. The restructurings for regular seven-year OL
loans come later during the life of the loan, as would
be expected, than for the one-year loans.
Nonetheless, the seven-year loans experience restructuring early on in the course of the loan—less than a
mean of three years into the loan. Like OL loans,
restructurings occur with similar frequency for FO
and EM loans paid in full.

obtained for different input purchases. This implies
no need to refinance the loan because the length of
time is too short to make it worth the transaction
cost. The more relevant question for OL loans paid
in full is whether the borrowers graduate from FSA
credit and move on to conventional forms of credit.
As noted earlier, most FY 1994–1996 borrowers were
not new FSA borrowers. The graduation rates of FSA
borrowers are explored shortly.
The estimated, mean loan durations for the OL loans
indicate that loans paid in full were paid off near the
agreed maturity of the loans. That is, the one-year
loans were paid off in about a year and the seven-year
loans within seven years. Those durations will
increase some, particularly for the seven-year loans,
as loans still active are paid off. However, given that
most of the loans have been paid off, the loan durations are not likely to increase substantially.

Restructurings come fairly early in the loan except for
regular OL one-year loans. The mean time to first
restructuring, excluding EM loans, is less than three
years for all loan categories having at least six or more
restructurings. Except for regular OL loans, the stan-

A small percentage of paid-in-full loans did experience restructurings. For the total sample, 5.6 percent
of the loans paid in full had at least one restructuring.
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Eleven percent of terminated loans were not-paid-infull. The greatest source of not-paid-in-full, terminated loans was OL loans to beginning farmers
except for those with one-year loans. It is not surprising that FO loans experience lower percentages of
not paid in full. Loans in financial difficulty also
seem to take a long time to be terminated, particularly the one-year loans. For regular one-year OL loans
not paid in full, the mean length of time to termination was 5.2 years. For OL loans not paid in full, OL
regular seven-year loans take somewhat longer than
the OL regular one-year loans with a mean of 6.3
years. However, a larger proportion of the seven-year
loans were active at the time of the survey so this 6.3
figure will increase more over time than the one-year
figure.

dard errors are large enough that no significant differences can be found among mean times to first
restructuring.
2.2.4. Characteristics of Loans Terminated
with a Loss
The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-233)
established rules allowing FmHA (or FSA) to restructure delinquent loans with the objective of keeping
farmers on the farm at the lowest cost to the
Government. Loan write-down and debt settlement
(or write-off) programs were established. These programs are available to the borrower after servicing
actions, such as reducing interest rates or rescheduling debt, have been considered when a loan becomes
delinquent. A loan write-down is a situation where
the borrower continues with FSA. The loan balance
may be written down to the calculated net recovery
value of the collateral (market value less liquidation
costs). If this servicing action fails to produce a successful debt repayment plan, the debt settlement program is considered. Debt settlements and write-offs
are situations where the borrower pays off the loan at
the calculated net recovery value if the borrower is
able to receive funds from other sources (USDA/ERS,
1991). A debt settlement is considered final whereas a
loan write-down and write-off may be subject to
recapture if funds subsequently become available to
the borrower. It is our understanding that recapture
of loan write-downs and write-offs have been relatively infrequent. Therefore, they are considered as
loan losses for this study.

The proportions of loans terminated due to foreclosure, bankruptcy, or debt write-off are approximately
the same as the proportions of loans terminated but
not paid in full. For the whole sample, about 8.3 percent of terminated loans were terminated due to foreclosure, bankruptcy, or debt write-off. The mean
loss for all 169 loans reporting a loss was $57,806.
The comparable mean figure for initial loan amount
was $62,001.48 The major source of monetary losses is
from loans terminated due to foreclosure, bankruptcy, or debt write-off.49 One-year regular OL loans had
a mean loss of $56,067 among the 8.5 percent of borrowers who experienced terminated loans. OL sevenyear loans had a lower mean loss of $31,416 and a
lower percent of affected borrowers at 7.4 percent.
OL BF farmers had a higher percentage of loans terminated due to foreclosure, bankruptcy, or debt
write-off than the regular loans but only the sevenyear percentage is statistically different from the two
regular OL percentages. SDA OL borrowers have
similar percentages to regular OL loans except for
SDA BF loans, which have a significantly higher percentage for seven-year loans. The various FO loan

Loan write-downs and write-offs47 are relatively
infrequent for the loans in the sample just as recaptures of them have been in general. Only two percent
of the loans had experienced a write-down since origination. This statistic is for both active and terminated loans. Table 2.8 reports frequencies and amounts
of write-downs and write-offs for terminated loans.

47 Loan write-offs are assumed to include debt settlements in this study.
48 The amount owed at termination could exceed the initial loan amount because of loan restructuring and accrued interest.
49 The FLMs were also asked the level of losses due to write-downs, and only 20 write-downs (mean of $76,747) were reported.
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Table 2.8. Characteristics of terminated FSA loans experiencing losses
Item
n (number of
observations)*
Percent of terminated
loans not paid in full
For terminated loans not
paid in full, mean length of
loan(years)
For terminated loans not
paid in full, mean length of
time between origination
date and first
restructuring (years)
Percent of terminated
loans due to foreclosure,
bankruptcy or debt writeoff
Mean amount of loss from
loans terminated due to
foreclosure, bankruptcy or
debt write-off
Number of years from
date of loan to
termination by
foreclosure, bankruptcy or
debt write-off

OLREG OLREG
7 yr
1 yr
695
523
10.1
(1.1)

OLBF
1 yr
163

OLBF
OLBF SDA OLBF SDA OLSDA OLSDA FOREG FOBF FOBFSDA FOSDA
1yr
7 yr
7 yr
1 yr
7 yr
155
45
57
145
142
73
169
33
28

EM

Total

487 2,715

11.0
(1.4)

9.9
(2.4)

16.7
(3.0)

17.8
(5.7)

27.4
(6.0)

13.7
(2.9)

16.6
(3.2)

5.6
(2.7)

4.7
(1.6)

10.5
(5.1)

6.7
(4.6)

5.2
6.3
(0.40) (0.42)

4.9
(0.49)

4.6
(0.51)

**

5.2
(0.76)

4.7
(0.49)

5.0
(0.68)

**

**

**

**

5.4
5.4
(0.48) (0.18)

1.3
2.6
(0.10) (0.26)

1.0
(0.09)

1.6
(0.26)

**

2.8
(0.47)

1.3
(0.22)

2.3
(0.46)

**

**

**

**

1.8
1.8
(0.28) (0.10)

9.6
(2.6)

16.1
(3.3)

10.3
(4.9)

23.6
(5.9)

12.9
(3.0)

10.4
(2.7)

3.1
(2.2)

2.6
(1.3)

9.1
(5.1)

3.8
(3.8)

56,067 31,416 112,907
(8,740) (5,491) (28,977)

53,179
(8,732)

**

37,407 46,457 52,262
(9,437) (14,719) (17,822)

**

**

**

**

87,940 57,806
(22,543) 4,871

5.6
(0.21)

2.0
(0.42)

6.7
7.4
(0.68) (0.88)

5.4
3.8
(0.15) (0.07)

8.5
(1.2)

7.4
(1.2)

1.6
5.6
(0.09) (0.13)

1.5
(0.15)

5.9
(0.41)

1.6
(0.17)

5.2
7.3
6.5
(0.28) (0.42) (0.27)

11.1
(1.5)

6.9
(1.3)

11.0
(0.6)

8.3
(0.6)

Source: Computed from 2004 Survey of FY1994–1996 New Loans
*Statistics in a given column may be based on fewer observations if there are missing values. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
**Statistic not reported because there were five or fewer observations.

type of exit was graduation to conventional credit,
i.e., not a transitional step through FSA guaranteed
programs. Only 9.1 percent of those exiting any of
the loan programs used FSA guarantees. The next
fact is that only about a third of exits used conventional credit. This result is surprising since we
expected a larger proportion. Overall, fewer than half
the borrowers continued farming with credit. An
exception to this behavior is FO BF, which showed a
much larger proportion of borrowers exiting via the
use of conventional credit. This indicates some program success since these beginning farmers used
FLPs early on and then continued without the help of
FSA programs.

types have lower percentages of loans terminated due
to foreclosure, bankruptcy, or debt write-off than
their counterpart seven-year OL loans. But the differences are only statistically significant between
seven-year OLBF and FOBF loans.
2.2.5. Frequency and Type of Borrower Exits from
FSA Direct Loan Programs
As noted earlier, 55 percent of the loans were by borrowers who had exited direct FLPs as of November
30, 2004. Table 2.9 lists the seven different reasons
the FLM could indicate as the reason for exit. The
FLMs could also report unknown. The statistics for
the two FO SDA programs should be interpreted cautiously because they are based on small samples.

About 10 percent of those exiting continued farming
and no longer needed credit. This could imply any
number of things such as scaling back the operation,
finally paying off all loans, or getting alternative
sources of income to support the farm operation. It

The FO SDA frequencies here are merely suggestive
and included for completeness of the table. Several
facts stand out in table 2.9. First, the most frequent
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Table 2.9. Type of exit by loan type for FY 1994–1996 borrowers exiting the FSA Farm Loan Program by November 30, 2004
I te m
Number of exited borrowers*

OLRE G
536

OL B F
148

OLB F SD A
43

OL S D A
104

FOREG
27

FOBF
71

FOBFSDA
12

FOSDA
9

EM
217

Total
1,167

Percent of borrowers who continued
farming and graduated to FSA guaranteed
credit**
Percent of borrowers who continued
farming and graduated to conventional
non-FSA credit
Percent of borrowers who continued
farming and no longer needed credit

9.2
(1.3)

10.2
(2.5)

4.4
(3.1)

3.5
(2.1)

7.5
(5.1)

8.5
(3.3)

0
0.0

0
0.0

11.1
(2.2)

9.1
(0.9)

33.3
(2.0)

33.4
(3.9)

22.2
(6.7)

29.2
(4.8)

41.5
(9.5)

62.0
(5.8)

28.6
(12.8)

11.1
(10.5)

31.6
(3.3)

34.6
(1.4)

7.6
(1.1)

6.8
(2.0)

2.2
(2.2)

13.3
(3.4)

11.3
(6.2)

11.3
(3.8)

7.1
(7.0)

22.2
(13.9)

16.2
(2.4)

9.7
(0.9)

Percent of borrowers who left farming
voluntarily other than retirement
Percent of borrowers who retired from
farming

21.9
(1.8)
8.9
(1.2)

35.2
(3.9)
2.0
(1.2)

44.4
(7.7)
0
0.0

23.0
(4.3)
14.2
(3.3)

26.4
(8.6)
5.7
(4.1)

12.7
(4.0)
0
0.0

50.0
(15.2)
0
0.0

44.4
(16.6)
11.1
(10.5)

19.8
(2.8)
6.9
(1.8)

23.7
(1.3)
6.9
(0.8)

Percent of borrowers who left farming
involuntarily other than death
Percent of borrowers who left farming
due to death

12.7
(1.4)
6.3
(1.1)

12.3
(2.7)
0
0.0

20.0
(6.0)
6.7
(3.7)

9.7
(2.8)
7.1
(2.4)

3.8
(3.7)
3.8
(3.7)

2.8
(2.0)
2.8
(2.0)

14.3
(9.6)
0
0.0

11.1
(10.5)
0
0.0

9.0
(2.0)
5.4
(1.5)

11.1
(0.9)
5.0
(0.6)

Source: Computed from 2004 Survey of FY 1994–1996 New Loans
*Note: This row gives the number of loans whose originators left the FLPs by November 30, 2004 and for whom the FLM gave a reason for exiting.
** Figures are the percentage of borrowers exiting for a given reason from the loan program indicated in the column. All columns sum to 100 percent except for rounding error. Figures in
parentheses are standard errors.

could also involve leasing some or most land or sale
of some farming assets. The reasons were not collected in the survey. Borrowers also left farming voluntarily for reasons other than retirement (23.7 percent
of all exited loans) and for retirement (6.9 percent).
Five percent of the loans were terminated due to the
farmer’s death. It is not clear if such loans can be
considered terminated because a relative or spouse
could have assumed the loan or refinanced it with
FSA under a new name. Overall, 53.4 percent of the
exiting farmers graduated, i.e., continued farming
without FLP Direct Loan assistance.

gories have small samples and OLSDA—which has
more observations than the other three SDA categories combined—has an exit rate similar to the
other non-SDA programs.
Only about 11 percent of exited borrowers left involuntarily. The highest proportion of borrowers leaving involuntarily was for the OLBFSDA assistance
type but the proportion, 20 percent, has a large standard error so that the rate is no different from the
others listed except FOREG and FOBF. Rates of
involuntary exit were higher for OLREG and OLBF
than their FO counterparts. Rates for beginning
farmers were not statistically different from those for
non-beginning farmers within the OL and FO programs, respectively.

Three of the four SDA categories display the highest
proportions for exiting farming voluntarily.
However, this may be misleading. These three cate81
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Overall, it is clear borrowers exited FLPs for a variety
of reasons and no one reason dominates. It is surprising that about 42 percent of those loans terminated had borrowers who left farming for some other
occupation or lifestyle. This suggests FSA Direct
loans make it possible for some people to try farming
and then seek alternative uses of their time. Such
exits certainly are not the typical path envisioned for
a borrower but this behavior also demonstrates that
farming need not be—and is not—a life-time career
path for all entrants. Gale estimates a 3.5 percent
annual exit rate for farmers from 1992 to 1997. Also,
for the majority of participants, FSA Direct Loans do
not appear to lead to a lifetime of using FSA Direct
Loans. So the Direct Loan Programs appear to be
serving as transitional sources of credit. Moreover,
FSA borrowers transitioned to conventional sources
of credit and a small proportion of farmers ended up
having to leave farming involuntarily, e.g., due to
financial stress. The reasons why one particular borrower leaves via one option instead of another is
explored in the next section.

The findings in table 2.9 must be interpreted in the
appropriate time context. Borrowers in the sample
are those who initiated loans in FY 1994–1996. The
termination status is as of November 30, 2004. In
subsequent years more borrowers, particularly those
holding FO loans, will exit the program. If table 2.9
were constructed with termination status as of
November 30, 2005 the results would be somewhat
different than with the November 30, 2004 date. In
addition, there is the possibility that some borrowers
who were inactive as of November 30, 2004 might
initiate new loans in the intervening year and thereby
have their status changed from terminated to active.
Given these caveats, table 2.9 gives a snapshot in time
of borrower status. Borrowers had approximately
nine years since originating loans in FY 1994–1996.
A perspective for interpreting table 2.9 is to consider
it as a long-run portrayal. That is, borrowers do leave
the program and most of them surely leave permanently. We know from looking at the demographics
of the borrowers at origination that they tended to be
younger than the farming population in general. It is
unlikely borrowers who have exited and are now in
their fifties would become FSA borrowers again
although an emergency loan would be the most obvious reason for re-entry. Since the mean age of those
who exited is only a year greater than those who were
still FSA debtors, we would expect future exits to be
shaded more toward retirement and death than the
current rates. It is more difficult to speculate on
those continuing farming versus those leaving farming. To the extent farmers leave farming for more
lucrative off-farm employment, such chances probably diminish as they age. However, older farmers do
tend to be less indebted (Gale) so the likelihood of
continued farming without any credit needs is a more
likely possibility. A reasonable conjecture is that
those exiting post 2004 will likely have fewer credit
needs, fewer good off-farm employment opportunities, and be more likely to retire than those who left
before 2004.

2.3. Modeling FLP Program Exit Status Using
Multinomial Logit
The analysis above indicates the variety of ways borrowers could exit direct FLPs. To understand why
borrowers exit in a given way, a multinomial logit
model is estimated below to identify the relevant
variables known at time of origination that can predict the type of outcome. Such information is useful
to help FSA better predict outcomes. In general, FSA
is interested in providing direct loans to farmers who
can use them to move to conventional credit sources
in due time, i.e., graduate. The analysis below identifies indicators of whether a borrower is likely to:
remain a longer term client, encounter payback problems, continue in farming, or leave voluntarily for
some other occupation.
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2.3.1. Logit Model Methodology

where ln denotes the natural logarithm. This equation reveals the impact of how characteristics of borrower i, xi, affect the log of the ratio of the probabilities.

The statistical model estimated is called a multinomial logit model. Logit models classify observations
into various outcomes as a function of independent
variables associated with each observation. For each
observation there are eight outcomes—the seven
forms of exit in table 2.9 plus the outcome of still
being an active FLP participant. There are theoretical
and practical reasons for combining the outcomes
into four categories. The practical considerations
include having a sufficient number of observations
for each category to allow for reliable statistical inference. Also, a large number of categories would make
for an unwieldy number of parameters that would
make parameter interpretation difficult. On a theoretical level, logit models require the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Greene, 2003). This
theoretical property requires that the different categories be distinctly different from each other. For
example, the two outcomes, exiting from direct OL,
FO, and EM loans and continuing farming with guaranteed loans or continuing with regular commercial
loans, are clearly much more similar than exiting
farming involuntarily.

The parameters in the βj are difficult to interpret in
any meaningful way. A clearer presentation and interpretation of the coefficients can be obtained by using
the coefficients to estimate changes in the probability
of an event for a one-unit change in an independent
variable. The formula for this is given in Greene
(2003). Moreover, standard errors for these statistics
can also be computed to determine if effects are statistically different from zero. These changes in probabilities are referred to as the marginal probabilities.50
An important characteristic of the estimated marginal probabilities as opposed to the estimated parameters (the βj) is that some variables may be statistically
significant in the estimated marginal probabilities
that are not significant as parameters. Moreover, the
number of estimated marginal probabilities exceeds
the number of estimated parameters by one third. So
if there are eighteen independent variables (including
a constant) in the three-group system there will be
fifty-four estimated parameters and seventy-two estimated marginal probabilities.51

In a logit model with four outcome categories, three
groups of parameters are estimated. Each parameter
group indicates how a particular set of independent
variables changes the odds of a particular outcome
relative to a base outcome. Denote Pij as the probability that the ith farmer will experience outcome j ( j
= 1, 2, 3 ,4 ). Let j = 1 be the base outcome of still
having one or more FO, OL, or EM loans. Thus we
define Pi1 as the probability that the ith farmer will still
be in the Direct Loan Program with one or more FO,
OL, or EM loan(s). The parameters estimated for
group j, call them βj, exert their effect on the probabilities, Pij and Pi1, through the equation:
ln(Pij /Pi1) = βjxi

The interpretation of the marginal probabilities as
marginal changes is strictly applicable only to independent variables that are continuous over some
interval of the observations. Seven of the independent variables in the estimated logit model are binary
variables that indicate the presence or absence of
some attribute. For example, the variable FO has a
value of one if the loan was an FO loan; and the variable FEMALE takes on a value of one if the borrower
is female. For binary variables, the marginal probabilities cannot be strictly interpreted as marginal
changes since the variable can only change from zero
to one. The appropriate procedure to compute the
change in probability resulting from a change in the

j = 2,3,4

50 To

evaluate the probabilities, it is necessary to set the values of the independent variables at some level. In this study the independent variables are set at their sample means.
51 Given the excess of the number of marginal probabilities over the number of parameters, the probabilities associated with a given
variable are required to sum to zero.
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binary variable is to compute the probability of a particular outcome with the binary variable set to one
and then subtract the probability with the binary
variable set to zero. This is typically done with the
other independent variables set equal to their sample
means. These probabilities were computed for the
seven binary variables. The standard errors for these
estimated probabilities were computed using a bootstrap approach.

In a pure econometric sense, the models estimated
are lacking all the relevant variables to explain exit
status because relevant post origination variables are
excluded. But the purpose of the models is to answer
the following question: Are there variables at time of
origination that can be used to help in determining a
borrower’s future exit status? The answer to this
question helps FSA to be more selective in identifying
borrowers most likely to benefit in the long run from
direct loans. As a consequence, the finding that plausible predictive variables are statistically insignificant
is not a failure in modeling or theorizing, but recognition that post-origination factors explaining exit
status are important determinants of borrower status.

As with classical regression models, it is useful to
compute measures of goodness of fit. Unfortunately
there are not a series of goodness of fit statistics with
interpretations as clear as those of the classical regression model. There are tests equivalent to the standard F test testing the null hypothesis that all the
coefficients are equal to zero. In addition, there are
prediction tests that measure how accurately the estimated model is able to predict the classification of
the sample observations into their actual (observed)
categories. This is computed using an actual versus
predicted table. The usual style is to have the actual
observations as the rows and the predictions as
columns. In a perfect model, each observation would
be classified in its correct category and the resulting
table would be diagonal.

2.3.3. Empirical Model Specification
The empirical model was specified with the goal of
including those explanatory variables most likely to
predict which borrowers exited the program and how
they exited. The explanatory variables are those
observed during the loan approval process. This is
the only information FSA has when evaluating a
potential borrower. The purpose of the logit model is
to determine which variables are most important in
predicting the long-term “success” of the borrower
without information on the events between origination and exit.

2.3.2. Modeling Issues
The model estimated and presented below is an
incomplete model in a statistical sense. All independent variables are functions of data observable at origination. The dependent variable is the exit status at a
later date. A complete model for explaining exit status would incorporate data on variables related to
actual events in the intervening years. For example,
in explaining exit status it would be useful to know
the actual cash flows experienced by the borrower,
and any emergencies or changes such as divorce, offfarm employment, or long-term illness that may have
been experienced by the borrower.52 All these factors
and other post origination factors influence exit status.

Outcomes for the model are classified into four categories. In the first category are those borrowers who
were still FSA debtors as of November 30, 2004. We
were furnished data from FSA in St. Louis on three
variables that were used in making this determination. These variables were the number of OL, FO,
and EM loans, respectively, outstanding as of
November 30, 2004. If a borrower had zero outstanding loans in each of the three variable types, the borrower was classified as having exited the program,
otherwise the borrower was considered to be still
active in FSA FLPs, which we label as outcome one. If

52 In a study of individual consumer bankruptcies, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook found loss of job or major medical event precede
a consumer bankruptcy filing.
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the borrower had exited FSA Direct Loan Programs,
the borrower was put into one of three other categories on the basis of which of the seven exited classes was indicated by the FLM.

pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property as
discussed previously. This essentially means the various outcomes should be distinct from all other outcomes.56 The proposed groupings satisfy this requirement in the estimated model. Further, statistical tests
of the IIA assumption indicate the assumption cannot be rejected.

Three of the exit possibilities were that the borrower:
(1) had graduated to FSA guaranteed credit, (2) had
graduated to conventional credit, or (3) had graduated and was still in farming and did not need credit.
For the purposes of logit estimation, these three outcomes were categorized together into outcome two
(graduation). This category represents farmers who
have been successful and were still in farming. The
next category, outcome three, contains those who had
left farming voluntarily or retired. This grouping
represents those who left farming, but not under
duress. Outcome four contains those who left farming involuntarily other than death. Farmers who died
were not included in any of the four categories
including “unknown.” There were 63 such farmers
out of the 2,705 farmers whose exit status was reported.53 There was no natural category among the four
created for those farmers who had died. The
deceased farmers could have been put into a category
of their own but then the specification of the economic and demographic variables (except for age)
would not have made much sense.54 Essentially, the
results show that for the loans with borrowers of the
ages sampled, two percent of the loans had borrowers
who exited because of death about nine years later.55

The independent variables are grouped into four categories: (1) borrower demographics, (2) characteristics of the current loan, (3) prior financial distress
and involvement with FSA Direct Loans, and (4) borrower financial characteristics. An exact description
of the variables is given in table 2.10. The demographic variables are age (AGE), race (RACE), and
gender (FEMALE). The characteristics of the current
loan include whether the loan is FO, OL, BF, or SDA.
These three variables are binary and take on the value
of 1 if the loan has the particular characteristic. Also
included is the number of weeks elapsed (WEEKELAP) since origination of the loan and November 22,
2004, the beginning day of the survey. As time elapses, it would be expected the borrower would be more
likely to leave the direct FLP.
The binary variable (FINDIS) indicates the borrower
had been in receivership, received a bankruptcy discharge, or petitioned for bankruptcy reorganization
prior to the loan application. This is included as a
measure of prior financial distress. Also included are
the number of active FO loans at time of application
(NUMFO) and similar measures for number of OL
loans (NUMOL) and number of EM loans
(NUMEM).

The reduction from eight possible categories to four
is justified for several reasons. First, it is important in
logit models to avoid the problems with the inde-

53 There were ten observations for which no status—including unknown—was reported.
54 A simple binomial logit model was estimated with the dependent variable equaling one

if the borrower was still alive at the time of
the survey and zero if deceased. With age as the sole independent variable, the coefficient on age was significant and negative as
expected. An exit by death can also be viewed as a missing observation in the sense that it is not really known what becomes of the
loan. The survivors might continue farming in their own right and get a new loan to continue farming. The new loan could be direct,
guaranteed, or conventional. Likewise, the heir might continue farming without any loans at all. Finally the decedent may have been
in precarious financial condition and have exited farming soon had he/she continued to live.
55 In computing the two percent figure, it was assumed that if a borrower exited because of death, the FLM would know that. If the
FLM indicated “unknown” for exit reasons, the borrower was almost certainly alive at the exit time.
56 The classic example (Judge et al.) is predicting whether a child chooses to receive a pony or a bicycle as a gift. If the choice set were
expanded to include a pony, a blue bicycle or a red bicycle, the IIA assumption would be violated. That is, two of the outcomes—the
two bicycles differing only by color—are sufficiently alike and both differing from the pony in essentially the same way, that an underlying construct of the logit model is violated. In such a case the estimated logit model would be of questionable value.
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Table 2.10. Logit model variable definitions
Dependent var iable is EXIT
EXIT = 1 if borrower has active direct OL, FO or EM loans as of November 30, 2004,
EXIT = 2 if borrower has no active direct OL, FO or EM loans and is still farming using
conventional sources of credit or no credit at all,
EXIT = 3 if borrower has no active direct OL, FO or EM loans and left farming
voluntarily or retired,
EXIT = 4 if borrower has no active direct OL, FO or EM loans and left farming
involuntarily (other than death).
Independent variables
AGE
Age in years of the operator at time of loan application,
RACE
Binary variable taking on a value of 1 if borrower not white, 0 otherwise,
FEMALE
FO
OL
BF

Binary variable
Binary variable
Binary variable
Binary variable
otherwise,

with
with
with
with

value
value
value
value

of
of
of
of

1
1
1
1

if
if
if
if

borrower female, 0 otherwise,
loan FO, 0 otherwise,
loan OL, 0 otherwise,
loan has a beginning farmer assistance code, 0

SDA

Binary variable with value of 1 if loan has a socially disadvantaged assistance code, 0
otherwise,

FINDIS
WEEKLAP
NUMEM

Binary variable with value of 1 if borrower has ever been in receivership, discharged in
bankruptcy or petitioned for reorganization under bankruptcy,
Number of weeks since loan origination date to November 22, 2004,
Number of active EM loans at time of loan application,

NUMOL

Number of active OL loans at time of loan application,

NUMFO

Number of active FO loans at time of loan application,

DA
NETWORTH
NFINTCFI
REPAY

Total liabilities divided by total assets,
Net worth in millions of dollars,
Non-farm income divided by total cash farm income,
Balance available for debt service divided by total debt service due that year,

TOTINC

Total annual household net cash income in millions of dollars.

farm income to total cash farm income sources
(NFINTCFI) is a measure of income diversification
as well as the ability to generate income to offset
financial shortfalls from farming. Repayment ability
is measured as the balance available for debt service
divided by total debt service due that year (REPAY).
The final variable (TOTINC) is total annual household net cash income in millions of dollars.
Borrowers with higher repayment ability and income

The financial variables are measured at the time of
loan application. The debt-to-asset ratio (DA) is
defined as total debts divided by total assets. Both
farm and non-farm debts and assets are included in
the computation. The greater the DA, the more likely the farmer is to be both financially stressed and/or
still be in the program at a later date. Net worth
(NETWORTH) is computed as total assets less total
liabilities in millions of dollars.57 The ratio of off-

57 Millions are used to facilitate convergence in maximizing the likelihood function and to keep the coefficients from becoming comparatively minute.
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The lack of predictive power also underscores the
point made earlier that events subsequent to origination play a major role in the financial well-being of
FSA borrowers as with any borrower involved in agricultural production. From 1994 to 2004, some years
were generally good and some were weaker, particularly from 1998 to 2002 in terms of net farm income.
Almost all FSA borrowers are at the financial margin
although some are financially stronger than others.
As we discuss shortly, there are indications of this
payback ability differential at origination. But these
indications are not clear enough to be blatant signals
that certain borrowers should be denied credit. This
suggests that in the application process, FSA is using
available information to deny credit to obvious credit risks.60

should graduate from FSA Direct Loan Program earlier than borrowers at lower levels of these variables.58
2.3.4. Analysis of Estimated Model
The estimated model yields a number of statistically
significant marginal probabilities as displayed in
table 2.11. The overall fit of the model can be
appraised in three dimensions. As mentioned earlier,
the IIA assumption cannot be rejected. Furthermore,
the likelihood ratio statistic measuring the overall
significance of the coefficients firmly rejects the
hypothesis that the coefficients of all the variables
simultaneously equal zero. The model included
1,928 observations. This is less than the 2,715 surveyed but an observation was included only if it had
valid entries for all variables in the logit model for a
given loan.

Even though the weak predictive performance of the
model can be partially explained in terms of the
unbalanced sample, it must be also recognized that
this indicates a lack of strong explanatory power in
the model. If there were explanatory variables that
varied distinctively by outcome category, then the
predicted versus actual would have better explanatory power. So in evaluating the model, it is fair to say
that there is some explanatory power but not sufficient power to give highly accurate predictors of exit
status. As discussed earlier, events subsequent to loan
origination are likely more powerful predictors. It is
the uncertainty of these events that makes for the
inherent risk in lending.

The percent of sample observations predicted correctly by the model is disappointing. Although 57
percent of the observations are correctly predicted,
this is not much better than simply predicting all of
the observations as being in the category of borrowers who are still paying on direct loans. The problem
is likely the disproportionate number of observations
in the outcome categories. In the sample used to estimate the logit model there were 1,928 observations
and 1,092 were from borrowers who still had active
FSA loans. Of the remaining observations, 456 had
graduated to non-direct loan credit or no longer
needed credit, 273 had voluntarily left farming, and
107 had involuntarily left farming.59 Thus the estimated model tends to classify each observation as
being in the category with the most observations—
not exiting the program in this case.

The marginal probabilities show largely predictable
effects. The analysis here focuses exclusively on those
variables statistically significant at the 0.05 level on a

58 An

alternative specification approach would be to use a credit scoring index. Such an index is the weighted value of various variables measuring borrower characteristics. Splett et al. use measures of liquidity, solvency, profitability, repayment capacity, and financial efficiency. Two of the variables in the estimated model, DA and REPAY, could be included in a credit score. Additional variables
to measure liquidity, profitability, and financial efficiency were tried in preliminary estimation but their estimated parameters were
not significant. Three other variables were included in the model during preliminary estimation. These were 1) whether the loan term
was one year or seven years for OL loans, 2) whether the borrower had been in receivership, discharged in bankruptcy or filed for bankruptcy reorganization, and 3) the proportion of gross farm income from crops. All three of these were insignificant and subsequently deleted from the model in the interest of parameter parsimony.
59 In particular, missing observations were a problem for those exiting the program. If the FLM did not know the reason for exit, they
could mark “unknown”.
60 The evidence does not prove but is only suggestive. “Proof ” would require granting loans to weak applicants to discover if they do
fail at markedly higher rates than the applicants receiving loans.
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Table 2.11. Estimated marginal probabilities for logit model of exit status
Marginal probabilities of continued farming with or without conventional
c r e d i t [E X I T = 2 ]
V a r ia ble
Coefficient
S ta n d a r d e r r o r
t-r a tio
p -v a lu e
Constant
-0.1676
0.1226
-1.37
0.17
AGE
0.0002
0.0010
0.17
0.86
-0.1076
0.0419
-2.57
0.01
RACE
FEMALE
-0.0703
0.0389
-1.81
0.07
FO
-0.0429
0.0388
-1.11
0.27
-0.0320
0.0318
-1.00
0.31
OL
BF
-0.0072
0.0300
-0.24
0.81
SDA
0.0086
0.0672
0.13
0.90
0.0015
0.0471
0.03
0.97
FINDIS
WEEKELAP
0.0004
0.0002
2.03
0.04
-0.0273
0.0131
-2.09
0.04
NUMEM
-0.0336
0.0076
-4.39
0.00
NUMOL
NUMFO
-0.0261
0.0153
-1.71
0.09
-0.1157
0.0348
-3.33
0.00
DA
0.1749
0.0583
3.00
0.00
NETWORTH
NFINTCFI
0.0160
0.0058
2.77
0.01
0.0084
0.0089
0.95
0.34
REPAY
0.0743
0.0908
0.82
0.41
TOTINC

Marginal probabilities of still active FSA borrower [EXIT = 1]
V a r ia ble
Coefficient
Constant
0.6692
-0.0034
AGE
0.1537
RACE
FEMALE
0.0292
0.1382
FO
0.0177
OL
BF
-0.0768
-0.0348
SDA
FINDIS
-0.0778
WEEKELAP
-0.0008
0.0545
NUMEM
NUMOL
0.0247
NUMFO
0.0698
0.0720
DA
NETWORTH
0.0824
NFINTCFI
-0.0018
0.0157
REPAY
-0.0945
TOTINC

S ta n d a r d e r r o r
0.1421
0.0011
0.0481
0.0444
0.0446
0.0346
0.0369
0.0673
0.0546
0.0002
0.0140
0.0079
0.0167
0.0320
0.0790
0.0091
0.0174
0.1526

t-r a tio
4.71
-3.04
3.20
0.66
3.10
0.51
-2.08
-0.52
-1.43
-3.34
3.89
3.11
4.19
2.25
1.04
-0.20
0.90
-0.62

p -v a lu e
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.51
0.00
0.61
0.04
0.61
0.15
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.30
0.84
0.37
0.54

M a r g i n a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f i n v o l u n t a r i l y le a v in g f a r m in g o th e r th a n d e a th
[EXIT = 4]
V a r ia ble
Coefficient
S ta n d a r d e r r o r
t- r a tio
p -v a lu e
Constant
-0.1237
0.0453
-2.73
0.01
AGE
-0.0007
0.0004
-2.03
0.04
RACE
0.0219
0.0310
0.71
0.48
FEMALE
0.0026
0.0137
0.19
0.85
FO
-0.0204
0.0095
-2.16
0.03
OL
0.0125
0.0102
1.23
0.22
BF
-0.0108
0.0091
-1.18
0.24
SDA
-0.0218
0.0099
-2.19
0.03
FINDIS
0.0420
0.0209
2.01
0.04
WEEKELAP
0.0002
0.0001
2.60
0.01
NUMEM
-0.0020
0.0044
-0.45
0.65
NUMOL
0.0026
0.0021
1.25
0.21
NUMFO
-0.0303
0.0074
-4.09
0.00
DA
0.0070
0.0064
1.10
0.27
NETWORTH
-0.1430
0.0399
-3.58
0.00
NFINTCFI
-0.0059
0.0056
-1.05
0.29
REPAY
-0.0043
0.0084
-0.52
0.60
TOTINC
0.0120
0.0179
0.67
0.50

M a r g i n a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f v o l u n t a r ily le a v i n g f a r m in g o r r e t ir e m e n t
[EXIT = 3]
V a r ia ble
Coefficient
S ta n d a r d e r r o r
t-r a tio
p -v a lu e
Constant
-0.3779
0.0998
-3.79
0.00
AGE
0.0040
0.0007
5.48
0.00
RACE
-0.0679
0.0246
-2.76
0.01
FEMALE
0.0385
0.0291
1.32
0.19
FO
-0.0749
0.0211
-3.55
0.00
OL
0.0017
0.0235
0.07
0.94
BF
0.0948
0.0365
2.59
0.01
SDA
0.0479
0.0500
0.96
0.34
FINDIS
0.0343
0.0259
1.32
0.19
WEEKELAP
0.0002
0.0002
1.16
0.24
NUMEM
-0.0252
0.0101
-2.50
0.01
NUMOL
0.0063
0.0049
1.29
0.20
NUMFO
-0.0135
0.0111
-1.22
0.22
DA
0.0367
0.0165
2.23
0.03
NETWORTH
-0.1143
0.0697
-1.64
0.10
NFINTCFI
-0.0083
0.0084
-0.98
0.33
REPAY
-0.0198
0.0215
-0.92
0.36
TOTINC
0.0082
0.0946
0.09
0.93
n
F2

1929
288

p-value

0.000
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two-sided test (p-values < .05). Category 1 (EXIT =
1) is of particular interest since it indicates borrowers
are still holding one or more direct loans. The older
the borrower at time of origination, the less likely
they are to still be in the Direct Loan Program.
However, the effect is not large since one more year
only increases the probability of exiting by 0.003. So
a ten-year difference would only alter the probability
by three percent. Non-white borrowers are more
likely to remain in FSA FLPs. Non-white, as opposed
to white borrowers, have a 15 percent higher probability of still having an FSA loan. Receiving an FO
loan indicates a 14 percent higher probability of still
being in the program. This is to be expected since FO
loans are longer term. Also, to the extent that the
interest rate is low relative to current market interest
rates, there is not a strong incentive for farmers to terminate the loan. Furthermore, a majority of the FO
borrowers are beginning farmers; and the interest
rates for BF FO down-payment loans were 4.0 percent during FY 1994–1996, which was lower than
market rates at the time (USDA/ERS, 1994). Thirtyeight percent of the FO loans in the sample were
down-payment loans. Beginning farmers are less
likely to remain in the programs. As discussed earlier, these may be younger farmers finding that farming is not as attractive as other opportunities they
could pursue.61

a proxy for overall financial weakness. That borrowers with multiple loans are less likely to exit is not surprising. But this fact does raise the important policy
issue of whether there should be a limit to the number of loans—particularly FO and OL loans—any
one borrower can have at a given time. The estimated marginal effects of 0.05 for EM, 0.02 for OL, and
0.07 for FO loans indicate that this effect is important. For example, a borrower with two OL loans and
one FO loan at the time of originating a new FO or
OL loan would be approximately 11 percent more
likely to still be active in the FSA Direct Loan
Programs than a borrower originating a new FO or
OL loan with no other active direct loans.
The final significant variable for not exiting is the
debt-to-asset ratio, DA. It has an expected positive
sign indicating that weaker solvency at origination
increases the likelihood of remaining in a Direct Loan
Program. However, the effect is not large. In the estimation sample, DA has a mean of 0.67. A one-unit
increase would take the ratio to 1.67 and, correspondingly, a 7.2 percent increase in the probability
of remaining in direct FLPs as indicated by the 0.072
marginal probability. However, for small increases in
DA, the altering of the probability of remaining in the
program is small.62
The significant marginal probabilities of continuing
farming with or without conventional credit (EXIT =
2) share some variables in common with the likelihood of remaining in the program. Numbers of outstanding OL and EM loans have a negative effect on
graduation as does DA. The signs on NUMOL and
NUMEM, which are negative, are consistent with the
findings for the probability of remaining in the program. Increased solvency at loan origination makes it
more likely the borrower will graduate from the
Direct Loan Program. A further confirmation of this
financial characteristic effect is the positive sign on
NETWORTH. The larger the ratio of non-farm

Not surprisingly, the longer the time since loan origination, the less likely a borrower is still to be in the
program. This indicates that borrowers tend to leave
FSA FLPs with the passage of time. Nonetheless,
some borrowers undoubtedly do stay for long periods of time. All three variables representing the
number of FO, OL, and EM loans outstanding at time
of loan origination have the expected positive signs.
Borrowers who hold multiple loans are more likely to
stay in the Direct Loan Programs. Even though there
are limits on the total FSA debt a borrower can hold
at any point in time, a large number of loans may be
61 While all FO down-payment loans go to beginning
62 For example, if DA increased from 0.3 to 0.6, then

farmers, the majority of beginning farmer loans were OL.
the probability of remaining in the program would increase by approximately

two percent.
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Those leaving farming involuntarily other than death
(EXIT = 4) are affected by an interesting set of factors. Somewhat surprisingly, age is negatively related,
suggesting that experience may be a factor in being
financially successful. Borrowers who received FO
loans were less likely to have left involuntarily.
Farmers receiving FO loans, which are relatively
longer-term loans, may be required to be in a relatively stronger financial position and have more experience than farmers qualifying for other FSA Direct
Loans, as is implied by some of FSA’s policies. Also,
farmers with FO loans own real estate. It is generally
considered that farmers are more personally attached
to real estate, particularly if it has been in the family
for a while, than non-real estate. Therefore, farmers
are more likely to do more to keep from losing their
farmland. This finding for FO is consistent with the
number of FO loans at time of origination being negatively related to leaving involuntarily. Thus a borrower with multiple FO loans and, perhaps, more
farmland equity, is less likely to leave involuntarily.
Also a borrower with a number of FO loans originating
at different points in time has gained more experience and the FLM may have developed a better information base from which to make a loan decision.

income to total cash farm income at loan origination,
the greater the likelihood of graduating. So solvency,
equity, and non-farm income are indicators of likely
success. RACE is a significant variable, and it is negative. The effect is substantial because the estimated
coefficient, -0.1076, indicates that being a member of
a non-white racial group means the probability of
graduating declines by nearly 11 percent. Finally, the
longer the time from origination, the more likely the
borrower is to graduate.
Significant variables influencing the probability of
leaving farming voluntarily or retiring (EXIT = 3)
include demographic- and loan-type variables. Age
is highly significant but its coefficient is small. The
fact that “retired” is included in this category is probably a deciding factor in making the coefficient positive. It could also be argued that younger farmers
who perceive they have alternative job opportunities
to farming might leave early while they still have time
to realize the benefits of an alternative career.
However, this argument is inconsistent with the positive sign of the age coefficient. The FO coefficient
estimates a seven percent decrease from originators
of EM or OL loans of voluntarily leaving farming or
retiring. Recipients of BF loans are nine percent
more likely to exit voluntarily than their non-BF
counterparts.

Borrowers originating SDA loans have lower probabilities of leaving involuntarily. SDA farmers have
lower mean farm assets and essentially equal nonfarm income. Perhaps because they have less invested in farming and equivalent income prospects, such
farmers might be more inclined to leave voluntarily
as financial prospects from the farming operation
decline. The coefficient of time since origination is
positive, implying that being in the program longer
can be an indication of distress.

Increasing numbers of EM loans at loan origination
are also negatively associated with being in the voluntarily left farming category. This makes sense because
such farmers are already saddled with debt via the
EM loans so they are less likely to become free of
additional debt. Finally, less initial solvency as evidenced by a greater debt-to-asset ratio at time of borrowing indicates an increased likelihood of leaving
farming voluntarily. This is not unexpected since
such farmers were in weaker financial condition at
the beginning of the loan and may have decided the
likelihood of achieving success via farming was too
small and thus left farming.

Two other variables, FINDIS and NETWORTH, are
significant in the probability to leave involuntarily.
The variable FINDIS is binary indicating, the borrower had experienced prior financial hardship by
virtue of having been in receivership, discharged in
bankruptcy, or having petitioned for reorganization
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increased net worth. While an increasing current
ratio and decreasing debt-to-asset ratio would also
seem to indicate financial progress, farmers earlier in
their careers can take on additional debt to build the
size of their operation and perhaps capture
economies of size. Nonetheless, strong, adverse
movements in these two variables are not positive
indications.

under bankruptcy. Given the positive coefficient of
FINDIS, the history of past financial difficulties to
the extent of having past bankruptcy actions indicates a four percent greater likelihood of distress in
the future. In addition, increasing net worth at time
of loan origination implies that financially stronger
borrowers are less likely to leave Direct Loan
Programs involuntarily. An implication of this finding, which is consistent with an earlier finding, is that
lowering the financial requirements of borrowers
would lead to lower graduation rates.

2.4.1. Measuring Change
The changes in net worth, current ratio, and debt-toasset ratio are measured in similar ways. It is necessary to measure the change on a per-unit-of-time
basis. This is required because the length of time
between the measurements for each loan is different
so that comparisons must be standardized for a given
unit of time, in this case years. For example, a change
in net worth from $5,000 to $10,000 over one year is
much different than the same absolute change over
four years. It is not possible to get meaningful, annual percentage changes for net worth because in the
sample, net worth can go from positive to negative or
vice versa. Since current and debt-to-asset ratios are
always non negative by definition, a similar problem
is not encountered. It is possible to compute a percentage change in such ratios but, even if outliers are
eliminated, the dispersion of percentage changes is so
great as to make computed annual percentage
changes highly susceptible to a few extreme values.

Results from the logit model are largely as expected.
Borrowers with strong financial backgrounds—lower
debt-to-asset ratio, higher net worth, and more nonfarm income relative to gross cash receipts—are more
likely to graduate from FSA FLPs. This is expected
but also serves as a warning that lowering eligibility
requirements could lead to longer stays in Direct
Loan Programs and more voluntary/involuntary exits
from farming. Older borrowers are more likely to
leave the programs and this may be through retirement.

2.4. Borrower Progress Measured by Changes
in Financial Characteristics
Borrower financial progress can also be examined by
measuring changes in borrower financial characteristics over time. In this section, borrower financial
progress is measured by three variables. In the survey, observations on the most current borrower net
worth and debt-to-asset ratio, and farm-level current
ratio were collected with the date of the observation
on these variables.63 In the survey the FLMs were not
tied to a specific data source. It was anticipated these
values would typically come from the latest Farm and
Home Plan. But if the FLM had a more recent, reliable source than the latest Farm and Home Plan,
those figures could be reported. The response rates
on these three variables were 71, 57, and 65 percent,
respectively. Financial progress is indicated by an

The measure of change used for net worth, current
ratio, and debt-to-asset ratio is the average annual
change. This is computed by subtracting the original
value of the variable from its most current value and
then dividing the difference by the number of years
between the two observations. For example, net
worth at origination is subtracted from the latest net
worth reported in the survey. This difference is then
divided by the number of elapsed years from loan
application to when the most recent net worth was

63 Net

worth and debt-to-asset ratio measured at the borrower level instead of farm level since they are better measures of overall borrower financial progress. Current ratio is measured at the farm level since the Farm and Home Plans did not have sufficient data to
compute borrower-level current ratio.
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analysis, the following statistics and models give an
approximate description as to level of financial
progress and sources of such progress.

observed. Similar computations are done for current
ratio and debt-to-asset ratio.
All three measures of financial well-being have flaws.
The most troublesome is the timing issue. Both the
original values and the subsequent values are not typically measured at the same point in their respective
years. This can be crucial in making comparisons.
Current ratio is especially sensitive. For example, at
planting time a current ratio is likely to be lower than
when the crop has been harvested, sold, and operating loans paid back. Debt-to-asset ratio can also
fluctuate by time of year although it typically is a
much longer term measure since it includes long-run
items such as land and land mortgages. Net worth
can also vary by time of year due to the impact of
short-term debt and when product is sold.64

2.4.2. Outlier Observations
Outlier observations were a problem for net worth
and current ratio. For four of the 1,794 observations
on change in net worth, the annual change was
greater than $300,000 or less than -$300,000. Such
changes seem implausible and more likely due to a
data entry error than an extreme reversal of net
worth.67 These four observations were deleted from
the models. As a result the mean annual change in
net worth went from $8,674 to $9,573. Similar
anomalies occurred with the current ratio. It was
possible to compute the annual change in current
ratio for 1,426 observations. When it was further
required that no reported current ratio be 10 or
greater, the number of valid observations fell by 32 to
1,394. This changed the mean annual current ratio
change from -0.17 to approximately 0.01. A similar
cleaning is done for the debt-to-asset ratio eliminating three observations with debt-to-asset ratios
greater than or equal to 10, but the difference in the
mean annual change in debt-to-asset ratio was minimal.

All three measures are also influenced by events
external to the FLPs. Land values, product prices,
production costs, yields, interest rates, and non-farmrelated economic events influence all three of these
variables. In the U.S. from 1995 to 2003, per-farm
farm net worth grew by $22,500 a year and the farm
debt-to-asset ratio for the U.S. went from 14.8 percent to 14.4 percent over the same time span.65 Using
ARMS data, the estimated farm current ratio in 1996
was 2.94 for all farms and in 2003 the corresponding
figure was 2.96, implying essentially no change over
time.66

2.4.3. Empirical Results: Change in Net Worth
As reported in table 2.12, the estimated mean annual
change in net worth was $9,573 per year and this estimate is statistically significant at 0.05 based on 1,790
observations. So borrowers are strengthening their
overall equity. However, the mean changes in net
worth vary substantially across loan categories as is
clearly seen in table 2.12 although many of the pairwise comparisons are not significantly different.
Some of the differences in net worth may be attributable to factors other than loan type. To explore this,
a regression model was estimated with annual change

In the following sections these variables—despite
their flaws—are used as approximate measures of
financial progress. A more detailed analysis interviewing borrowers directly would likely give a more
comprehensive picture of financial progress over
time and be able to identify whether changes in
financial progress were due to participation in FSA
programs or to other factors. In the absence of such

solution to the time problem would be to use only observations where the observation dates were approximately some integer
number of years apart. Unfortunately, this would result in losing most of the sample observations and then basing conclusions on
small samples.
65 http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/farmbalancesheet/fbsdmu.htm. Accessed May 20, 2005. Data for 2004 were not available.
66 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/arms/app/FarmResponse.aspx. Accessed May 20, 2005. No data were available for 1995.
67 An inheritance could justify a large increase in net worth just as a sudden decrease in asset values such as a drop in stock prices could
result in a large decrease in net worth. We think a data entry error or incorrect computations by the applicants are a more likely explanation.
64 One
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Table 2.12. Loan activity and financial progress of FY 1994–1996 farm loan program borrowers
OL R E G
23,557

OLB F
6,351

OL B F S D A
1,139

OLSD A
2,979

F ORE G
660

FOBF
1,728

FOBFSDA
339

FOSDA
356

EM
8,359

Total
45,468

1,218

318

102

287

73

169

33

28

487

2,715

118,009
(5,834)

54,704
(13,660)

45,221
(6,583)

94,488
(10,394)

115,959
(19,551)

69,771
(6,791)

46,554
(6,763)

124,056
(32,888)

196,057
(19,216)

116,307
(4,852)

Mean annual level of
change in net worth

9,716
(1,198)

7,794
(2,225)

2,427
(5,985)

-2,916
(3,467)

14,885
(3,986)

18,378
(2,042)

3,067
(7,268)

12,340
(17,989)

10,359
(3,321)

9,573
(921)

Borrower’s current ratio at
time of loan origination

1.8
(0.313)

1.6
(0.645)

1.6
(0.781)

1.1
(0.146)

2.2
(0.635)

2.9
(0.677)

1.5
(0.583)

1.9
(0.998)

1.1
(0.223)

1.7
(0.181)

Mean annual level of
change in current ratio

0.016
(0.019)

-0.036
(0.037)

-0.073
(0.067)

-0.040
(0.053)

0.095
(0.092)

-0.057
(0.097)

-0.246
(0.310)

0.057
(0.093)

0.026
(0.018)

0.007
(0.014)

Borrower’s debt/asset
ratio at time of loan
origination
Mean annual level of
change in debt/asset ratio

0.743
(0.019)

0.604
(0.034)

0.577
(0.038)

0.619
(0.025)

0.608
(0.033)

0.384
(0.026)

0.723
(0.209)

0.919
(0.392)

0.773
(0.075)

0.690
(0.017)

0.035
(0.015)

0.083
(0.018)

0.159
(0.067)

0.129
(0.068)

0.001
(0.005)

0.131
(0.045)

0.115
(0.134)

0.008
(0.031)

0.108
(0.113)

0.067
(0.021)

N (number of FY 1994–
1996 loans by assistance
code)
n (number of
observations)*
Mean borrower’s net worth
at time of loan origination

Source: Computed from 2004 Survey of FY 1994–1996 New Loans
*Statistics in a given column may be based on fewer observations if there are missing values. Standard errors are in parentheses.

squares inference is invalid and an alternative estimation technique must be employed. A robust solution
to this problem is to estimate the regression coefficients by least squares but then estimate the standard
errors of the coefficients by White’s heteroscedasticity consistent estimator (White, 1980). This was the
approach taken here.

in net worth (DNETWORTH) regressed on borrower age, race, gender, loan type (FO, OL, or EM),
whether the loan was beginning farmer (BF) and/or
SDA, and four variables measuring financial characteristics at origination. These variables were: (1)
whether the borrower had previously been financially
distressed in the form of receivership or bankruptcy
(FINDIS), (2) net worth (NETWORTH), (3) nonfarm income (NONFMINC), and (4) gross total cash
farm income (TCFI). All four variables were
observed at origination. The variable FINDIS indicates potential financial problems given past financial
difficulty. Net worth controls for the size of increase
in the sense that the magnitude of change is likely to
be related to initial starting point. Non-farm income
is independent of farm income and the primary
source of net income for most farm operators.
Finally, TCFI adjusts for the magnitude of changes in
net worth since larger changes would typically only
be associated with higher levels of gross revenues.

Results of the regression model are displayed in table
2.13. The model has little explanatory power by
virtue of the coefficient of determination being
0.019, which is low even for cross-sectional data. The
most striking aspect of the regression results is the
lack of statistical significance of all but one of the
independent variables. This is somewhat surprising
since one would at least think initial net worth or
projected size of the operation as embodied in TCFI
would be significant. Both coefficients of these variables are positive but clearly insignificant. The lack of
significance indicates that changes in net worth are
functions of events subsequent to loan origination.

The model was estimated with least squares but
analysis of the residuals showed significant heteroscedasticity. In such a case conventional least

The variable RACE is significant in the change in net
worth equation. Its negative coefficient of $11,109
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implies the annual change in net worth was $1,981
for non-whites. However, if the regression model is
simplified by omitting all the statistically insignificant variables, then the annual change in net worth
for non-whites becomes a negative $2,516, which
indicates that non-whites in the program actually lost
net worth. In comparing whites with non-whites, the
negative $2,516 is the more reliable figure. A more
intense study of non-white farmers observing what
happens to them subsequent to originating a loan
might shed light on reasons for this disparity.

model68 and four financial variables. These variables,
as measured at loan origination, are debt-to-asset
ratio (DA), current ratio (CR), ratio of non-farm
income to total cash farm income (NFINTCFI), and
ratio of balance available to pay debt to debt service
due in the first year after the loan (REPAY). The
intent of these variables is to measure the long-term
solvency, current liquidity, reliance on non-farm
income sources, and loan repayment capacity. These
are key indicators in the loan decision process and
should be good predictors of financial progress.

2.4.4. Empirical Results: Change in
Current Ratio

The annual average change in the current ratio of
0.01 is not statistically significantly different from
zero as shown in table 2.12. Table 2.14 displays the
current ratio model. This model fits much better
than the net worth model with a coefficient of determination of 0.23. Two coefficients are statistically
significant in this model. If the originating loan is FO
then the average annual change in the current ratio is
0.2 greater than EM loans, ceteris paribus. The reason
for this is not totally clear since FO borrowers can
certainly have other types of FSA Direct Loans. Many
FO borrowers are just beginning their careers relative
to many EM borrowers and therefore would have relatively few current assets, potentially making the ini-

The next two measures of financial progress are
measured as ratios. The two ratio models have the
same independent variables. These models are constructed differently from the net-worth model where
the dependent variable was measured in dollars. For
current ratio and debt-to-asset ratio models, the
dependent variables are changes in current ratio
(DCR) and changes in debt-to-asset ratio (DDA).
Regression model specification typically requires that
the dependent variable and independent variables be
of generally the same form (Kennedy, 2003). These
include all of the binary variables in the net worth

Table 2.13. Regression explaining variability of annual change in net worth
Dependent variable is
Independent variable
CONSTANT
AGE
RACE
FEMALE
FO
OL
BF
SDA
FINDIS
NETWORTH
NONFMINC
TCFI
n
F
R2
Adjusted R2
68 Binary

DNETWORTH
Coefficient
13,090
-100
-11,109
-2,960
7,348
-1,160
-1,764
-2,907
-3,493
0.006
13
0.011
1,730
3.08
0.019
0.013

Standard error
5,569
87
5,205
4,977
4,395
3,467
2,423
5,758
4,308
0.012
86
0.018

t -r a tio p -va lue
2.35
0.02
-1.15
0.25
-2.13
0.03
-0.59
0.55
1.67
0.09
-0.33
0.74
-0.73
0.47
-0.50
0.61
-0.81
0.42
0.46
0.64
0.15
0.88
0.59
0.55

p-value

variables are appropriate for models where the dependent variable is in levels or ratios.
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Table 2.14. Regression explaining variability of annual change in the current
r a tio
Dependent variable is DCR
Independent variable Coefficient
CONSTANT
0.063
AGE
0.001
RACE
-0.121
FEMALE
-0.108
FO
0.195
OL
0.026
BF
-0.032
SDA
0.057
FINDIS
0.037
DA
-0.050
CR
-0.186
PCTNFINC
-0.008
REPAY
0.100
n
1,331
F
33.45
R2
0.233
0.226
Adjusted R2

Standard error
0.126
0.001
0.071
0.109
0.076
0.024
0.049
0.094
0.053
0.027
0.021
0.010
0.082
p-value

t -r a tio
0.50
0.94
-1.71
-0.99
2.57
1.11
-0.66
0.61
0.71
-1.84
-8.91
-0.74
1.23

p -va lue
0.62
0.35
0.09
0.32
0.01
0.27
0.51
0.54
0.48
0.07
0.00
0.46
0.22
0.00

It is further important to note that none of the demographic or loan program variables are statistically significant in the current ratio model. This confirms
that no one group of borrowers or loan assistance
types are more or less likely to have a change in the
current ratio. This result holds even if the model in
table 2.14 is re-estimated without the four financial
variables.

tial current asset ratio low. Note that receiving a BFloan assistance type is not significant. Thus the
enhancement in current ratio of the FO program is
equally beneficial to BF and non-BF FO borrowers.
The current ratio at origination is also significant and
has a surprisingly negative coefficient. At first glance
it would seem borrowers with high initial current
ratios should be in stronger financial condition so
that current ratios should grow positively, implying
the sign is counter intuitive. What is really happening here is that the way the model is structured gives
a somewhat false impression. The variable CR is in
levels and the dependent variable is in differences.
The actual implication is likely that the more recent
current ratio is related to past current ratio but with
a coefficient less than one. When the differences are
taken of the dependent variable, a negative sign arises for the initial level. What this implies is that other
factors are helping to keep the current ratio from
changing over time although these factors are not
present in the model in a statistically significant
sense. The model in table 2.14 is incomplete and
does not include those events subsequent to loan
origination that clearly affected changes in current
ratios.

Two variables in table 2.14 have p-values between
0.05 and 0.10, suggesting near significance at 0.05.
These are RACE and debt-to-asset ratio (DA). Race
has a negative sign indicating that members of nonwhite racial groups are less likely to experience positive growth in their current ratios. Likewise, DA has
a negative sign indicating that less solvent borrowers
at origination are more likely to have less or negative
growth in their current ratios. This is not surprising
since increased debt (leverage) makes it more difficult for borrowers with low income, as many FSA
borrowers have, to strengthen their financial characteristics.
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None of the other variables in the regression model
are statistically significant. Repayment capacity has a
p-value of 0.06 and a negative sign. As balances available to pay debt relative to debt service increase, the
debt-to-asset ratio should decrease. The general lack
of significant independent variables indicates events
subsequent to origination are influencing the DA for
borrowers. As with the other two measures of financial progress, the finding that subsequent events
affect financial well-being is not surprising.

2.4.5. Empirical Results: Change in
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
The mean of the annual change in the debt-to-asset
ratio (DDA) is 0.067 and it is statistically different
from 0 at 0.05 as shown in table 2.12. This implies
that the solvency position of borrowers becomes
weaker over time. Typically this is not considered a
positive result. However, to the extent that borrowers
are relatively early in their careers, increases in debtto-asset ratios are part of the life-cycle of farm operators, particularly in the early part of the life-cycle. It
is during the early years that borrowers use debt to
acquire assets and operating capital to build their
enterprise.

2.5. Summary
The most important findings in this section are that
an estimated 78 percent of FSA Direct Loans in FY
1994–1996 terminated by the end of 2004 and that
more than half the borrowers originating the loans
during FY 1994–1996 exited the Direct Farm Loan
Program. Loan termination was much more frequent
for OL and EM loans than for FO loans. This was
expected given the longer-term nature of FO loans.
The 81 percent paid-in-full status for the 75 percent
of terminated EM loans also indicates most EM borrowers were able to pay back loans despite experiencing a catastrophic event that precipitated the EM
loan. Within a given loan type (FO, OL), being an

Table 2.15 displays the results of a regression model
to explain variability in the annual change of DA.
The model has poor explanatory power with a coefficient of determination of 0.021. Initial debt-to-asset
ratio (DA) is the only significant variable and it has a
negative coefficient. As with the change in current
ratio, the finding of a negative coefficient on the initial level of the change variable should be interpreted
as saying that the later DA is related to the prior level
with a coefficient less than one.

Table 2.15. Regression explaining variability of annual change in the debt-toasset ratio
Dependent variable is DDA
Independent variable
Coefficient
CONSTANT
0.058
AGE
0.001
RACE
0.072
FEMALE
0.008
FO
-0.005
OL
0.026
BF
0.032
SDA
-0.040
FINDIS
0.005
DA
-0.097
CR
0.001
PCTNFINC
0.004
REPAY
-0.019
n
1,168
F
2.04
R2
0.021
Adjusted R2
0.011

Sta nda r d e r r o r
0.071
0.001
0.054
0.027
0.024
0.019
0.020
0.049
0.040
0.029
0.001
0.005
0.010
p-value
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0.82
0.58
1.34
0.31
-0.23
1.33
1.55
-0.83
0.14
-3.37
0.70
0.76
-1.85

p-va lue
0.41
0.56
0.18
0.76
0.82
0.18
0.12
0.41
0.89
0.00
0.48
0.45
0.06
0.18
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worth at origination was important. Higher debt-toasset ratios led to fewer exits or to leaving farming
voluntarily. Higher net worth at origination made
leaving involuntarily less likely.

SDA or beginning farmer did not have a substantial
impact on loan termination rate. Also encouraging
was that most of the loans did not experience writedowns or losses to FSA. This is not to say there were
no loan losses. Nearly 10 percent of the loans experienced losses and these losses were not negligible.

The evidence on change in financial well-being is
mixed but generally positive. Annual changes in net
worth were positive and significant. One finding was
that non-white races had negative changes in net
worth, particularly for OL borrowers. The current
ratio did not show a significant change over the sample period nor were the changes significant for a loan
type or SDA or BF loan types. Debt-to-asset ratios
did increase over time and this was somewhat surprising. The increases were significant for OL loans
for regular, BF, and SDA and BF borrowers. The
debt-to-asset increases were mostly insignificant for
FO borrowers. The increases can partially be
explained in terms of life cycle factors or borrowers
optimizing leverage. Mean borrower age is relatively
young. Hence these borrowers should be in an
expansion phase. For farming that means acquiring
new debt and expanding the business. Thus
increased debt-to-asset ratios can likely be viewed as
evidence of increased farming activity.

Lengths of loans to termination were close to the
term lengths for OL loans. That is, one-year loans
paid in full averaged loan lengths of about a year and
paid-in-full seven-year loans of about six years.
However, not all FO and OL loans have been terminated. When such loans are terminated, the mean
loan lengths will increase. That a one-year loan made
in FY 1994–1996 is not terminated by November 30,
2004 is vexing. However, the termination rates
reported here are minimal rates due to data insufficiencies so it could be that more of the loans have
been paid back than it was possible to verify in this
study. It is encouraging that for the 75 percent of EM
loans terminated, the average term of the loan was
between five and six years.
Borrowers exit the FSA programs for a variety of reasons. The findings are somewhat surprising because
of the proportion of farmers who left FSA Direct
Loan Programs but did not continue farming. About
24 percent of borrowers of loans initiated in FY
1994–1996 but terminated by November 30, 2004 left
farming voluntarily. Only slightly more than half of
the borrowers who left FSA loan programs stayed in
farming (graduated) and only 17 percent of these
used FSA guaranteed credit as a transition to conventional credit. Perhaps even more surprising is that 18
percent of the continuing farming group continued
farming without any credit at all. Consistent with
other findings about FO loans, FO borrowers were
less likely to exit. Also, borrowers with larger numbers of other active FSA Direct Loans at time of loan
origination were less likely to exit. Those with less
FSA involvement were more likely to exit and continue farming or to leave farming voluntarily. Financial
strength as measured by the debt-to-asset ratio or net

For the most part, it appears borrowers are using FSA
Direct Loans on a temporary basis. A majority of
borrowers did not become permanent FSA clients.
Most borrowers paid back their loans without a loss.
The financial status of most borrowers improved in
the sense that net worth improved. On the other
hand, current ratios were static on average, and debtto-asset ratios were increasing—perhaps due to farm
expansion.

3. Measuring and Reducing Subsidy Costs
FSA’s Direct FLP costs can be roughly divided into
administrative
and
loan
subsidy
costs.
Administrative costs are the charges for personnel,
offices, and other overhead expenses necessary for the
loan application and monitoring process. The loan
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It might be expected that FO loans would have experienced the highest losses since they have the largest
volume of outstanding principal in each year (figure
3.1). However, the FO loans have the lowest average
annual loss ($88 million) compared with those of OL
($148 million) and EM ($341 million). As expected,
EM loans have large losses since these loans are given
to farmers who have experienced significant income
losses because of natural disasters. The beginning-ofyear outstanding principal for Direct FO and EM
loans decreased consistently every year during the
period. These decreasing balances are likely the result
of decreasing obligation authority or decreasing
demand in recent years relative to earlier years. A
consistently declining balance has not been the case
for OL loans. The beginning-of-year outstanding
principal for OL loans decreased annually from
$3,100 million in 1994 to $2,559 million in 1999, and
oscillated the rest of the period, ending with $2,723
million in 2004.

subsidy costs are primarily associated with the losses
due to loan default or debt reorganization, except for
some loans where the interest rate is lower than the
cost to the government of borrowing funds (Koenig
and Dodson, 1998).69
This section of the study focuses on FSA loan subsidy
costs. The overall objective is to describe the extent
of subsidy use by various loan programs and to determine what steps can be taken to lower subsidy costs.
Lower subsidy costs could enable FSA to expand its
lending operations per subsidy dollar budgeted.
The first part of this section reports FSA’s Direct FLP
default costs in the form of loan principal and interest losses for FY 1994–2004. The second part presents
FY 1992–2005 subsidy rates for Direct FLPs. These
subsidy rates are applied to loans originated in FY
2000–2003 to estimate the ex-ante subsidy costs for
these loans. Econometric models are estimated in the
third part to identify factors associated with loan loss
occurrences and loan loss rates using the survey data
described in section 2. These results along with
results reported earlier are then used to investigate
how changes in credit standards may result in
changes to loan losses.

The amounts of Direct FLP loan losses have generally trended downward over the FY 1994–2004 period
(figure 3.2). Part of the explanation for the downward trend is that FSA was still reacting in the 1990s
to the financial crisis in agriculture of the early and
mid-1980s. Of the three loan programs, EM loans
consistently experienced the largest losses, except for
FY 2004 when OL loans sustained higher losses. Loan
loss percentages, presented in figure 3.3, are computed from principal and interest losses and beginningof-year outstanding principal balances. The loss percentages for the three Direct FLPs have trended
downward over the period. EM loans have the highest loss percentage with an average annual percentage
loss of 13.2 percent, followed by OL loans with 5.3
percent and FO loans with 2.0 percent.

3.1. Recent Loan Loss Experience for
FSA Direct FLPs
The majority of subsidy costs for FSA Direct FLPs in
recent years takes on the form of loan defaults and is
discussed in greater detail below. But first it is interesting to consider the loan losses of principal and
interest over the last decade (table 3.1). During
FY1994–2004, the average annual loss of principal
and interest for OL, FO, and EM loans combined was
$576 million. Over the same period, the largest loss
($1,125 million) occurred in FY1996 and the smallest
loss ($260 million) occurred most recently in FY
2004.

The EM loss percentage was particularly high in FY
1996 when over one dollar of principal and interest
was lost for every four dollars of beginning-of-year

Koenig and Dodson (1998) state, “Anticipated loan default costs, repayment rates, and certain transaction costs are other, but more
minor, factors that influence the subsidy rate.” (p. 3).
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Table 3.1. Principal and interest losses for FSA Direct loans, by type, FY 1994–2004 (millions of dollars)
Fiscal
Year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Total

Outstanding
principal
$3,100
$2,966
$2,705
$2,656
$2,589
$2,559
$2,692
$2,678
$2,758
$2,715
$2,723

OL*
Losses

Percent

$260
$206
$113
$146
$144
$147
$116
$109
$130
$128
$126
$1,625

8.4%
6.9%
4.2%
5.5%
5.6%
5.7%
4.3%
4.1%
4.7%
4.7%
4.6%
5.3%

Outstanding
principal
$5,181
$4,841
$4,664
$4,375
$4,119
$3,857
$3,641
$3,560
$3,484
$3,273
$3,031

FO**
Losses

Percent

$177
$137
$188
$89
$72
$64
$49
$48
$53
$47
$40
$964

3.4%
2.8%
4.0%
2.0%
1.7%
1.7%
1.4%
1.3%
1.5%
1.4%
1.3%
2.0%

Outstanding
principal
$3,876
$3,435
$3,139
$2,662
$2,395
$2,104
$2,041
$1,907
$1,749
$1,523
$1,405

EM
Losses

Percent

$618
$470
$824
$396
$357
$229
$248
$135
$215
$161
$93
$3,746

15.9%
13.7%
26.2%
14.9%
14.9%
10.9%
12.1%
7.1%
12.3%
10.6%
6.7%
13.2%

Outstanding
principal
$12,157
$11,242
$10,508
$9,693
$9,103
$8,520
$8,375
$8,146
$7,991
$7,512
$7,159

T OT A L
Losses

Percent

$1,055
$813
$1,125
$631
$574
$440
$413
$293
$398
$336
$260
$6,336

8.7%
7.2%
10.7%
6.5%
6.3%
5.2%
4.9%
3.6%
5.0%
4.5%
3.6%
6.0%

Source: FSA-KCMO-FO Report Codes 616, 541 and 523. FY 1994–2000 Loss Data from General Ledger. FY 2001–2004 Loss Data from DSTH FOCUS File.
Principal is beginning-of-year outstanding principal. Losses include both principal and interest. Beginning in FY 2003, losses include judgment cases.
*
Includes youth loans.
**
Includes Non-Farm Enterprise loans.

Figure 3.1. FSA Direct loan beginning-of-year outstanding principal by type, FY 1994–2004
outstanding principal. The unusually large losses may
have been the result of drought in the southwestern
United States. These losses may have also been the
result of procedural changes. FSA suspended some
foreclosures in March 1993 pending a review of its
implementation of borrower appeal rules. The suspension was lifted in February 1994 and a taskforce
was formed to collect from borrowers with delinquent, large loans. The taskforce’s assignment was

expanded in August 1994 to collect on delinquent
loans of all sizes for the next two years (USDA/ERS,
1995). Therefore, there may have been a backlog of
loans in foreclosure and greater emphasis was placed
on collecting delinquent loans. Again, it is not surprising that EM loans experience such large losses
since farmers must have experienced large losses of
production (30 percent or more), and associated
income losses, as the result of a natural disaster to
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Figure 3.2. FSA Direct loan principal and interest loss amounts, by type, FY 1994–2004

Figure 3.3. FSA percent principal and interest loss rates for FSA Direct loans, by type,
FY 1994–2004
100

Farm Service Agency Direct Farm Loan Program Effectiveness Study

qualify for such loans. Also, an EM loan if used as an
annual production loan may be secured less well than
a corresponding OL loan. An EM loan may only have
the growing crop as security, whereas an OL loan may
have other chattel property as security in addition to
the growing crop, particularly if FSA also has a sevenyear OL loan with the farmer.
It is not surprising that FO loans had lower loss percentages than OL and EM loans. FO loans are secured
with real estate while OL and EM loans may be
secured with non-real estate or real estate. Real estate
tends to maintain its value better than non-real
estate, particularly over this period when the U.S.
average farm real estate-value per acre has increased
every year (USDA/NASS, 2004 a). In addition, when
cash flows are insufficient to service all debts, real
estate-secured loans are more likely to be paid first by
farmers since loss of this asset is more critical to the
farm business as a going concern than a non-real
estate asset. Moreover, there is often more equity to
protect in real estate assets than non-real estate assets.
Also, farmers are generally more attached to their
farmland than non-real estate assets, particularly if
the farmland has been owned by their family for a
number of years. Therefore, farmers may take greater
care not to lose the family homestead, potentially
holding more equity, than a tractor which is easily
replaced and may have little equity. In addition, FO
loans can require more farming experience than
farmers receiving OL loans in general.
It is expected that FSA, in its traditional role as lender
of last resort, would have higher loss rates than other
lenders since FSA borrowers are generally riskier than
other borrowers. In addition, FSA may have a lower
lien position if a borrower has credit from multiple
sources, thus FSA would be more likely to suffer a loss
if secured assets are liquidated. USDA presented
loss rates for FSA, commercial bank, Farm Credit

System, and life insurance lender categories for
1980–2002 (USDA/ERS, 2003).70 The loss rates for
FSA are not directly comparable with other lenders
because of accounting differences. For instance, commercial bank loans are moved to non-accrual status
after 90 days delinquent, whereas FSA loans continue
to accrue interest until settled, perhaps for years
because of a lengthy borrower appeal process.
However, it is interesting to see how FSA loss rates
have changed relative to other lenders over time. The
FSA loan loss percentage reached a peak of 16.1 percent in FY 1990 when the loss percentages were 0.2
percent for commercial banks, 0.0 percent for the
Farm Credit System, and 0.9 percent for life insurance companies that same year. Since then the differences between the FSA loss percentage and those of
the other lenders have narrowed. FSA experienced a
decline in loss percentage to 5.6 percent in FY 2002.
Conversely, commercial banks and the Farm Credit
System saw slight increases in their loss percentages
to 0.3 percent and 0.1 percent. Life insurance companies saw a slight decrease in loss percentage to 0.3
percent. Therefore, although FSA has significant loan
loss amounts and loss percentages, it appears to have
made improvements in its loan portfolio that have
resulted in lower loan losses and lower loss percentages over time. Also, FSA loss percentages, while still
much higher than those of commercial banks, the
Farm Credit System, and life insurance companies,
have declined relative to the loss percentages of these
other lenders.

3.2. Direct FLP Subsidy Rates
Subsidy rates for FSA Direct Loan and loan guaranteed FLPs are computed by the Office of Management
and Budget (2004) credit subsidy calculator with
input from the FSA Budget Office subject to the
Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508), as
amended by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L.
105-33). The four components of the subsidy

70 The data reported by USDA/ERS for FSA losses are not directly comparable with data reported in table 3.1 because USDA/ERS
reports loan losses for other Direct FLPs, for example the Economic Emergency loan program, in addition to OL, FO, and EM loan
programs. Also, loss percentages reported by USDA/ERS are for loans outstanding at end of period instead of at beginning of period
as reported in table 3.1.
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rates are defaults net of recoveries, interest, fees, and
all other costs.71 The estimated subsidy rate is the sum
of these components computed on a present value
basis. Therefore, the subsidy rate is based on assumptions regarding the future of the economy, interest
rates, and loan maturity. Of the four components, the
vast majority of the subsidy rate in recent years is
attributed to defaults net of recoveries.72 If defaults
net of recoveries were reduced, FSA could provide
additional loans to farmers given its current level of
funding. For this reason, the focus in this section of
the study is on default cost instead of the more general subsidy cost.
Before focusing on default costs, it is enlightening to
see how the estimated subsidy rates for FSA Direct
FLPs have varied over time. Figure 3.4 presents these
subsidy rates for Direct OL, FO, and EM loans for FY
1992–2005. The subsidy rate for EM loans is greater
than those for OL and FO loans for most years. It is
somewhat surprising that the EM subsidy rate is not
the highest subsidy rate every year.73 As presented earlier, EM loss rates were much higher than those for
OL and FO in every year. The downward trend in EM
subsidy rates is to be expected given the downward
trend in EM loss rates.
Downward trends for OL and FO subsidy rates are
also observed for 1992 through 2002, although the
FO and OL rates were higher the following three
years.
Another unexpected observation from figure 3.4 is
the trend to more convergence of OL, FO, and EM
subsidy rates. Historically, EM loans have had greater
loss rates than OL loans which, in turn, have had
greater loss rates than FO loans. These relative loss
rates indicate a similar ranking for subsidy rates, i.e.,

EM subsidy rates greater than OL subsidy rates which
are greater than FO subsidy rates. Potential explanations for the changes in these relative subsidy rates, in
addition to changes in loss rate predictions, are
changes in predicted interest rates and loan maturities. A better appraisal of subsidy rate variability
might be possible if the specific methodology for
determining subsidy estimates were investigated further.
The subsidy rates for Direct FLPs are applied to loans
originated in FY 2000–2003 to estimate the subsidy
costs for these loans (table 3.2). This estimate of projected subsidy is the best estimate of subsidy cost for
these loans at time of origination. Each year re-estimated subsidy rates are computed for every year of
loan origination with loans still outstanding.
However, these re-estimated subsidy rates incorporate information that was not available at time of
origination.
The total loan amount for the 60,151 OL (excluding
Youth), FO, and EM loans originated in FY
2000–2003 is $3,741 million (table 3.2). The projected subsidy for these loans is $392 million for an average subsidy rate of 10.5 percent. The average loan
amount is $62,191 with an average subsidy of $6,518.
Since most of the 2000–2003 loans are OL, it is not
surprising that most of the $392 million in total subsidy goes to OL loans, amounting to $274 million.
The average OL loan principal is $55,822 with an
average subsidy of $5,753 and a subsidy rate of 10.3
percent. EM loans are expected to receive the next
highest subsidy at $72 million. The average EM loan
amount of $60,177 is only 7.8 percent larger than the
average OL loan amount. Yet the average EM loan
subsidy of $11,102 is nearly double the average OL
loan subsidy indicating, the much higher EM subsidy
rate of 18.4 percent.

71 The fee component is applicable to FSA guaranteed FLPs since a 1 percent fee is collected. However, the fee component is not applicable to FSA Direct FLPs since fees are not collected.
72 Interest subsidy via the Limited Resource interest rate is very costly when government borrowing rates are high. However, regular
OL and regular FO interest rates have been near or below the Limited Resource rate of 5 percent since 2000, such that interest subsidy
has been relatively minor.
73 The FO subsidy rate published for FY 2004 was formulated incorrectly and was used for budgetary purposes (personal communication with Susan Craft, FSA, Budget Office, May 24, 2005).
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Figure 3.4. Estimated subsidy rates for FSA Direct loan programs, by type, FY 1992–2005

Table 3.2. Ex-ante FSA Direct loan subsidies, FY 2000–2003
Loan type
Total
OL
FO
EM
OL Regular
OL BF
OL BF SDA
OL SDA
FO Regular
FO BF
FO BF Ethnic
FO BF Gender
FO SDA Ethnic
FO SDA Gender

N u m be r of
loa ns
60,151
47,540
6,127
6,484
24,266
16,762
3,042
3,470
1,538
3,491
356
297
267
178

Mean
su bsid y
6,518
5,753
7,601
11,102
6,179
5,475
4,919
4,851
7,299
7,497
11,636
12,995
7,984
7,622

T o t a l su b si d y
392,069,040
273,507,446
46,573,544
71,988,050
149,940,817
91,770,755
14,964,311
16,831,564
11,225,417
26,171,008
3,109,741
2,578,827
2,131,821
1,356,730

M e a n lo a n
Total loan
amount
amount
62,191 3,740,835,215
55,822 2,653,767,709
113,739
696,878,656
60,177
390,188,850
60,173 1,460,167,783
53,069
889,541,085
46,471
141,363,564
46,886
162,695,277
111,871
172,058,355
113,816
397,331,079
170,179
41,870,665
170,369
36,154,196
111,140
29,674,325
111,180
19,790,035

Source: Subsidy Amount is calculated as Subsidy Rate (Office of Management and Budget, 2004)
times Loan Obligation Amount (FSA New Loan Database). The Subsidy Rates vary by year and by
loan type (OL, FO and EM).
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The FY 2000–2003 subsidy rates are also applied to
loans from targeted loan programs within the OL and
FO loan programs (table 3.2). The subsidies for each
row assume the factors that determine costs to the
government, like losses and time until repayment,
will be the same within each FLP, e.g., FO BF race and
FO SDA gender loans are assumed to have the same
losses per dollar of loan and actual pay off terms. The
Office of Management and Budget (2004) did not
publish subsidy rates for the targeted loan programs
within the general loan programs. Since we do not
know the exact methodology used by the Office of
Management and Budget in determining the OL and
FO subsidy rates, we assume potential differences in
default costs and loan maturities across targeted
loans and non-targeted loans are not explicitly recognized in determining subsidy rates.74 Recognition of
these potential differences may be important in providing better subsidy estimates as discussed later in
this section.
The potential geographical distributions of projected
subsidy by loan program could be presented in a map
by applying the subsidy rates to loans originated in
FY 2000–2003. However, these maps would look similar to the maps presented in section 1.2 of this
report, showing where the loans have been made. For
example, a map showing many FO loans are made in
a given state would correspond to a map showing
much FO subsidy goes to the same state. Therefore
such subsidy maps and any discussion would be
redundant and are omitted.75

3.3. Factors Associated with Loan Losses
While loan loss amounts, loss rates, and subsidy rates
have been presented and discussed above, it is important to identify the factors associated with loan losses
as this will allow FSA to develop a better prediction of

the success or failure of a given loan. Also, FSA may
be able to use this information to adjust its underwriting standards in an effort to reduce subsidy costs.
Probit and regression models are estimated to explain
the occurrence of loan losses and the percent of loan
losses if they occur. The probit model is appropriate
for explaining the likelihood of a given event occurring, a loan loss in this case. For this study, the regression model is used to explain the variation of an
observable outcome, the loan loss percentage if a loss
occurs. Observations for estimating these models are
individual loan data collected from the survey of
FLMs for a sample of loans originated in FY
1994–1996 described in section 2.1 of this report.
The models are used to identify the variables most
crucial in predicting the likelihood of a loss and loss
percentage. Many of the independent variables in the
models are the same variables used in section 2.3 to
explain the likelihood of farm exit. These variables
include demographic variables, variables indicating
the characteristics of the loan, variables about the
borrower’s past and current involvement with FSA
and prior financial stress, and variables measuring
the financial characteristics of borrowers at the time
of origination.
3.3.1. Technical Presentation of the Incidental
Truncation Model
A two-equation, incidental truncation model is
hypothesized as presented in Greene (2003) and
applied in Dixon, et al. (1997). The first equation,
equation 3.1, explains the probability of a loan loss.
The second equation, equation 3.2, explains the variation in the percentage of the loan loss if a loss
occurs. The forms of these equations are:
(3.1)
zi = β’xi + εi
(3.2)
yi = γ’wi + ηi
where zi is a binary variable indicating whether or not
a loss has occurred for loan i. A loss is said to occur

Alternatively, differences may exist but a decision might be made to average differential subsidy costs within a loan program over all
the assistance types in a given loan program.
75 It was planned that actual Direct FLP loan losses for individual loans during FY 1994-2004 would be available. However, the data
were incomplete because of difficulties in retrieving some pertinent data from archives. Since the complete data were not available,
planned geographical analyses at the county level and loan program analyses similar to those presented in tables 3.1 and 3.2 and figures 3.1 through 3.4 could not be performed.
74
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when the FLM indicates either the loan has experienced a debt write-down or the loan terminated due
to foreclosure, bankruptcy, or debt write-off and
there was a dollar amount recorded.76 The variable yi
is the dollar loss amount divided by the initial loan
amount, in percent, for loan i when zi equals 1. The
vectors xi and wi represent independent variables.
Vectors β and γ contain parameters to be estimated.
The error terms εi and ηi are assumed to be normally
distributed with zero means and variances of one and
σ2. Incidental truncation occurs if the covariance of
εi and ηi is not zero.
Equation 3.1 is the selection equation that predicts
the probability of a loan experiencing a loss.
Equation 3.2 is the regression equation that explains
the variation in loss percentages among loans with
losses and predicts the loan loss percentage for a
given wi. The selection equation is estimated as a
probit model since the dependent variable is binary
(0-1). The dependent variable in the regression equation is only observable if a loan loss occurs. This may
result in incidental truncation. A two-step estimation
approach is used to obtain consistent estimates of the
parameters in the regression equation (Greene,
2003).
The procedure is to estimate the selection equation as
a probit model, then use the parameter estimates to
estimate the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR), which
accounts for any incidental truncation. The IMR is
then included as a regressor in the regression equation. If the estimated IMR coefficient is statistically
insignificant in the regression equation, it indicates
insignificant incidental truncation and the IMR may
be dropped from the regression equation. The regression equation can then be re-estimated using ordinary least squares. An estimation consideration is the

presence of heteroscedasticity in the regression equation. To allow for this situation, the standard errors
in the regression equation are estimated using
White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator.
The same independent variables are hypothesized for
both equations of the model, since variables thought
to be associated with a loan loss occurrence are also
thought to be associated with the percent of loan loss.
3.3.2. Empirical Model Specification
The independent variables included in the estimated
empirical model are grouped into four categories as
was done for the multinomial logit model in section
2 of this report: (1) borrower demographics, (2)
characteristics of the current loan, (3) prior financial
distress and involvement with FSA Direct Loans, and
(4) borrower financial characteristics. An exact
description of the variables is given in table 3.3 and
descriptive statistics are presented in table 3.4.
Demographic variable age (AGE) measures the
wealth of knowledge that the borrower has accumulated, which is expected to be negatively related to
loan losses.77
Characteristics of the current loan include whether
the loan is OL, one-year OL (ONEYR), FO, Limited
Resource (LR), BF, or SDA. These variables are binary and take on the value of 1 if the loan has the particular characteristic. It is expected that OL, ONEYR,
and FO are negatively related to the incidence of a
loss and the percentage of the loss relative to the
effect of EM loans, which is captured by the constant
term in the estimated equations. These relationships
are expected because OL and FO loans have lower
loss rates than EM loans, as discussed earlier. It is
expected that LR is unrelated to loss occurrence and

76 A discussion of loan write-down and write-off is in section 2.2.4. There are loans that are still active and may potentially have a loss
occur in the future. However, these loans are assumed to have zero loss for the analysis presented here since none had occurred prior
to the survey.
77 Other demographic variables considered are number of years of farming experience (EXP), number of household members
(HOUSEMEM), marital status (MAR), race (RACE), and gender (FEMALE). AGE and EXP are highly correlated, so only AGE is
included in the estimated model since there are more observations for this variable than EXP. HOUSEMEM and MAR were statistically insignificant during pretest estimation and subsequently deleted from the model in the interest of parameter parsimony. Binary
variables RACE and GENDER were considered during pretest estimation, however, they are related to the SDA variable, which was
included in the estimation.
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Table 3.3. Incidental truncation model variable definitions
Dependent variables
LOSS
Binary variable with value of 1 if loan experienced a loan write-down or debt
write-off or both, 0 otherwise,
LOSSPCT
Amount of loan write-down or write-off divided by initial loan amount, in
percent,
Independent variables
AGE
Age in years of the operator at time of loan application,
OL
Binary variable with value of 1 if loan is OL, 0 otherwise,
ONEYR
Binary variable with value of 1 if loan is one-year OL loan, 0 otherwise,
FO
Binary variable with value of 1 if loan is FO, 0 otherwise,
LR
Binary variable with value of 1 if loan has a limited resource assistance code,
0 otherwise,
BF
Binary variable with value of 1 if loan has a beginning farmer assistance
code, 0 otherwise,
SDA
Binary variable with value of 1 if loan has a socially disadvantaged assistance
code, 0 otherwise,
NUMOL
Number of active OL loans at time of loan application,
NUMFO
Number of active FO loans at time of loan application,
NUMEM
Number of active EM loans at time of loan application,
DEBTSETT Binary variable with value of 1 if applicant had ever been released from
personal liability as part of a debt settlement action, 0 otherwise,
DA
Total liabilities divided by total assets,
CR
Total current farm assets divided by total current farm liabilities,
REPAY
Balance available for debt service divided by total debt service due that year,
CRPINPRO
Proportion of crop and livestock cash farm income from crops,
Total cash farm income from crop, livestock, and other farm income in
TCFI
thousands of dollars.

loss percentage. An LR loan initially receives a lower
interest rate so it will have a similar repayment capacity as a non-LR loan that does not receive this lower
interest rate. Therefore, LR and non-LR loans should
have a similar chance of success if all other nonrepayment capacity characteristics of the borrowers
and loans are the same. However, if the borrower and
farm operation associated with an LR loan actually
have more limited resources than those of a non-LR
loan such that the lower interest rate does not fully
compensate for these limitations, a positive relationship would be expected. There are no prior expectations on the signs of the BF and SDA coefficients.
The third category of independent variables contains
variables available at the time of origination about
past and current involvement with direct loans and
prior financial distress. Variables included in the esti-

mation to gauge the level of involvement and how
much experience the borrower has with FSA are the
number of active OL loans at time of application
(NUMOL) and similar measures for number of FO
loans (NUMFO) and number of EM loans
(NUMEM).78 The signs of the coefficients are
unknown a priori. A positive relationship between
the number of loans and loan loss rates would indicate that as FSA borrowers become more reliant on
FSA loans instead of loans from conventional creditors, the weaker financial situation they are in and the
more likely they are to have a loan loss. Conversely, a
negative relationship would indicate more and better
information between the borrower and FLM such
that the borrower has performed satisfactorily on the
loans and the FLM is willing to extend additional
credit to the borrower.

A binary variable that indicates previous FSA involvement is the response to the question, “Has this borrower or any member of an
entity ever obtained a direct loan or guarantee from Farmers Home Administration?” (PREVFSA). PREVFSA was statistically
insignificant during pretest estimation and subsequently deleted from the model in the interest of parameter parsimony.
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Table 3.4. Weighted descriptive statistics of variables in incidental truncation
model
V a r ia ble s
LOSS
LOSSPCT (%)

Mean
0.09
133.56

Std. de v.
0.29
196.12

N
2,289
184

AGE
OL
ONEYR
FO
EM
LR
BF
SDA
NUMOL
NUMFO
NUMEM
DEBTSETT
DA
CR
REPAY
CRPINPRO
TCFI ($1000)

41.17
0.71
0.39
0.11
0.17
0.28
0.23
0.07
1.41
0.44
0.42
0.04
0.69
2.01
1.16
0.61
153.47

12.83
0.45
0.49
0.32
0.38
0.45
0.42
0.25
1.71
0.85
1.00
0.20
0.83
9.36
1.19
0.42
161.46

2,285
2,715
2,715
2,715
2,715
2,715
2,715
2,715
2,282
2,289
2,288
2,414
2,279
1,932
2,290
2,278
2,301

A binary variable indicating prior financial difficulty
is created from responses to the question on the loan
application: Has the proposed entity had a loan debt
settlement action (DEBTSETT)?79 DEBTSETT is
expected to be positively related to loan losses. It suggests that if the borrower has had financial difficulty
in the past, debt settlement in itself may not be
enough assistance to have the borrower completely
recover from the past problems. It also suggests that if
the borrower has been able to settle debts when in
financial difficulty in the past, the borrower may have
learned from this experience and is thereby more
likely to settle debts in the future.
Borrower financial variables are computed from
information documented in the Farm and Home
Plan and available to the FLM prior to loan closing.
The total debt-to-asset ratio (DA) measures relative
solvency and is expected to be positively related to
losses. The current ratio (CR) measures liquidity and

is expected to be negatively related to losses.
Repayment ability (REPAY) is the ratio of the balance
available to service principal and interest payments to
the total amount of principal and interest due.
REPAY is expected to be negatively related to losses.
An indicator of borrower farm type is the proportion
of crop and livestock cash farm income from crops
(CRPINPRO). Crop income is typically more variable than livestock income because weather variations have a larger impact on crop income than livestock income (Dixon et al., 2004; Settlage et al., 2001).
Since crop income is riskier than livestock income, a
positive relationship between the proportion of farm
income from crops and loan losses is expected.
Finally, total cash farm income in thousands of dollars (TCFI), also known as gross cash farm income, is
a measure of farm size. The a priori relationship
between farm size and loan losses is unknown. It is

79 Two other binary variables created from information in the loan application and indicating prior financial distress are FINDIS,
which indicates that the applicant or any member of the proposed entity has been in receivership, been discharged in bankruptcy, or
filed a petition for reorganization in bankruptcy, and FEDDEBT, which indicates the applicant has been delinquent on federal debt.
Neither of these variables was statistically significant during pretest estimation, and they were subsequently deleted from the model.
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commonly thought larger farms are more likely to
take advantage of size economies and be more efficient. This suggests larger farms are less likely to have
loan losses. However, larger farms, particularly farms
with limited financial and managerial resources that
are common among LR and non-LR FSA borrowers,
may be difficult to manage effectively, resulting in a
greater probability of a loan loss.80
3.3.3. Estimation Results for the Loan Loss
Selection Equation
The selection equation is estimated as a probit model
and the parameter estimates are used to estimate the
IMR. The IMR is included as a regressor in equation
3.2, the regression equation, and is found to be statis-

tically insignificant. Therefore, equation 3.2 is re-estimated without the IMR using ordinary least squares.
The results of the estimated selection and re-estimated regression equations are presented in tables 3.5
and 3.6.81
The test of the hypothesis that all coefficients equal
zero is a test of equation validity. The χ2 statistic for
the selection equation and the F statistic for the
regression equation clearly reject this hypothesis for
both equations. Measures of explanatory power are
also considered. Equation 3.1 predicts 92 percent of
the observations correctly as having a loss or not.
This percentage is no better than if all loans are predicted to not have a loss, which would also result in
92 percent of the loans being predicted correctly.

Table 3.5. Estimated loan loss selection equation by Probit model
Dependent variable is LOSS
Independent
Coefficient
va r ia ble
CONSTANT
-1.172
AGE
-0.007
FO
-0.478
OL
0.185
ONEYR
-0.166
LR
0.139
BF
0.125
SDA
0.110
DEBTSETT
0.848
NUMOL
-0.004
NUMFO
-0.132
NUMEM
0.007
DA
0.222
CR
-0.064
REPAY
-0.446
CRPINPRO
0.229
TCFI
0.001
n
1,738
F2
98.907
% Correct*
91.945

Standard
erro r
0.364
0.004
0.269
0.150
0.113
0.110
0.147
0.193
0.166
0.030
0.064
0.047
0.069
0.035
0.225
0.124
0.000

t-ratio
-3.218
-1.639
-1.780
1.233
-1.464
1.264
0.852
0.569
5.109
-0.118
-2.062
0.153
3.221
-1.829
-1.986
1.839
3.637
p-value

p-value
0.001
0.101
0.075
0.217
0.143
0.206
0.394
0.570
0.000
0.906
0.039
0.878
0.001
0.067
0.047
0.066
0.000
0.000

*Percent of observations in the sample correctly classified by the probit model.

Total planned acreage (ACRES) was an alternative measure of farm size. This variable was statistically insignificant and was subsequently dropped from the model.
81 The regression results with and without the IMR were similar. The only differences were that FO was insignificant and OL was only
significant at the 0.10 level in the regression equation with IMR and FO and OL were significant at the 0.05 level when IMR was
excluded.
80
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Equation 3.2 has an R2 of 0.197, indicating nearly 20
percent of the variation in loan loss rates is explained
by the independent variables, which is respectable for
cross-sectional data, but also means much of the variation is left unexplained. This is not surprising considering economic, social, and personal events that
occur after loan origination are likely to have a large
impact on the potential success of a loan and are not
captured by the model.82 The selection and regression equations have significant coefficient estimates,
which indicate explanatory power.
The estimated selection equation has a number of
variables with significant coefficients at the 0.05 level
for a two-tailed test. All of these coefficients have the
anticipated signs. The DEBTSETT coefficient has a
positive sign that indicates a positive relationship
between the borrower having a previous debt settlement experience and FSA having a loan loss occur.
This indicates that these borrowers are higher risk
and they may not have received enough debt relief for
them to be successful with future loans.
This debt settlement result is also similar to a moral
hazard issue of property insurance that is frequently
cited. Owners of property that is fully insured may
not take all the necessary actions required to fully
protect their property because they will be made
whole by the insurance payment if a loss occurs. This
is analogous to a farm borrower who may not do
everything in their power to repay a loan if they think
or, particularly, if they have experienced, that they
will be able to settle for less than full repayment.
While there was no expected sign a priori for the
NUMFO coefficient, the negative sign supports the
notion that information about the farm business and
borrower is learned by the FLM because of their pre-

vious experience with the borrower. This information
may be used to make a better decision, i.e., not make
a bad loan. It can also be argued that borrowers with
more FO loans are more dedicated to paying off loans
to increase their likelihood of keeping their land and
protecting equity.
Borrower financial characteristics are important in
explaining the probability of a loan loss occurring. As
expected, the probability of loan loss increases as the
debt-to-asset ratio increases (solvency decreases).
Borrowers with high debt-to-asset ratios are highly
leveraged and unable to withstand financial setbacks
that are more likely to lead to loan losses. The repayment ratio is also related to loan losses. As expected,
borrowers with greater repayment capacity are less
likely to have a loss. In addition, the current ratio is
related to loan losses, although at the lower level of
statistical significance of 0.10. As expected, borrowers
with greater liquidity are less likely to have a loss.
The size of the farm business (TCFI) is important in
explaining loan loss occurrences for this sample of
FSA loans. Larger farms, as measured by the farm’s
planned total cash farm income, have a greater probability of having a loan loss. This supports the
hypothesis that larger farm businesses require larger
FSA loans, and the farmers may not have the necessary financial and managerial resources to successfully repay their loans. Also, these larger farms with larger loans may not have sufficient non-farm income to
assist in paying loan payments and family living
expenses.83 An alternative explanation may be that
larger farm businesses with FSA loans are more likely
to have received EM loans because OL and FO loans
are targeted to relatively smaller farm businesses.84

Similar to the discussion in section 2.3.2, the model is incomplete because only information available at the time of loan origination is included, yet events occurring after loan closing that are likely to have a large impact on the loan are excluded.
83 The data support the hypothesis that total cash farm income and loan size are positively related. Also, the data support the hypothesis that total cash farm income and non-farm income are negatively related.
84 The data support the hypothesis that EM loans go to larger farms than do OL and FO loans. For observations used to estimate equation 3.1, it was found that planned total cash farm income for farms that received EM loans was $68,952 and $111,442 greater than
for farms that received OL and FO loans, respectively. These are statistically significant differences.
82
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Large farm businesses with EM loans have experienced a significant income loss that they may not
recover from, even with a low interest loan, ultimately
resulting in a loan loss. However, the selection equation
controls for this relationship by having the constant
term capture the effect of EM loans on loan losses.
The FO coefficient in the selection equation is marginally significant at the 0.10 level, implying FO loans
have a lower probability of having a loss. This result
is consistent with the data presented earlier showing
FO loans have lower loss rates than EM loans.
The marginal significance of the CRPINPRO coefficient indicates that the likelihood of a loan loss
increases as the farm has more crop cash income relative to livestock cash income as expected. A conclusion from this result is that crop farms have a greater
chance at a loan loss than livestock farms because
crop income is riskier than livestock income.
3.3.4. Estimation Results for the Loss Percentage
Regression Equation
All of the estimated regression equation coefficients
that are significant have the anticipated signs (table
3.6). The negative signs on the estimated FO and OL
coefficients indicate loan loss percentages are 154 and
105 percentage points less for FO and OL loans than
for EM loans.85 FO loans primarily rely on real estate
to secure the loan. As was mentioned earlier, real
estate values have increased steadily since 1994.
Therefore, unpaid principal and interest on an FO
loan are more likely to be repaid from liquidation of
the real estate security compared with those on an
EM loan, which may or may not be secured by real

estate. Also, OL loans have lower loss rates than EM
loans, as was shown earlier.
There was not an expected sign for the BF coefficient.
However, the regression results indicate BF loans
have a 143 percentage-point larger loss rate than the
base case captured by the constant term.86 Perhaps
FLMs are more willing to use various servicing
accommodations with BF loans than other loan types
in an attempt to allow beginning farmers to continue
farming. For example, multiple restructurings of
unpaid principal and interest into ever larger loans
may ultimately result in a large loan loss. However,
survey data to test this hypothesis are unavailable. An
alternative explanation for BF loans having larger loss
percentages than non-BF loans when a loss occurs is
that BF loan losses occur earlier and thereby reflect
larger losses since little principal has been retired relative to non-BF loans. The data support the hypothesis that BF loan losses occurred sooner after loan
origination than do non-BF loan losses.87
The repayment variable is the only borrower financial
characteristic found to be significant in explaining
the loan loss percentage. As the amount available for
debt servicing increases relative to the amount
required to service debt, the loan loss percentage
decreases as expected. Although the projected repayment capacity was not sufficient to keep a loss from
occurring, the loss percentage was smaller the greater
the planned repayment capacity.
Perhaps the most surprising finding is the lack of significance for debt-to-asset ratio. Although the sign of
the coefficient indicates loan loss percent increases as

85 The results from a loan loss amount regression indicate loan losses are $54,899 and $34,456 less for FO and OL loans than for EM
loans.
86 The results from a loan loss amount regression indicate loan losses are $40,880 more for BF loans than the base case captured by
the constant term.
87 Another alternative explanation is that BF farmers rely more on FSA credit than do non-BF farmers, such that when a loan loss
occurs, few other loan sources are available. Surprisingly, the FSA proportion of total liabilities is less for BF farmers than non-BF
farmers, although not significantly. This in itself could contribute to the BF loans having larger losses. The non-FSA creditors for the
BF farmers may have a superior lien position to FSA, such that when a loss occurs, the non-FSA creditors are more likely than FSA to
be repaid from the liquidation of secured property.
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Table 3.6. Estimated loan loss percentage regression equation
Dependent variable is LOSSPCT
Independent
Coefficient Standard error
va r ia ble
CONSTANT
339.045
116.059
AGE
1.085
1.153
FO
-154.415
54.816
OL
-105.421
46.841
ONEYR
-23.745
27.222
LR
17.793
35.065
BF
142.810
63.105
SDA
2.261
34.074
DEBTSETT
-4.076
30.164
DA
23.177
38.354
CR
8.993
7.365
REPAY
-222.740
79.762
CRPINPRO
49.905
32.268
TCFI
-0.030
0.034
n
124
F
2.080
0.197
R2
Adjusted R2
0.102

debt-to-asset ratio increases, the estimate is insignificant. Of course all the assets are not necessarily taken
as collateral to securitize the FSA loan. Some assets
are non-farm assets and the borrowers are reluctant
to offer additional collateral. A better measure would
be collateral value relative to loan value, although the
measure was not collected by the survey. It would be
expected that loan loss percentage decreases as the
collateral-to-loan value increases.
3.3.5. Implications of the Loan Loss Estimations
The results from the estimation of the selection and
regression equations have implications for reducing
loan losses. In simplest terms, loan loss occurrence
may be reduced several ways: by rejecting applicants
who have had previous debt settlement experience;
by encouraging loans to borrowers who already have
FO loans; by requiring loans be given to farmers with
lower debt-to-asset ratios, higher current ratios, and
greater repayment capacity; by making fewer loans to
crop farms; and by focusing loans on smaller farms.
When a loan loss occurs, the percentage of the loan
loss would be reduced by making proportionately

t -r a tio
2.921
0.941
-2.817
-2.251
-0.872
0.507
2.263
0.066
-0.135
0.604
1.221
-2.793
1.547
-0.872

p-value

p-va lue
0.004
0.349
0.006
0.026
0.385
0.613
0.026
0.947
0.893
0.547
0.225
0.006
0.125
0.385

0.021

more FO and OL loans relative to EM loans, decreasing the number of BF loans, and making loans to
farmers with greater repayment capacity. Loss reductions are not as simple as this.
The debt settlement result is quite interesting. The
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of
1996 (P.L. 104-127) limited the number of times FSA
may provide debt forgiveness to a borrower to just
one time. The legislation goes on to make borrowers
receiving debt forgiveness ineligible for additional
direct or guaranteed loans, with an exception of
allowing OL loans for annual operating expenses in
cases of certain loan write-downs (USDA/ERS, 1997).
The debt settlement result from the selection equation suggests that FSA should strictly adhere to this
legislation in an effort to reduce the number of loan
losses. Even then, losses may occur on the annual
operating expense-type OL loans these borrowers
subsequently receive. However, it would be difficult
to justify disallowing these borrowers credit for
annual operating expenses just after FSA has written
down their debts to levels that are expected to be
manageable.
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The debt settlement result brings up the broader
question of allowing loan write-downs, write-offs
and debt settlements in the first place without the
borrower filing for liquidation bankruptcy. Although
loan write-downs, write-offs, and debt settlement are
limited to the net recovery value of liquidating
secured property, these actions may promote unethical behavior, such that the borrower has learned from
this experience and is more likely to settle debts in the
future in this manner (moral hazard problem).
However, debt settlement may be effective at keeping
more farmers farming, although at a lower rate than
farmers without debt settlement experience. Of the
loans in the survey to farmers with a previous debt
settlement, 63 loans did not report a loss and 36 loans
did report a loss. Presumably, more farmers benefited
from previous debt settlement and did not have a loss
on a subsequent loan than did have a subsequent loan
loss. In fact it could be argued that the prior debt settlement assistance received by the farmers with subsequent loan losses was insufficient assistance for the
farmers to be successful with those loans.
Financial characteristics are important in explaining
the likelihood of a loan loss. Restricting loans to
farms with less than a certain debt-to-asset ratio or
greater than a certain repayment capacity would likely reduce the number of loan losses. However as was
seen in section 1.5, many FSA applicants with high
debt-to-asset ratios or low repayment ratios who
receive loans would instead be denied credit by FSA if
debt-to-asset and repayment limits are put in place.
Some of these applicants—if granted loans—would
have a loan loss, although many more would likely
make a positive contribution to agriculture if they
received FSA loans. The same thing could be said for
restricting loans to farms with greater than a certain
current ratio.
The results suggest that crop farms are more likely to
have loan losses than livestock farms. Crop insurance
and additional collateral beyond the crop itself are
needed to decrease the chance of a loan loss.

FSA already emphasizes providing loans to small
farms. The selection equation results suggest that a
continuation of this policy would limit the number
of loan losses.
FO loans have inherently low loss rates. Land values
have increased, at least over the study period, so that
the collateral value has increased as opposed to nonreal estate collateral, which frequently decreases
(depreciates) in value. This is particularly important
because of the lengthy appeal process for FSA borrowers and the accruing of interest on delinquent
loans. Also, a real estate-secured loan is more likely to
be paid before a non-real estate-secured loan when
cash flows are tight since the loss of real estate is often
more critical to the farm business as a going concern
than a non-real estate asset. This implies FSA loans
need to be secured with ample collateral. Including
farmland as collateral, when possible, would likely
reduce loan losses.
If FO loans have inherently low loan losses, EM loans
have inherently high loan losses. It should be expected that EM loans have large loan losses because the
farms with these loans have experienced large production and income losses from which the operator
may never recover, even with the assistance of an EM
loan. Attention should be given to having insurance
products ex ante substitute for EM loans in certain
circumstances. Over the years, farm policy has occasionally required farmers to purchase insurance in
order to receive farm program payments and qualify
for emergency assistance. Putting this policy firmly
in place should guard against adverse selection, i.e.,
farmers who are more likely to qualify for emergency
assistance are less likely to purchase insurance since
they believe the government will come to their assistance if a natural disaster occurs. Although an EM
loan may allow the farmer to spread the income loss
over a number of years following a disaster, the
farmer may really need a grant (or an insurance
check) to be able to recover. It is recommended that
EM loans also be secured with ample collateral.
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It is difficult to provide a recommendation related to
the finding that BF loans are related to greater loss
rates. FSA has increased the emphasis on providing
loans to beginning farmers. Beginning farmers are
the most likely group of farmers to be denied credit
from conventional creditors since they have little
experience, no track record, and often, little equity.
Many small businesses outside of agriculture ultimately fail, and it should be expected that many small
farm businesses are no different. These small farm
businesses are risky by nature, and it is a matter of
public policy whether or not the government will
continue to assume the risk associated with providing
loans to them.
The results from the selection and regression equations indicate that LR loans are not a significant factor in explaining loan losses. This implies that the
subsidized interest rate associated with LR loans is
allowing farmers receiving LR loans to have similar
success at repaying their loans as those farmers
receiving non-LR loans. However, although the
default subsidy appears to be similar for LR loans and
non-LR loans, it comes at the cost of increased interest subsidy.

3.4. Summary
The major component of subsidy costs for FSA
Direct FLPs in recent years is loan default cost. The
outstanding principal, principal and interest loan
losses, and loss rates have had a downward trend over
the FY1994–2004 period. The average annual loss of
principal and interest for OL, FO, and EM loans combined over this period was substantial at $576 million. However, the most recent loss in FY 2004 was
less than half that at $260 million. The difference in
loss rates between FSA and other lenders has also followed a downward trend over this period.

The likelihood of a loan loss is found to be positively
related to borrowers with previous debt settlement
experience, higher debt-to-asset ratios, lower current
ratios, less repayment capacity, crop farms, and larger farms and negatively related to borrowers already
having or receiving an FO loan. When a loan loss
occurs, the percentage of the loan loss is positively
related to beginning farmer loans and negatively
related to borrowers with FO and OL loans and
greater repayment capacity. Loan losses are not
found to be significantly related to LR or SDA loans.
It is clear that there is substantial volatility in computing ex ante subsidy rates. The reasons for this
volatility should be an area of future study. However,
it appears from the loan loss results presented in this
section that EM loans should have higher subsidy
rates than OL loans, which should have higher subsidy rates than FO loans. Also, an assignment of higher subsidy rates to beginning farmer loans than nonbeginning farmer loans may be justified.
It was planned that actual Direct FLP loan losses for
individual loans during FY 1994–2004 would be
available. However, the data were incomplete because
of difficulties in retrieving some pertinent data from
archives. If such data were to become available in the
future, it would be useful to compute various loan
loss rates and conduct geographical analyses at the
county level and loan program analyses similar to
those presented in tables 3.1 and 3.2 and figures 3.1
through 3.4.

The estimation results of the selection and regression
equations have implications in reducing loan losses.
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Conclusions
Direct FLPs appear to be serving their intended clientele. Recent FLP borrowers are more financially
stressed than non-borrowers and would be generally
considered as family farms. About 78 to 92 percent
would qualify as small family farms using USDA’s
Small Farms Commission definition. The Direct FLP
credit market penetration is relatively high among
farms likely to be eligible for these credit programs,
despite the fact that these programs represent a relatively small proportion of total outstanding agricultural debt.
Increasing market penetration or the
share of farms served by the program would require
greater obligation funding and hence greater budgetary costs. Conversely, implementing more rigorous
loan eligibility criteria would likely lower the number
of operators receiving loans and hence loan loss
occurrences and subsidy rates would likely fall.
The concept of “creditworthy” is not well defined for
the purposes of loan eligibility for FLPs. Almost any
borrower is risky in the sense that unforeseen events
can transpire that could preclude repayment. Thus
creditworthy is not a discrete concept but a continuous one. There are degrees of credit worthiness. FSA
experiences higher loan loss rates than conventional
agricultural lenders. This is to be expected because
commercial lenders can be more selective in choosing
borrowers and price loans to match risk profiles,
which FSA does not do. In essence, FSA’s mission is to
provide credit to riskier “creditworthy” borrowers.
The agency is accomplishing this goal. The natural
consequence is that FSA loan loss rates are higher
than for conventional lenders. Whether the current
borrowers are too risky or should even riskier borrowers be included are policy questions. The analysis
indicates that attempts to cut losses systematically
would imply denying credit to some current borrowers.
A majority of borrowers from FY 1994–1996 used
FLPs as a transitional tool. At time of origination,

FSA Direct borrowers had fewer years of farming
experience than the farming population at large.
More than half of these borrowers no longer had
active FLP loans by the end of November 2004. So
for the majority of borrowers, FLPs are not a lifetime
credit source. FLPs are helping farmers move to conventional credit or aiding farmers who subsequently
leave farming completely, as is common among U.S.
farmers. Not surprisingly, farmers in stronger financial condition originating FSA Direct Loans are more
likely to exit and have fewer outstanding loans with
FSA. Thus exit rates could be increased by tighter eligibility standards. But such a policy would eliminate
the riskier borrowers and policy considerations may
dictate that it is exactly these riskier borrowers who
should be served.
This research has described and analyzed various
aspects of the Direct FLPs but, in the process, has
raised other issues that deserve further investigation.
Is there a long-term class of borrowers? That is, do
some borrowers utilize FLPs continuously over thirty
or forty years? If so, what characterizes them? Are
there ways to motivate them to exit FLPs after a few
years? Would the mandating of crop insurance as a
condition of obtaining loans curtail FSA default
costs? Could more extensive study of ex post subsidy
rates explain, and perhaps dampen, the volatility in
ex ante subsidy rates?
In calling for further analysis, it is important that FSA
collect information useful to research. Currently,
data are collected with the objective of originating
and servicing existing loans. While much useful
research data are generated in the process, research
considerations would require some changes. For
example, we noticed that in many of the Farm and
Home Plans examined from FY 2000–2003, zeroes
were recorded where almost surely the data were
missing. While this might be understood by Farm
Loan Managers that such data are missing, it is not
clear to researchers. FSA has upgraded its application
process so that data from applications and Farm
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Business Plans, which have replaced Farm and Home
Plans, could be made available electronically. It would
be useful for FSA staff concerned with research and
program evaluation to examine existing forms to see
how they could be altered to still serve the primary
roles of borrower evaluation and loan monitoring
but also provide useful information for research and
program evaluation. Mandatory filing of Farm
Business Plans at least every five years for continuing
borrowers would provide very useful data on the
financial progress of borrowers.
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Appendix 1.B. Definitions of
Targeted Groups

Direct Loan Eligibility

Socially Disadvantaged Farmers
The 2004 FSA definition of socially disadvantaged
farmer is: “A socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher is one of a group whose members have been subjected to racial, ethnic, or gender prejudice because of
their identity as members of the group without
regard to their individual qualities. For purposes of
this program, socially disadvantaged groups are
women, African Americans, American Indians,
Alaskan Natives, Hispanics, and Asian Americans and
Pacific Islanders.”
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/html
/sdaloan02.htm, accessed June 1, 2005.
Beginning Farmers
The 2004 FSA definition of beginning farmer is: “A
beginning farmer or rancher is an individual or entity who (1) has not operated a farm or ranch for more
than 10 years; (2) meets the loan eligibility requirements of the program to which he/she is applying; (3)
substantially participates in the operation; and, (4)
for FO loan purposes, does not own a farm greater
than 30 percent of the average size farm in the county. (Note: all applicants for direct FO loans must have
participated in business operation of a farm for at
least 3 years.) If the applicant is an entity, all members
must be related by blood or marriage, and all stockholders in a corporation must be eligible beginning
farmers.”
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/html
/begloan02.htm, accessed June 1, 2005.

In 2004, the FSA definition of direct loan program
eligibility is: “A direct loan applicant must: have sufficient education, training, or experience in managing and operating a farm or ranch that demonstrates
the managerial ability needed to succeed in farming;
be a citizen of the United States (or legal resident
alien), which includes Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
Guam, American Samoa, and certain former Pacific
Trust Territories; have the legal capacity to incur the
obligations of the loan; be unable to obtain credit
elsewhere; have an acceptable credit history; be the
operator or tenant operator of a family farm after the
loan is closed. For a Farm Ownership Loan, the producer must also own the farm. For an Operating or
Emergency Loan, the producer need only be the
operator; not have had a previous loan which resulted in a loss to the Agency (with certain exceptions);
not be delinquent on any federal debt; Corporations,
cooperatives, joint operations, and partnerships and
their members/stockholders must meet these same
eligibility requirements, and the entity must also be
authorized to operate a farm or ranch in the State
where the land is located.”
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dafl/directloans.htm#Eligibi
lity, accessed June 1, 2005.
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Appendix 1.C. Matching Farm and
Home Plans to Borrowers in the New
Loan Database
The data records analyzed in this study contained
information extracted from several sources and databases. Information was aggregated and combined to
create one record per borrower for each of the federal fiscal years from 2000 to 2003. First the New Loan
(NL) database was used to summarize loan information for those who received one or more direct loans
in a given year. Demographic information for each
borrower was added to the data record. For each borrower/year identified in the NL database, information
was extracted from the Farm and Home Plan (FHP)
database for the one most relevant application file
and merged with the loan summary information.
Details of the steps entailed in building the data
records are provided here.
The NL database provided by FSA consisted of a data
record for each of 70,923 new loans originated and
represented 54,984 borrowers. After excluding youth
and non-program loans, 60,151 direct loans
remained. Seventy-nine percent were OL, 10.2 percent were FO and 10.8 percent were EM loans. Those
loans went to 45,016 borrowers, each of whom had at
least one direct loan of any type. The 45,016 borrowers were unique within year but not unique across all
four years. A borrower who received at least one FSA
Direct loan in each of the four fiscal years would be
counted four times. Each borrower was counted only
once in one year even if the borrower received multiple loans in the same fiscal year. For each fiscal year,
2000–2003, information was summarized to create
one record per borrower containing the number of
direct loans received and the funded amount for each
loan type. Those records were matched by taxpayer
identification number to extract demographic information from records in a separate data file also provided by FSA. The demographic records contained
information about sex, date of birth, and race/ethnicity of the borrower. One data file was created for each
of the four fiscal years with the data records sorted by
taxpayer identification number within each year.

The FHP data are maintained by FSA in relational
database tables. To provide data for this study, each of
the database tables was exported as a separate file on
a state-by-state basis. Data from two tables in the
FHP database were used to construct data records for
analysis: (1) the application (APL) table, with each
record representing a plan for a given plan year, and
(2) the Classification of Borrower Account (CBA)
table, with each record containing basic financial
information about a borrower and matched by FIPS
State-County and Plan Number to a specific plan in
the APL file.
To construct the data files, each state’s APL data file
was input, with the restrictions that plans were from
FY 1999–2003 and were classified as “current” plans.
Five different kinds of plans were found in the FHP
APL file: (1) Typical, (2) Current, (3) Projected, (4)
Working and (5) Scenario plans. Analysis was limited to the Current plans in the APL file because they
were assumed to be closely representative of the borrowers’ actual financial status based on the information obtained from FSA. Individual state files were
combined to generate the national APL data set that
was then sorted by taxpayer identification number
and plan date. The national APL data set had 117,000
observations. It was possible for a given borrower
(taxpayer) to have multiple plans in a given year, and
each plan could be associated with multiple loans.
Each state’s CBA data file was also input, combined to
create a national CBA file, and then sorted by the
database key identifiers, FIPS State-County and Plan
Number.
The summarized NL file for each year, FY 2000–2003,
was matched with the national APL file using taxpayer identification number as the unique identifier.
Only one record was allowed for selection from the
APL file for each taxpayer/borrower in a given year.
Records were evaluated using the following criteria.
(1) If a current plan(s) was filed within 365 days prior
to the first loan obligation date in a fiscal year, the
nearest plan before the first loan obligation date was
selected. (2) If no plan was found to meet the first cri-
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terion, and the borrower had multiple loans in a fiscal year, then the current plan with the closest date
after the first loan obligation, but not later than the
last loan obligation in that fiscal year, was selected.
(3) If no current plan met either of the above two criteria, the borrower was excluded from the data set.
The matched NL-APL data set was then sorted by
FIPS State-County and Plan Number. The data set
consisted of 29,639 borrowers for FY 2000–2003.
Borrowers were unique within a year but not necessarily across years, a condition imposed on the initial
NL files. The possibility also existed that a Current
APL plan could be selected more than once if the
borrower existed in two consecutive years and the
plan met the conditions for selection in both years.

The final step was to merge the national NL-APL file
with the national CBA data set, matching by FIPS
State-County and Plan Number. Only those NL-APL
records with matches in the CBA file were retained. A
total of 10,486 borrowers in the national NL-APL file
had no CBA matching records. Thus the final national NL-APL-CBA file had 19,153 borrowers with
matched loan-plan-financial records. This represented 42.5 percent of the total number of borrowers
identified in the NL file.

A pp e n dix 1. D . F SA bor r owe r f ina ncia l da ta by loa n typ e
Mean financials*

A ll lo ans

OL

FO

EM

Total debts/total assets

0.85

0.86

0.81

0.89

Return on assets

0.09

0.09

0.03

0.10

Current assets/current debts

1.46

1.39

2.68

0.88

Balance available/amount due this year

1.10

1.09

1.21

1.09

Total debts/total assets

0.68

0.68

0.63

0.74

Return on assets

0.03

0.03

0.00

0.06

Median financials**

Current assets/current debts

0.71

0.70

1.11

0.40

Balance available/amount due this year

1.03

1.03

1.06

1.02

19,153

16,674

1,946

2,616

Maximum number of observations***

Source: FY 2000-2003 Sample of Farm and Home Plan
* Average for FY 2000–2003.
** Median for FY 2000–2003
*** The same maximum number of observations is used for both mean and median financials.
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Appendix 2.A. Survey Sampling, Data
C olle ction, and Data Cleaning
2.A.1. Sorting the Sampling Frame Prior to
Sampling
The lists of new FSA loan originations for FY
1994–1996 were received on October 7, 2004 on a
compact disc (CD) from Edward Zera of the Farm
Credit Automation Office of FSA in St. Louis. The
data file included one observation for each new loan
originated from October 1, 1993 through September
30, 1996. Each loan origination included information on borrower’s state and county of residence,
social security number, loan number, assistance type,
date and amount of obligation, borrower’s race and
gender, fiscal year of loan, fund code, and settlement
code. Youth loans were included in the file. Since
youth loans are not part of the analysis, they were
excluded from the sampling frame. We refer to the
sampling frame as the New Originator (NO) data set.
A Status of Loan and Grant Obligation’s Allotments or
Distributions Report for FY 1994–1996, originating
from the FSA Finance Office, was received from
Kathleen Miller of the USDA/FSA Loan Making
Division. This report was used to compare loan totals
in the NO data set with those of the FY1994–1996
obligations for OL, FO and EM loans as stated in the
Report. The Report has a total FY 1994–1996 loan
count of 45,363 compared to the NO data set’s total
of 45,468, a difference of 105 loans.88 The NO data
set was selected as the sample frame for the purpose
of drawing the FY 1994–1996 survey sample.
The NO data were imported from the CD into SAS
software. The data columns were labeled and formatted using the FLP file description code that came with
the CD.89 Total observation counts in each file were
then verified. The CD data set was comprised of nine
loan files: one file per year for each of Operating

Loan (OL) , Farm Ownership (FO) and Emergency
Loans (EM). In the SAS program the three annual
files for each loan type were combined into one file,
resulting in three loan files_one each for OL, FO and
EM. Three observations on the race variable and one
observation on the gender variable had values of
zero. These were deemed invalid, and the corresponding four observations (loans) were deleted from the
NO file.
Because the research team was interested in getting
adequate sample sizes for females and racial minorities, it was necessary to sample sub-populations at
different intensities. This required sorting the observations in the NO file into three different groups for
the purpose of differential sampling rates. Each individual loan obligation was classified into one of three
groups, labeled as A, B and C, as a function of gender
and race. The five gender codes were: 1 = male, 2 =
female, 3 = family unit, 4 = organization, maleowned, 5 = organization, female-owned. The 5 race
codes were: 1 = White, 2 = Black, 3 = Asian/Pacific
Islander, 4 = American Indian/Alaskan Native, 5 =
Hispanic. A loan was classified into group A if the sex
code was 1, 3, or 4 and race code was 1. Loans in
group B were associated with sex codes of 2 or 5 and
race codes of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. Loans in group C had sex
codes of 1, 3, or 4 and race codes of 2, 3, 4, or 5. This
procedure resulted in three loan files by loan type
with each file separated into A, B and C groups.
The OL and FO files were further segmented into
beginning farmer and non-beginning farmer groups
using assistance type codes Emergency loans do not
have a beginning farmer program. Thus the NO sampling frame consists of five files: (1) Beginning Farm
Ownership Loans (BFFO), (2) Non-Beginning Farm
Ownership Loans (NONBFFO), (3) Beginning Farm
Operating Loans (BFOL), (4) Non-Beginning Farm

88 The reasons for the discrepancies are not clear. However, databases are revised and converted over time and the data in the 205
reports are not revised. As a general rule, we found in this study that strict agreement among all databases was not the typical outcome. This is not surprising since the design of the databases is complex and extracting data was similarly complex so that perfect
matches are not the norm.
89 The file description code contains state, county, social security number, loan number, assistance type, date of obligation, race, sex
and fiscal year.
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Operating Loans (NONBFOL), and (5) Emergency
Loans (EM). Each loan in all five files was designated as belonging to group A, B or C.
2.A.2. Sampling Algorithm
The sampling frame had 45,468 observations. There
were five distinct loan files: BFFO, NONBFFO, BFOL
NONBFOL, and EM. Each loan type file was then
subdivided by whether a loan was in the A, B, or C
group. This gave fifteen (5x3) separate sub-files. For
example, loan type BFFO file was classified into three
sub-files where the first had all the loans in group A,
the second all the loans in group B and the third all
the loans in group C. Each of the fifteen sub-files was
sampled as a separate entity.
Sequential sampling was used to ensure proportional
sampling over time and location. In order to achieve
proportionate racial, geographical, time representation in the sample, the loans were ordered within
each of the fifteen groups. First, in groups B and C
the loans were sorted by the race variable. Then, each
of the fifteen groups was sorted by state by the states’
numerical order via FIPS code. Then, within a given
state, all the borrower loans were ordered by date of
loan closing (making) beginning with the earliest
date to the latest. This completely ordered the loans
for all groups. There is the possibility of two loans
being closed on the same date in the same state. If
this occurred, we let the ordering of two (or more)
such loans be in whatever order indicated by how the
data had been entered into the data file in St. Louis. A
goal of 1,000 usable responses (observations) was set.
The anticipated response rate was 33 percent. We
then followed a sampling scheme where loans in
group (A) were sampled at a rate of 5.56 percent for
NONBFOL, BFOL, and EM. That is, a random number between one and 18 was selected; then every eighteenth observation thereafter was selected. NONBFFO and BFFO loans and all loans in groups B and C
were sampled at a rate of 11.1 percent. So a number
between one and nine was selected, and then every
ninth observation thereafter was selected. For the five

A groups, the initial observations were: NONBFFO,
5; NONBFOL, 1; BFFO, 2; BFOL, 5; and EM, 10. For
the five B groups, the initial observations were:
NONBFFO, 1; NONBFOL, 8; BFFO, 7; BFOL, 5; and
EM, 8. For the five C groups, the initial observations
were: NONBFFO, 3; NONBFOL, 8; BFFO, 8; BFOL,
9; and EM, 6.
The sampling method was executed in an SAS program and resulted in 3,004 observations. An excel file
was then prepared and sent to FSA in Washington,
D.C. In this file, each observation (loan) had a column for state, county, social security number/ borrower identification number, and loan number. At
FSA, the file was sorted by state or territory and all
the loans in a given state or territory were put into a
separate file. Each of these individual state borrower
files was sent to each corresponding State FSA office
which then sent it to the FSA field offices. The borrower identification and loan numbers guided the
field staff in determining which borrower files were
to be used to fill in the survey instrument.
2.A.3. Data Collection
The online survey instrument consists of 71 questions about the loan and borrower, see Appendix
2.B.1. The initial instrument was designed by the
research team at the University of Arkansas Division
of Agriculture. During the design process, the instrument was sent to Charles Dodson and Steven Koenig
of FSA for their critical reviews. They made several
constructive comments, many of which were incorporated into the design of the final instrument. In
October 2004, a paper copy was taken to the field
offices of Arkansas and Washington counties in
Arkansas, Cherokee County in Oklahoma, and
Lawrence and Dade counties in Missouri. The FLM at
each county office filled out approximately five copies
of the instrument as part of the pre-testing. Once
this phase of the design was completed, a copy of the
instrument was sent electronically to the Direct Loan
Program Effectiveness Study Application (DLPESA)
team in Washington, D.C. The key contacts on the
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DLPESA team were Ellen Sachs, JT Taylor, and Roopa
Thimmahanumaiah. Connie Holman, USDA/FSA
Loan Making Division, was instrumental in coordinating activities between the University of Arkansas
Division of Agriculture team and the DLPESA team
through weekly teleconference calls.
The final online survey application (questionnaire)
was pre-tested in five Arkansas counties
(Washington, Madison, Franklin, Sebastian and
Crawford) before distribution across the United
States and sampled territories for actual implementation. Three University of Arkansas Division of
Agriculture team members participated in the first
day of pre-testing at the Washington County FSA
office. The number of offices visited expanded to the
other counties in the ensuing days. In these latter
offices, the instrument was filled out by FSA employees on the FSA intranet computer system just as they
would for actual FSA employees filling out the actual
survey instruments for loans in the sample. The pretesting was limited to Arkansas due to time constraints.90 The pre-testing results showed that the
survey questionnaire could take up to one and a half
hours to complete. In addition, it became apparent
that the offices could have difficulty finding all the
information needed for completing the seventy-one
questions. This prompted stronger wording in the
letter from the Washington, D.C., FSA office to each
state office stressing the importance of this survey
information. During the pre-testing, it was discovered that the save/submit button occasionally malfunctioned. This was corrected by the DLPESA team
in Washington, D.C., under their assumption that it
was due to a time-out problem with the program.
The final version of the instrument was posted on a
secure FSA intranet site. Each involved FSA County
office received a letter from the National Office
(through each FSA State office) explaining the

importance of the study and giving instructions for
accessing the online site and for filling out the online
survey application. The letter also contained the list
of county case and loan numbers to be surveyed in a
given state.
The online survey officially began on November 22,
2004. The respondents were monitored daily by
Connie Holman, Senior Loan Officer, USDA/FSA
Loan Making Division, who made personal followups if a state office was slow to submit their surveys
from the list. She responded to various problems
offices had and encouraged participation.
Each case number entered by the respondent was
automatically verified against the sample list as part
of the log-in procedure. This made it possible for the
survey administrator to monitor saved and submitted
surveys on a daily basis. This also prevented the
respondents from entering a wrong case number.
Subsequent to November 22, 2004, programming
problems were encountered. To answer daily phone
and e-mail help requests, help desks were set up and
monitored by Sandy Hamm at the University of
Arkansas and Connie Holman at the FSA National
office. The Arkansas help desk received 93 phone
calls and 69 emails during the course of the online
survey. The first and most important problem was
the malfunctioning of the save/submit button on the
survey application. Many saved and submitted surveys were initially lost. The problem was discovered
on the first day of the online survey. An email alerting users to this problem was sent by Connie Holman
of the Loan Making Division to the State offices giving instructions to first adjust browser settings; and
then if that did not work, to print and fax the complete survey to Connie Holman at the National office.
One hundred sixteen surveys were faxed and entered
into the online survey application by Connie
Holman. These “handwritten” entries were later ver-

90 All parties involved in the design phase of the survey believed it was important to complete the survey by December 31, 2004. It
was further recognized that the response after December 24 was likely to be light. It was assumed any marginal improvements in design
and implementation would likely result in lower response and less overall accuracy if this December 31 deadline was not observed.
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ified for entry accuracy at the University of Arkansas
Division of Agriculture. During the first week, the
county offices continued to have difficulties with the
ability to save and submit the application. A second
issue arose about the inability to enter negative numbers into the application. On Friday, November 27,
2004, a “hot fix”91 was implemented to correct these
two major issues. This fix corrected the problem with
entering negative numbers. It helped but did not
completely fix the save/submit problem.
On December 10, 2004, the survey administrator’s
report, which allowed Connie Holman to view the
saved and submitted survey applications for each
state, began to report faulty numbers. A number of
the completed surveys were listed on the report as
saved, but had actually been submitted into the database as final entries by the county offices. This
impaired the ability of the administrator (Ms.
Holman) to monitor successful completion of the
survey. Nonetheless, a total of 2,767 responses were
collected during the period of November 22, 2004,
through December 17, 2004. After verification of the
“faxed surveys”, an additional 10 surveys that were
faxed were added to the database resulting in a final
count of 2,777 surveys received. The final data download from DLPESA was received by the Arkansas
research team on December 21, 2004.
2.A.4. Data Cleaning
The final survey data set transmitted from FSA in
Washington D.C. contained 2,76792 observations,
which corresponded to the same number of responses. Thirteen observations were found to have cells
that did not meet the variable criteria. It was not
possible to determine which cells the entries corresponded to so these observations were designated as
unusable. These observations are believed to have

been the result of the malfunctioning save/submit
button. One additional observation had an assistance
code for an Indian land acquisition, which does not
meet the direct loan criteria for this study. This was
considered a wrong entry made by the FLM filling
out the survey and the observation was deleted.
Another 48 observations were removed from the data
set because they had either application or farm and
home plan dates that did not fall within the applicable FY 1994–1996 date range, which implied either a
data entry error or the use of forms not relevant to
the loan that had been originated within the FY
1994–1996 window. These procedures resulted in 62
observations being deleted from the original survey
data set for a total of 2,715 usable responses.
Even though a survey instrument was accepted as
usable, it did not mean all the observations on all
variables were accepted as usable. Observations on
variables that were not in the criteria range for a
given question were set to missing. These outliers can
be explained by either data entry error or misinterpretation of the survey question. Since it is likely that
the respondent had a data entry error on only some
of the survey questions, the responses to the other
questions were kept while the entry in question was
set to missing.
Upon close inspection and use of simple descriptive
statistics93 on each variable, several data anomalies
were discovered. The two variables debt-to-asset
ratio (question 64 on the survey) and the current
ratio (question 65 on the survey) were found to have
outliers in the data set. If the reported current ratio
was greater than 1,000 or the debt-to-asset ratio was
greater than 500, the observations on those variables
were set to missing. Then, if both the debt-to-asset
and current ratios for an observation were greater

91 A ‘hot fix” is a term used by DPLESA that means the team provided a quick fix to the problem and put the application back on line
without field testing.
92 This number includes only the surveys that were transmitted electronically. It does not reflect the additional ten faxed surveys that
were manually entered.
93 Descriptive statistics used include means, standard deviations, minimum, and maximum values.
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than 10, the variables were divided by 100.
Otherwise, the variables were set to missing. The
observations for the ratios in questions 64 and 65 did
not necessarily come directly off a Farm and Home
Plan. Since the ratios did not necessarily come from
a defined source, they are subject to error and larger
variation. If the years of farm operation experience
exceeded the age of the applicant, years of farm operation experience was set to missing.
The final total number of remaining usable observations is 2,715, which is equivalent to a response rate
of 90 percent. Based on the experience of the

University of Arkansas research team, this is an
unusually high response rate. This is a tribute to the
various personnel at FSA who adapted the survey
instrument to the computer and made the application user-friendly as well as those personnel who
assisted in the administration of the survey.
Certainly, a key factor in the success of the survey was
the prompting of state offices by FSA National office
in Washington D.C. and, subsequently, State offices
prompting field offices to encourage field participation. Obviously, the participation and dedication of
the FLMs and their staffs were greatly appreciated by
the research team.
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Appendix 2.B. Survey Instrument and Drop Down Codes
2.B.1. The Survey Instrument
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Appendix Table 2.B.2. Alternatives in survey drop down boxes
Question

Value

Loan #
Case #
Loan date
Loan amount
Assistance type

Text
Text
Date
Numeric

File accessible

0
1
2
0
1
2
3
Text
Numeric
Numeric
Numeric
Numeric
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
0
1
2
3
0
1
2
3
0

File status ID

Which county
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5

Q6

Q7

Q7a

Q8

132

Description

MM/DD/YYYY
See assistance ID and code in
appendix table 2.B.3.
Select
Yes
No
Select
In state office
Destroyed
Changed counties

Select
Married
Separated
Unmarried
Unknown
Select
Yes
No
Unknown
Select
Yes
No
Unknown
Select
Yes
No
Unknown
Select
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Appendix Table 2.B.2. Continued.
Question
Q55a
Q56

Q56a
Q56b
Q57

Q57a
Q57b
Q58-60
Q61

Q62
Q63
Q63a
Q64
Q64a
Q65
Q65a
Q66-69
Q70
Q71

Value
Date
0
1
2
3
Date
Numeric
0
1
2
3
Date
Numeric
Numeric
0
1
2
3
Numeric
Numeric
Date
Numeric
Date
Numeric
Date
Numeric
Date
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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Description
MM/YYYY
Select
Yes
No
Unknown
MM/YYYY
Select
Yes
No
Unknown
MM/YYYY

Select
Yes
No
Unknown

MM/YYYY
MM/YYYY
MM/YYYY
MM/YYYY
Select
Continued farming and graduated to
FSA guaranteed credit sources
Continued farming and graduated to
conventional non-FSA credit sources
Continued farming and no longer
needed credit
Left farming involuntarily (other than
retirement)
Retired from farming
Left farming involuntarily (other than
death)
Death
Unknown

Farm Service Agency Direct Farm Loan Program Effectiveness Study

Appendix Table 2.B.3. Assistance ID and codes for FY 1994 – 1996 FSA loans
Codes
Assistance ID
30
31
34
35
36
37
38
40
42
43
44
47
50
51
56
60
92
102
104
105
106
109
110
112
117
119
124
125
126
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

FO-FE-Limited Resource-SDA-Ethnic
FO-FE-Regular-SDA-Ethnic
FO-FE-Limited Resource
FO-NFE-Limited Resource
FO-FE-Regular
FO-NFE-Regular
Soil and Water
Grazing Land - Association
Indian Land - Acquisition
Indian Land - Acquisition - Limited Resource
FO-NFE-Regular-SDA-Ethnic
OL-Limited Resource-Delinquent Borrower
OL-Limited Resource-7 Year
OL-Regular (Except Youth) -7 Year
EM-Actual Loss-Real Estate Purposes
EM-Citrus Grove-Rehabilitation/Reestablishment
EM-Actual Loss-Operating Purpose
OL-Limited Resource-Delinquent Borrower-SDA
OL-Regular (Except Youth)-1 Year-SDA
OL-Limited Resource-7 Year-SDA
OL-Regular(Except Youth)-7 Year-SDA
Soil and Water-Limited Resource
Farm Ownership Credit Sale
OL-Regular (Except Youth)-1 Year
OL-Limited Resource-1 Year
OL-Limited Resource-1 Year-SDA
FO-FE-Regular-SDA-Gender
FO-FE-Limited Resource-SDA-Gender
FO-NFE-Regular-SDA-Gender
FO-FE-Beginning Farmer-Down Payment
FO-FE-Beginning Farmer-Down Payment-SDA-Ethnic
FO-FE-Beginning Farmer-Down Payment-SDA-Gender
FO-FE-Beginning Farmer-Regular
FO-FE-Beginning Farmer-Limited Resource
FO-FE-Beginning Farmer-SDA-Ethnic
FO-FE-Beginning Farmer-SDA-Gender
FO-FE-Beginning Farmer-Limited Resource-SDA-Ethnic
FO-FE-Beginning Farmer-Limited Resource-SDA-Gender
OL-Beginning Farmer-Regular-1 Year
OL-Beginning Farmer-Regular-1 Year-SDA
OL-Beginning Farmer-Regular-7 Year
OL-Beginning Farmer-Regular-7 Year-SDA
OL-Beginning Farmer-Regular-Special Assistance-1 Year
OL-Beginning Farmer-Regular-Special Assistance-1 Year-SDA
OL-Beginning Farmer-Regular-Special Assistance-7 Year
OL-Beginning Farmer-Regular-Special Assistance-7 Year-SDA
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Appendix Table
Assistance ID
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224

2.B.3. Continued.
Codes
OL-Beginning Farmer-Limited
OL-Beginning Farmer-Limited
OL-Beginning Farmer-Limited
OL-Beginning Farmer-Limited
OL-Beginning Farmer-Limited
OL-Beginning Farmer-Limited
OL-Beginning Farmer-Limited
OL-Beginning Farmer-Limited
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Resource-1 Year
Resource-1 Year-SDA
Resource-7 Year
Resource-7 Year-SDA
Resource-Special Assistance-1
Resource-Special Assistance-1
Resource-Special Assistance-7
Resource-Special Assistance-7

Year
Year-SDA
Year
Year-SDA

Farm Service Agency
Direct Farm Loan Program
Effectiveness Study
40

35

Percent Eligible

30

25
All Farms

All SDAs

20

SDA Ethnic

15

Female

African American/Black

10
Hispanic/Latino

5

0
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